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Introduction
2 INTRODUCTION
0.1 Energy Transition and Residential Consumers
The transition to a green, CO2 neutral, renewable and sustainable society is one
of the key challenges of the 21st century. In 2017, the temperature of our planet
increased by 1.1◦C since the pre-industrial era and 2013-2017 were the ﬁve warmest
years on record, so far. This warming of the planet has had far-reaching consequences
across the globe; from severe storms and ﬂooding to deadly droughts and wildﬁres
which have had major economic impacts on human life. Human inﬂuence is the main
driver behind the increasing global and regional temperatures (World Meteorological
Organization, 2018).
In order to combat increasing temperatures, governments across the world have set
targets to reduce our impact on the planet. The European Union has set objectives
to be achieved by certain dates. The EU as a whole is on track to meet its 2020
objectives of a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compared to
1990 levels, a 20% share of renewable energy in the production mix, and a 20%
improvement in energy eﬃciency2. By 2030, the EU will further its energy strategy
by aiming to reduce GHG emissions by 40%, to have a share of at least 27% of
renewable energy sources (RES) in the production mix, and to achieve energy savings
of at least 25% across all sectors (industry, commercial, transport, residential)3.
Concerning GHG emissions, the EU met its 2020 target in 2014, and estimates in
2016 suggest that GHG emissions in the EU are 23% below 1990 levels. However, the
EU is currently falling short of its 2030 trajectory (European Environment Agency,
2017c). Similarly, France is on target to meet its 2020 GHG emissions target, how-
ever, the rate of reduction in emissions is due to slow down, and France is unlikely
to reach the 2030 target (European Environment Agency, 2017d).
Concerning renewable energy, the EU is on track to meet its 2020 objective however,
growth in the share of RES is slowing, making the 2030 target diﬃcult to reach
(European Environment Agency, 2017b). In order to meet the EU's renewable
energy target, France has committed to achieving a 23% share of RES by 2020.
However, in 2016, France's RES share was at 15.6%, and at the current rate of
progress, France will meet its 2020 objective in 20294.
2See https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2020_en
3See https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2030_en
4This is calculated based on the share of renewable energy in France reported by the European
Commission (see
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/
eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester_en)
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Concerning energy savings, in 2014, in the EU-28, residential energy consumption
represented the third highest consuming sector with 25% of ﬁnal energy consump-
tion. Between 2005 and 2014, ﬁnal energy consumption in the household sector
fell by 14.8% (European Environment Agency, 2017a). However, in France, res-
idential electricity consumption is the highest consuming sector representing 36%
of ﬁnal electricity consumption, and between 2001 and 2017, residential electric-
ity consumption in France increased by 12%, remaining relatively stable from 2011
(Réseau de Transport d'Electricité, 2018). In 2014, France needed to reduce its ﬁnal
energy consumption (all sectors combined) by a further 7.5% in order to meet its
2020 target (European Environment Agency, 2017a).
Given that residential consumption is the highest consuming sector and that France
is on track to meet only one of the EU 2020 targets within the next year (European
Environment Agency, 2017d), there is clear potential for lowering consumption in
the residential sector in France in order to achieve the national and European energy
transition objectives.
A way of reducing GHG emissions is to move away from the use of high cost,
ineﬃcient, polluting generators. These generators are typically used during peak
periods when demand is particularly high. In 2008 in France, just 6% of peak
capacity was used during 1% of hours (Faruqui et al., 2010a). Increasing the share
of RES, which is intermittent by nature, means that there will be electricity available
at certain periods of the day and of the year when the sun is shining and when the
wind is blowing. Both of these imply a change in the traditional functioning of
the electricity market so that demand follows supply rather than supply following
demand (Strbac, 2008).
In the future, the increasing integration of electricity produced from RES will be
stored for use during peak periods. Consumers will charge their electric vehicles
at times when electricity is in plentiful supply and is cheaper, to then be used at
times when supply is constrained, and high demand means high prices. Currently,
capabilities for storing electricity are limited and expensive (Stephens et al., 2015)
and so other methods of encouraging demand to follow supply are needed.
In the absence of electricity storage, Demand Side Management (DSM) is a method
for redistributing loads from peak to oﬀ-peak periods. In the residential sector,
consumers can be encouraged to lower their consumption during peak periods to
avoid connecting ineﬃcient generators to the grid. They can also be encouraged
to increase their consumption during oﬀ-peak periods when there is a supply of
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renewable energy available. DSM in the residential sector requires that consumers'
demand be ﬂexible and that consumers respond to incentives used to modify their
behaviour. Signiﬁcant savings, both monetary and environmental, can be achieved
if households are successfully incentivised to lower their peak demand.
While peak demand reduction is important for achieving the objectives of reduced
emissions and for the integration of RES, it does not necessarily result in a reduction
in overall demand which is necessary to meet the EU's third objective of energy
savings. The eﬀect on overall demand will depend on whether there are spillovers
from the use of incentives to lower peak demand, on the demand during other periods
(Allcott, 2011a), or by how much consumers increase their demand during oﬀ-peak
periods after being incentivised to decrease their peak demand (Torriti, 2012).
A reduction in overall demand refers to a decrease in total energy consumption at
any time of day or year. While such reductions can made be through improvements
in energy eﬃciency (Nearly Zero Energy Building standards, retroﬁtting of older
buildings, and use of energy eﬃcient appliances), occupant behaviour is an impor-
tant factor in reducing residential energy consumption. Building characteristics can
account for 42% of a building's energy use whereas occupant characteristics and be-
haviour can account for 4.2% (Santin et al., 2009). Though this may not seem like
a large proportion, Gram-Hanssen (2013) ﬁnd that the electricity consumption of
households living in similar houses (according to building characteristics) can vary
by a factor of 5 and the heating consumption can vary by a factor of 2-3. Ad-
ditionally, there is an energy-eﬃciency gap where realised eﬃciency gains are less
than predicted gains. This is partly due to behavioural barriers (Hirst and Brown,
1990) and partly due to rebound eﬀects when consumption increases following an
improvement in energy eﬃciency (Greening et al., 2000). Given the variation in
energy consumption and the increase in consumption after eﬃciency gains, there
is a need to inﬂuence consumer behaviour and to encourage consumers to reduce
their energy consumption. In the traditional electricity market in which consumers
are passive and are unaware of their consumption, inﬂuencing behaviour is a signif-
icant challenge. However, the introduction of smart meters in the residential sector
is an important technological advancement that allows for the implementation of
incentives to encourage households to lower their energy consumption.
The European Commission (2014a, p.8) has stated that "in sectors such as housing
[...] there will be a need for a signiﬁcant acceleration of current eﬀorts to tap the
signiﬁcant unexploited potential. This will require large investments in the building
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sector (that lead to lower running costs), framework conditions and information that
encourage consumers to take up innovative products and services and appropriate
ﬁnancial instruments to ensure that all energy consumers beneﬁt from the resulting
changes." Across the EU, Member States have invested in the installation of smart
meters in residential homes. Figure 1 shows the deployment strategies of the Member
States by 2020. Faruqui et al. (2010a) estimate that the deployment of smart meters
in the EU will cost 51 billion euros and that the operational beneﬁts5 will recuperate
26-41 billion euros. The missing 10-25 billion euro investment in smart metering
technology can be recovered through a reduction of residential energy demand, in
particular during peak periods. Smart meters are key technological advancement
for an electricity market in which consumers take a more active role in in energy
consumption management but they alone are not suﬃcient to encourage consumers
to lower their demand. To motivate a behavioural change, consumers need to be
appropriately incentivised.
0.2 Technologies and Incentives
Through the use of smart meters, diﬀerent incentives can be delivered to consumers
based on accurate consumption measurements. Incentives which target overall de-
mand reduction are traditionally information based (Darby et al., 2006) - infor-
mation on historic consumption or real-time feedback - or, more recently, based
on insights from behavioural economics (Allcott, 2011b). Smart meters facilitate
the use of ﬁnancial incentives such as dynamic pricing which is used to encourage
lower peak demand (Faruqui and Sergici, 2013). The following sections provide an
overview of the literature on these diﬀerent incentives.
0.2.1 Feedback
One of the main advantages of smart meters is the ability to communicate real-
time consumption data to consumers. By providing households with information on
their energy consumption, households will be made more aware of their consump-
tion habits and will make eﬀorts to lower their consumption. Increasing households'
awareness of their energy consumption is the ﬁrst step towards changing consump-
5Operational beneﬁts include: remote meter reading, quicker detection of power outages, and
fraud detection, among others.
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Figure 1: Smart meter deployment strategies across the EU-27 by 2020 as of July
2013, (European Commission, 2014b)6
tion habits (Attari et al., 2010).
Paper bills are the method of feedback traditionally used to inform consumers of
their energy consumption and expenditure. Darby et al. (2006) highlight that such
feedback is useful for assessing the impact on consumption of investments in energy
eﬃciency, as opposed to behavioural changes. Such information does not provide
6The map displays the results of Member States' cost-beneﬁt analyses (CBA), either positive,
negative, unavailable or inconclusive, and the state of smart meter (SM) deployment. As of 2013,
countries in solid green have oﬃcially begun installation of SM, those in shaded green are planning
to install SM after an oﬃcial decision has been taken, those in red have decided against SM
installation after a negative or inconclusive CBA, those in solid orange have not yet made a decision,
and those in shaded orange have begun a selective installation. For example, in Germany SM
installation is limited to new or renovated houses, to prosumers and high-consumption households
(Edelmann and Kästner, 2013).
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appropriate feedback on eﬀorts to lower energy consumption as the data is received
long after the behavioural change. For feedback to have an eﬀect, the relationship
between action and eﬀect needs to be clear to households so that they can see how
behavioural changes aﬀect energy consumption (Fischer, 2008).
In order for consumers to truly beneﬁt from the consumption information provided
by the smart meter, they must be able to access the information soon after imple-
menting a behavioural change. Data that is available online provides a greater depth
of information on consumption levels and can potentially close the action and eﬀect
gap, but it requires that consumers have a computer with an internet connection,
and that they log on to access the data. Studies of such feedback and its eﬀect on
energy consumption ﬁnd that few people log on to the online portals and the num-
ber of connections decreases during the course of the study (Benders et al., 2006,
Vassileva et al., 2012, Schleich et al., 2013).
To further close the action-eﬀect gap, households can use a device capable of in-
terfacing with their smart meter which can provide them with real-time, accessible
consumption information. These devices are commonly known as energy monitors,
real-time monitors or in-home displays (IHD). They are dedicated platforms which
provide real-time consumption data thus providing a direct link between action and
eﬀect. The use of IHDs can encourage a reduction in consumption so long as they
are kept in visible locations in the home for easy and quick access to the data
available, however this is not always the case and the novelty factor of consulting
one's consumption in real-time tends to wear oﬀ (Hargreaves et al., 2010, 2013).
In order to engage households with the data provided, attention needs to be given
to how data is presented, whether in monetary or energy terms (Buchanan et al.,
2014), whether numerical or graphical displays are used (Chiang et al., 2012), or
whether amount spent on consumption is displayed factually, or presented as a loss
(Bager and Mundaca, 2017). Such presentations and their eﬀect on eﬀort are further
explored in Chapter 4.
0.2.2 Dynamic Pricing
Dynamic pricing refers to the adjustment of retail electricity prices to better reﬂect
wholesale costs of energy production. During times of peak demand, production
costs are higher leading to higher retail prices which incentivise households to lower
their demand during peak periods, and in some cases, to increase their demand
during oﬀ-peak periods, in order to maintain supply and demand balance (Faruqui
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et al., 2009). There are diﬀerent tariﬀ structures which are more or less dynamic,
from time-variant, but static, time-of-use (TOU) pricing to dynamic real-time pric-
ing (RTP). These diﬀerent pricing programmes diﬀer by degree of risk and possible
reward (Faruqui and Palmer, 2011). A ﬂat-rate tariﬀ in which prices are ﬁxed no
matter the time of consumption is `risk-free' as all kWh are consumed at the same
price. A TOU tariﬀ has a slightly greater associated risk but the risk remains
much lower than that of critical peak pricing (CPP) or RTP. Figure 2 shows the
risk-reward trade-oﬀ of dynamic pricing tariﬀs where risk refers to the exposure of
consumers to volatile wholesale electricity market prices (Faruqui, 2012).
Figure 2: Risk-reward trade-oﬀ in dynamic pricing rates (adapted from Faruqui
(2012, p.17))
Dynamic pricing tariﬀs are eﬀective at reducing energy consumption, particularly
CPP and RTP tariﬀs when combined with energy monitors (Faruqui and Sergici,
2013). Indeed, in order for households to successfully respond to dynamic pricing,
consumers require an IHD device to inform them of the changing prices (Dütschke
and Paetz, 2013), particularly in the case of RTP. However, opponents of dynamic
pricing argue that residential consumers should not be asked to support the volatil-
ity of electricity prices, particularly consumers who are vulnerable to changes in
electricity supply (young children, the elderly, disabled people) (Alexander, 2010),
and that the peaks of demand are natural peaks due to the organisation of daily life
which are diﬃcult to shift (Naus et al., 2014, Hall et al., 2016).
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0.2.3 Nudging
The installation of smart meters and IHDs is not suﬃcient to engage consumers in
behavioural change. The majority of households show a lack of interest in IHDs and
it is often only those who are already concerned by their energy consumption who pay
attention to their IHD (Buchanan et al., 2015). Increasing retail electricity prices to
better match wholesale prices tends only to have an impact on those consumers who
are fully informed and attentive to the price changes (Jessoe et al., 2016). Given
this, there has been an increase in the use of tools from behavioural economics
to increase consumer response to incentives. Such incentives are coined `nudges'
and are predominately based upon the work of Nobel prize winners Richard Thaler
(2017), and Daniel Kahneman (2002).
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) deﬁne a nudge as follows:
"A nudge [...] is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behavio[u]r
in a predictable way without forbidding any options or signiﬁcantly changing their
economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and
cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates."
Nudging is based on the idea of libertarian paternalism which is an approach that
steers individuals towards choices which are in their best interest and will increase
their welfare without limiting their freedom to choose. It recognises that individuals
make choices which are not in their best interest, choices which they would not make
if they had complete information and unlimited cognitive capabilities (Thaler and
Sunstein, 2003).
Households have been nudged to lower their energy consumption via the use of
social and injunctive norms. Social norms are a type of feedback which compares
a household's energy consumption to the consumption of their neighbours' (Schultz
et al., 2007, Nolan et al., 2008). Injunctive norms add social approval of a household's
consumption in relation to that of their neighbours' (Schultz et al., 2007). For
example, Opower7 put this into practice with their Home Energy Reports (HER).
These are paper bills which include a comparison of one's own consumption to the
average consumption of neighbouring households along with a smiley face (injunctive
norm) if you are consuming less than your neighbours (Allcott, 2011b). Figure 3
provides an example of the use of social and injunctive norms in an Opower HER.
7Opower was an American company which provided software for utilities to use to analyse
consumption data in order to encourage demand reduction. The company was acquired by Oracle
Corporation in 2016.
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Figure 3: A Home Energy Report from Opower
In the absence of injunctive norms, i.e.: only descriptive comparisons of consump-
tion, households who are consuming less than the average, tend to increase their
consumption. Schultz et al. (2007) suggest that the use of a descriptive social norm
provides a level from which it is undesirable to deviate. This level becomes the
normal level of behaviour and so, being above or below is unwanted. This leads
to a convergence towards the average which Schultz et al. call a boomerang eﬀect.
Such behaviour can also be described by a licensing eﬀect when engagement in a
good deed, lowering consumption, licenses an individual to subsequently engage in a
bad deed, increasing consumption (Khan and Dhar, 2006). The inclusion of smiley
faces is used to counteract these eﬀects by providing social approval of desirable
behaviour: lowering consumption.
If such relatively costless nudges are eﬀective at reducing energy consumption, then
they may be used as an alternative to costlier incentives such as dynamic pricing.
Before such a step is taken, the eﬀect of nudges and pricing should be explored in
order to determine the monetary value of such nudge (see Chapter 3).
0.3 Outline of the Thesis
Smart meters are being introduced to households to embolden consumers to take
active roles in their energy management, and in turn, to help meet national and
European climate change objectives. Currently France is not on target to meet all
of its objectives within the next year. Furthermore, there are both advantages and
disadvantages to the incentives used to encourage households to lower their demand
as highlighted in the previous section. The central question of this thesis is thus:
How do residential consumers respond to incentives used to encourage
them to lower their consumption?
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This question is addressed in four chapters, a preview of each is given below.
0.3.1 Chapter 1
The ﬁrst chapter of this thesis provides a review of the existing literature which has
explored how residential consumers interact with and use the incentives described
in section 0.2 to lower their consumption, either peak or overall. The objective
of the ﬁrst chapter is to identify any issues that aﬀect the successfulness of the
diﬀerent incentives at encouraging households to lower their consumption. Diﬀerent
barriers to the acceptance and the adoption of smart meters, IHDs and the incentives
delivered by them are identiﬁed.
The objective of chapter 1 is to analyse the potential of smart meters to encourage
residential consumers to lower their consumption through the use of ﬁnancial and
non-ﬁnancial incentives.
The research question of this chapter is: What are the main barriers to the
acceptance and adoption of smart meters and the incentives they can
deliver?
The literature is organised into two main types of barriers: barriers to acceptance
and to adoption, as these are two key obstacles to be overcome if households are
to be incentivised to lower their consumption. Acceptance is the ﬁrst obstacle as
households must initially be willing to accept the installation of smart meters in
their homes, and the provision of feedback on their consumption, whether it be by
continued paper bills, through online portals or IHDs. The installation of smart
meters paves the way for the use of dynamic pricing which is predominately im-
plemented on an opt-in basis. After accepting smart meters and the associated
incentives, the next obstacle to overcome is adoption. The installation of a smart
meter, the presence of an IHD, and the changing of prices is not suﬃcient alone for
households to lower their consumption. They must make use of and engage with
these diﬀerent incentives.
The extensive literature highlights that the main barrier to the acceptance of smart
meters is that households do not trust energy companies, that they are unsure of
what smart meters are and how they can be used to beneﬁt consumers. Concerning
dynamic pricing, households ﬁnd the tariﬀs to be complex and so few opt-in into
dynamic pricing preferring to remain on the simpler, risk-free ﬂat-rate tariﬀ. With
regard to households' adoption of smart meters and incentives, the ﬁndings of the
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literature suggest that any eﬀects on consumption are typically short-lived. House-
holds tend to engage with feedback initially, but their interest wanes after a few
weeks or months. Furthermore, households are constrained to respond to feedback
within their personal comfort levels on which they are not willing to compromise,
and by the inﬂexibilities of daily life. In addition, the monetary savings resulting
from lowering their consumption are rarely suﬃciently high to encourage persistent
behavioural changes.
The contribution of this chapter is a recent review of the experimental literature in
order to identify the obstacles to using smart meters and associated incentives as a
means to encourage households to lower their consumption.
0.3.2 Chapter 2
Given the wealth of ﬁeld experiments and pilot studies exploring how consumers
respond to incentives (alone or in combination, across many diﬀerent countries, and
under many diﬀerent experimental designs) and the increasing attention given to
behavioural incentives such as nudging in recent years, the second chapter uses a
meta-analytic approach to analyse the results of contemporary experimental studies
which have explored the eﬀect of incentives on residential energy consumption.
The objective of chapter 2 is to quantitatively analyse the existing experimental
literature to obtain precise estimates of the eﬀect of diﬀerent incentives on residential
consumption.
The research questions addressed in the second chapter are: Which incentives
are most eﬀective at encouraging households to lower their energy con-
sumption? How does the design of the experimental study impact the
eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent incentives at lowering residential energy con-
sumption?
Meta-analysis is the practice of combining the results of many studies which explore
a same objective (the eﬀect of incentives on residential energy consumption) in
order to obtain a more precise estimate of the true eﬀect. The idea is that the
combination of many estimates of an eﬀect size leads to a better estimate of the
true eﬀect (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012).
The focus for this chapter is studies conducted around the time of the "Smart Grid
Era" (McKerracher and Torriti, 2013). The data collection is limited to this period in
order to avoid distorting estimated eﬀect sizes by using studies from previous decades
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when greater eﬀects of incentives on energy consumption were found (Ehrhardt-
Martinez et al., 2010). In the past, greater eﬀect sizes were found due to diﬀerent
levels of consumer knowledge of energy consumption, and due to available technology
and feedback methods. In recent years there have been more studies which have used
incentives based on behavioural economic theory. In this chapter, such behavioural
incentives are separated into those which provide only a social norm or descriptive
comparison, and those which also include an injunctive norm. This is in order to
determine whether there is a diﬀerence in eﬀect size due to boomerang or licensing
eﬀects (Schultz et al., 2007). In addition, the meta-analysis seeks to provide a better
estimate of the true eﬀect size of diﬀerent incentives by including results not only
from peer reviewed journals but also from government and utility reports. This is
in order to avoid the "ﬁle drawer problem" (Rosenthal, 1979).
Results show that accounting for the sample size of the original study mitigates
publication bias in the sample. Thus, accounting for sample size, on average, a
study testing the eﬀect of an incentive on residential energy consumption will expect
to ﬁnd a 2% decrease in consumption. This is a much lower eﬀect than estimated
in previous meta-analyses. Providing households with feedback on their energy
consumption in real-time or in monetary terms has the greatest eﬀect: respectively,
a 2.89% and 2.86% reduction in consumption. Eﬀect sizes are aﬀected by study
design choices such as how participants are recruited into the study. Studies in
which participants choose to take part ﬁnd greater reduction eﬀects of incentives on
energy consumption which suggests that a national roll-out of a particular incentive
is likely to be less eﬀective than ﬁeld experiments and pilot studies have shown.
This is of particular importance to policy makers.
This chapter contributes to the ﬁeld of research by providing an up-to-date analysis
of the eﬀects of diﬀerent incentives on residential energy consumption. In particular,
this meta-analysis focuses on recent studies, and includes a greater number of ex-
periments using behavioural incentives. It reduces the problem of publication bias,
often rife in meta-analyses, and ﬁnally it takes additional study design features into
consideration compared to previous meta studies.
0.3.3 Chapter 3
Highlighted in chapters 1 and 2, is the idea that dynamic pricing can be politically
diﬃcult to implement (Alexander, 2010), and that consumers ﬁnd the tariﬀs diﬃcult
to understand (Layer et al., 2017, Schlereth et al., 2018). Additionally, nudges in the
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form of social comparisons, both with and without injunctive norms, are eﬀective
at lowering consumption but can have the undesired licensing or boomerang eﬀect
where households who consume less than the average of their neighbours feel that
they can increase their consumption (Schultz et al., 2007, Allcott, 2011b). In the
third chapter, each of these incentives are explored in a laboratory environment in
order compare their respective advantages and disadvantages in a controlled setting.
The objective of chapter 3 is to compare how individuals respond to a behavioural
incentive and a ﬁnancial incentive in a stylised energy consumption game.
The research questions asked in this chapter are: Which incentives are more
likely to increase socially optimal behaviour? What is the "price" of the
nudge?
Chapter 3 describes an experiment based upon a common pool resource game applied
to the context of residential energy consumption. Ostrom (1990) describes a common
pool resource as a resource system from which a ﬂow of resources can be extracted.
The stock of resources is renewable and can be maintained so long as the amount
being extracted does not exceed the rate of renewal. Collectively, it is best if everyone
does not exceed their share of the renewable amount of the resource, however, each
individual would like to extract more. Previous research has discussed how this
framework can be applied to energy infrastructure (Bäckman, 2011, Goldthau, 2014,
Gollwitzer et al., 2018). This framework is applied to residential energy consumption
during a period of peak demand where maximum capacity is being used. Each
household would like to consume as they see ﬁt, however, it would be beneﬁcial for
everyone if all households made an eﬀort to lower their consumption in order to
avoid reductions in tension, brownouts and blackouts.
The results of the experiment show that both the use of a nudge and a price encour-
age individuals to behave in a more socially optimal manner, i.e.: reducing their
consumption, than if there were no incentives. The nudge is understood quickly by
individuals and has an immediate eﬀect on consumption in the second period of the
game after feedback is ﬁrst received. The price takes longer to have an eﬀect, and it
is not until the fourth period of play that individuals integrate the price into their
decision making. The hypothesis behind the nudge is that individuals who are not
behaving optimally, i.e.: over-consuming, will be encouraged to do so after receiving
the nudge, however, the results show that these individuals do not respond to the
nudge and continue to over-consume. This ﬁnding is of particular importance as it
highlights a potential drawback of nudge methods.
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The contribution of this chapter is the application of the common pool resource
framework to the electricity market within a laboratory experiment. A monetary
evaluation is made for the nudge by setting a price which incentivises individuals to
consume the amount observed under the nudge and seeing whether this price level
successfully encourages the same level of consumption.
0.3.4 Chapter 4
Chapter 1 identiﬁes that households do not necessarily engage with the informa-
tion provided by their IHD: when the information is displayed in energy units it is
incomprehensible (Raw and Ross, 2011, Buchanan et al., 2014), when it is in mone-
tary units, the potential savings are too small. Households feel that any eﬀort they
make to lower their energy consumption is not worth it as it only has a small eﬀect
of consumption and on monetary savings (Hargreaves et al., 2010, 2013, Goulden
et al., 2014). Given the identiﬁcation of these barriers, the ﬁnal chapter explores
how incentives can be framed to encourage greater eﬀort when individuals are asked
to make small eﬀorts, for small rewards akin to eﬀorts to lower consumption.
The objective of chapter 4 is to explore the framing of incentives used to encourage
small eﬀorts when the rewards are small.
The ﬁnal research question is: How can information (on IHDs) be framed to
incentivise eﬀort provision?
Chapter 4 looks at how information can be framed to encourage individuals to
make a small eﬀort when the rewards are small. In the experiment, individuals
are incentivised to make an eﬀort to complete an artiﬁcial, real-eﬀort task over a
number of periods by diﬀerent ways of framing their payoﬀs - gain or loss framing,
and by slight changes in the payoﬀ structure - whether payoﬀs are risk-free or risky.
The experiment builds on ﬁndings from Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979) which postulates that individuals make more eﬀort when payoﬀs are framed
as a loss (in particular when losses are risky), than when they are framed as a gain.
In the case of small rewards for small eﬀorts, the present experiment ﬁnds no sig-
niﬁcant treatment eﬀects of gain or loss framing. On average, individuals provide
the same level of eﬀort whatever the frame. However, individuals will provide more
eﬀort when payoﬀs are relatively higher under both framing types. This suggests
that when rewards are small, as in the case of actions to lower energy consumption,
individuals are equally incentivised to make an eﬀort under both gain and loss fram-
16 INTRODUCTION
ing. Increasing the size of the rewards associated to an action is key to encouraging
individuals to make an eﬀort.
This chapter contributes to the literature on gain and loss framing by looking at how
Prospect Theory applies in a situation where individuals must make small eﬀorts
for small rewards, and by including an element of risk in the payoﬀ structure.
Finally, the thesis concludes with an overview of the four chapters and their ﬁndings
in relation to the central research question. The limitations of the research and
its implications for policy makers, practitioners, and theorists are considered. The
thesis ends with a discussion of avenues for further research.
Chapter 1
Barriers to Acceptance and Adoption
of Smart Meters and Incentives to
Lower Residential Energy
Consumption
This work received funding from Innovacs8.
8See http://innovacs.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/
Abstract
Qualitative studies which explore consumer acceptance and use of
smart meters and incentives are reviewed in order to identify barriers
to their use for encouraging consumers to lower their energy consump-
tion and to engage in demand response. Consumers do not trust energy
companies to act in their best interests and are wary of data misuse and
automation of their consumption. They are uncertain of what smart me-
ters and incentives such as dynamic pricing are and can do, and they
perceive electricity contracts to be complex. While ﬁnancial reasons are a
signiﬁcant motivating factor, the realised savings are often smaller than
anticipated. Smart meters and devices encourage reductions in energy
consumption in the short-run while they are a novelty, consumers use
them to identify and maintain an acceptable level of consumption which
trades-oﬀ energy savings for comfort, and are reluctant to lower demand
further due to inﬂexibility in daily routines. Finally, recommendations
for overcoming the identiﬁed barriers are given. Notably that a one-size-
ﬁts-all approach may not be appropriate as diﬀerent segments of con-
sumers accept and engage with smart services to diﬀerent degrees.
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1.1 Introduction
The average residential consumer has learnt to be a passive user of electricity. For
this consumer electricity has an invisible quality; it arrives in the household through
hidden wires and is consumed as part of daily life and routine which makes it dif-
ﬁcult for consumers to connect their daily activities to speciﬁc amounts of energy
consumption (Burgess and Nye, 2008, Hargreaves et al., 2010). The majority of
residential consumers have a limited idea of how much they are consuming for dif-
ferent purposes (Darby et al., 2006). They tend to overestimate the energy use of
lighting and other visible, low-energy uses whereas they underestimate the energy
consumption of less visible, high-energy uses (Attari et al., 2010).
To add to this, the majority of residential consumers pay a ﬁxed-rate for their elec-
tricity. Under a ﬂat-rate structure, all consumed kilowatt hours (kWh) are charged
at the same ﬁxed price; the consumer does not diﬀerentiate between a kWh that
is consumed at 7pm to one that is consumed at 4am. Yet these two kWh do not
have the same costs of production. The kWh that are consumed during peak hours
cost signiﬁcantly more to produce and to distribute (Faruqui, 2012). This lack of
transparent pricing gives electricity an unlimited quality from the point of view of
consumers; no matter how much they consume, no matter when they consume it,
the price per kWh remains the same. Additionally, energy consumption is a rela-
tively small part of a household's bills which further heightens the unlimited quality
of electricity.
In reality, electricity is not invisible nor in unlimited supply. Electricity grids across
the world are under pressure to supply enough to meet the growing demands of mod-
ern life. With the electriﬁcation of the home and the domestication of technology,
energy needs have changed and energy networks cannot keep up (Verbong et al.,
2013). This increased demand is putting great strain on generators of electricity
and certain generators are used for only a few hours a year to meet the demand on
high peak days. Across the EU 5-8% of electricity network capacity is used only 1%
of the time (Faruqui et al., 2010a).
Across the world, countries are setting objectives to reduce humankind's impact on
the climate by reducing CO2 emissions, increasing the share of renewable energy
in the production mix, and achieving greater levels of energy savings. Given these
objectives, many countries are investing in the installation of smart meters in res-
idential homes. The impetus behind the smart meter initiatives across the globe
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is that residential consumers will be better informed of their energy consumption
through more detailed feedback, and monetary incentives such as dynamic pric-
ing tariﬀs can be more easily implemented. This use of greater information, and
monetary incentives will help households to lower their consumption, and in turn
environmental and supply objectives will be met.
This transition to a cleaner, sustainable energy system through the use of smart
meters will require residential consumers to take on a more active role in the energy
system. Households will be asked to respond to signals about the price and supply
of electricity. Smart meters are the technological advancement which will help them
to do so and their installation removes a technological barrier to the implementation
of time-variant tariﬀs and to the delivery of real-time consumption information.
However, these environmental objectives can only be achieved through smart meter
installation if consumers are willing to accept smart meters in their homes. Con-
sumers are considered to be central to the success of changes taking place in the
electricity grid, and as such, they are also considered to be one of the greatest bar-
riers to smart meter implementation. Consumers' acceptance of smart meters will
greatly inﬂuence the success of installation (Verbong et al., 2013). Even if consumers
accept the installation of smart meters and the use of diﬀerent incentives, this is
not suﬃcient alone to lower energy demand. A reduction in energy consumption
will only be achieved if consumers engage with the information and incentives pro-
vided and use them to modify their daily energy consuming behaviour (Buchanan
et al., 2015). This ﬁrst chapter discusses the diﬀerent barriers to the acceptance and
adoption of smart meters and incentives by residential consumers, beginning with a
deﬁnition of smart meters and dynamic pricing.
1.1.1 Smart Meters
Smart meters are installed at the end-users' premises in the place of the traditional
meter and allow for two-way communication between suppliers and end-users. Fig-
ure 1.1 gives an example of a smart meter in deployment in France.
On the supply side, the beneﬁts of smart meter installation include better eﬃciency
in electricity production, transmission and distribution, reduced fraud, greater bill
accuracy, electricity outage detection, and integration of micro-generation, among
others (Krishnamurti et al., 2012, Darby, 2016). Faruqui et al. (2010a) estimate
that the return on investment of these supply-side beneﬁts are worth between 26
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and 41 billion euros.
Figure 1.1: Smart meter `Linky' in deployment in France
On the demand side, residential consumers will beneﬁt from remote meter reading,
real-time energy consumption information, and a greater control over one's own
consumption (Carroll et al., 2014, Darby, 2016).
Smart meters correct a market failure of imperfect information as in the traditional
electricity market, consumption data can be inaccurate (Carroll et al., 2014). Con-
sumers receive monthly bills based on an estimate of their consumption calculated by
the energy company with meter readings taking place perhaps quarterly. Smart me-
ters, in combination with an IHD or other enabling technology, allow the collection
of real-time energy consumption data and the communication of this information
to both the utility and the consumer. This gives the consumer more accurate and
more frequent information about their consumption, and thus allows the consumer
to take a more active role in their energy consumption. In addition to a greater depth
of consumption information, diﬀerent incentives can be delivered to consumers via
their smart meter and IHD.
1.1.2 Dynamic Pricing
Smart meters also pave the way for the use of dynamic pricing which requires that
consumers pay diﬀering prices according to the real-time cost of electricity pro-
duction. The logic behind dynamic pricing is to provide consumers with economic
incentives to reduce, or to increase, their demand in order to maintain supply and
demand balance in the electricity market (Borenstein et al., 2002). The dynamic
pricing tariﬀs currently used diﬀer in degree of time-variability:
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Time-of-use pricing
Under Time-of-use (TOU), as depicted in ﬁg. 1.2, the price depends on the time
at which electricity is being consumed. This could be the time of day or the time
of year (Faruqui and Sergici, 2013). Typically TOU tariﬀs consist of two or three
periods; oﬀ-peak and peak, and occasionally the shoulder or mid-peak period which
transitions between the two (Faruqui et al., 2009). The peak hours depend upon
location and daily rhythms. For example, hotter countries have a peak during
summer afternoons when the sun is at its hottest, whereas colder countries have
peaks in the early morning, or later in the evening. Under seasonal TOU tariﬀs,
there will be higher rates in summer for hotter countries when air conditioners are
in greater demand and higher rates in winter for colder countries when heating is
in high demand. This type of tariﬀ is not technically a dynamic tariﬀ as it is ﬁxed
ex-ante and does not depend on real-time electricity demand (Faruqui et al., 2009).
Figure 1.2: Example of a TOU tariﬀ
Critical peak pricing
Critical peak pricing (CPP), shown in ﬁg. 1.3, is an extension of TOU pricing:
prices increase substantially on days where electricity demand soars, known as crit-
ical event days. Such days are when the temperature is particularly low (high) in
cold (hot) countries. On days where there is no critical event, prices either revert to
TOU prices or to ﬂat-rate prices. This tariﬀ is designed to communicate the true,
ﬂuctuating electricity costs to consumers during diﬀerent periods (Faruqui et al.,
2009). Consumers receive a price signal to incentivise them to reduce their con-
sumption during periods when electricity production is reaching maximum capacity.
Customers are notiﬁed of the occurrence of critical events on a day-ahead or day-of
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basis. CPP carries more risk for consumers than TOU pricing as consumers will pay
a much higher price if they cannot shift their demand, however it oﬀers a greater
reward; by shifting their consumption consumers can take advantage of the much
lower priced oﬀ-peak periods (Faruqui and Palmer, 2011).
Figure 1.3: Example of a CPP tariﬀ
Peak-time rebates
During critical events, consumers receive a rebate on their electricity bill if they
reduce their demand below a certain pre-deﬁned and individual level. During non-
critical hours, the consumer faces the standard ﬂat-rate tariﬀ (Wolak, 2011). Faruqui
and Sergici (2013) suggest that this type of tariﬀ may be viewed more favourably
from a political or regulatory point of view as a PTR tariﬀ does not penalise con-
sumers with a much higher price for consumption that they cannot shift. Despite
the demand-side advantages to PTR, Faruqui et al. (2009) argue that if consumers
eﬀectively reduce their consumption as a result of PTR, then the energy companies
will look to increase electricity prices in order to maintain their revenue stream.
Figure 1.4 represents a PTR tariﬀ.
Real-time pricing
Under Real-time pricing (RTP), depicted in ﬁg. 1.5, the electricity price faced by
a consumer changes on a real-time basis, typically on an hourly basis, according
to current demand. The prices are communicated to consumers on a day-ahead or
hour-ahead basis (Faruqui et al., 2009). This pricing programme is the highest risk
of the programmes described in this section, however, it has the highest potential
reward compared to a standard tariﬀ (Faruqui and Palmer, 2011); consumers have
the opportunity to move their consumption to much lower oﬀ-peak prices.
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Figure 1.4: Example of a PTR tariﬀ
Figure 1.5: Example of a RTP tariﬀ
1.2 Barriers to Acceptance
As highlighted above, if smart meters and their associated devices, and monetary
incentives such as dynamic pricing are to result in signiﬁcant and sustainable reduc-
tions in residential energy demand then the household is key; without households'
implication, there will be no reduction in consumption. While neither concepts are
new to the consumer, there is a certain amount of reticence and hesitation concerning
their use in the home.
In today's society, much of an individual's life is tracked, monitored and analysed,
via smartphones, when making credit card payments, whenever one connects to
the internet. Smart meters are another example of such monitoring of daily life,
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yet there is an increasing amount of opposition to their use. Nor are time-variant
tariﬀs a new way of pricing goods and services. Consumers face dynamic pricing
in numerous areas; when buying a plane or a train ticket, when reserving a hotel
or a hire car, when using a toll bridge. Yet, such pricing programmes have low
penetration in the electricity market (Dütschke and Paetz, 2013).
Given that consumers have some level of familiarity with the monitoring of con-
sumption and other activities, and with dynamic pricing, this ﬁrst section looks at
the barriers to households' acceptance of smart meters and dynamic pricing.
1.2.1 Mistrust of Energy Companies' Intentions
With the arrival of smart meters trust issues have once again come to the forefront.
Consumers are wary of energy companies' motives in oﬀering installation of smart
meters and energy monitors as previous bad experience with their energy provider
leads consumers to question the energy companies' motives in providing smart me-
tering technology (Hall et al., 2016). They feel that the energy companies may not
oﬀer a smart meter package that is in the interest of the household, but one that
serves the energy companies' interest (Kaufmann et al., 2013). Consumers who feel
that energy companies beneﬁt most from the use of smart meters are less positive
about their installation in their homes (Krishnamurti et al., 2012). Furthermore,
householders doubt whether the energy companies will pass on the monetary savings
to customers as they feel that the energy companies will maintain their proﬁt mar-
gins (Spence et al., 2014). As participants (n=72) in Goulden et al. (2014) suggest,
energy companies' proﬁts increase as consumers use more energy.
In interviews with relevant Dutch stakeholders9 (n=37), Verbong et al. (2013) ﬁnd
that interviewees expressed ambiguity as to whether smart meters are in the interest
of end-users. The stakeholders emphasised that while there are advantages for con-
sumers, energy companies have their own motivations and it is unclear as to whose
interests are better served.
Stenner et al. (2017) conduct a survey (n=1499) to explore the eﬀect of trust on
Australian households' willingness to participate in direct load control. The authors
ﬁnd that households' level of trust in their energy supplier greatly aﬀects their
willingness to participate, with those who explicitly express mistrust being much less
9The stakeholders interviewed represented governmental organisations, electrical and gas utility
companies, researchers of energy related consumer behaviour, and residents.
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likely to participate. Even when this lack of mistrust is addressed, via reassurances
that their energy company is taking steps to "rebuild community support", the
proportion of households willing to participate only increases by a marginal amount.
These trust issues continue once the smart meter has been installed, consumers are
unsure of what energy companies will do with the substantial amount of data on their
energy consumption behaviour and habits (Richter and Pollitt, 2018). A small-scale
study which involved interviews and workshops with ﬁve Dutch households found
that participants are concerned that energy companies will use data for commercial
means (Naus et al., 2014). Namely, that energy companies will be able to use the
real-time data to market speciﬁc services and/or products to consumers. The 228
participants in Pepermans (2014) were willing to pay a signiﬁcant amount to have
a smart meter which had no eﬀect on privacy. This lack of trust increases the
psychological costs that consumers face, as they must spend time monitoring energy
companies' use of their data (Gerpott and Paukert, 2013).
Though trust issues are mostly viewed as a barrier to adoption of smart meters, par-
ticipants (n=22) in Krishnamurti et al. (2012) suggest that the increased accuracy
of energy bills due to real-time feedback from smart meters provides energy compa-
nies with an opportunity to build trust with consumers. However, households could
face increased bills if their consumption was previously underestimated (Raimi and
Carrico, 2016).
1.2.2 Uncertainty Regarding Technology
Aside from questions of trust, uncertainty is also an important issue. With new
technologies of a particularly technical nature, such as smart meters, consumers are
not always sure of what the technology is and what it can do. Consumers have a
tendency to confuse smart meters with the devices required to obtain data concern-
ing energy consumption (Darby, 2010). In an online survey of American consumers
(n=305), Raimi and Carrico (2016) ﬁnd that less than 36% participants have heard
of smart meters and smart grids, and more than 64% showed no understanding
of what smart meters were and could do. Other American participants (n=22) in
Krishnamurti et al. (2012) confused the smart meter with the devices; expecting
a smart meter to come with an energy monitor so that they can verify the accu-
racy of their energy bill and see appliance-speciﬁc feedback describing their energy
consumption in detail.
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In an online conjoint analysis, Dütschke and Paetz (2013) questioned German par-
ticipants on their beliefs and expectations of dynamic pricing. They found that
consumers are unsure of what dynamic electricity pricing is and what it can do. Of
160 participants, just over half (53%) believed that dynamic pricing may result in a
reduction in their energy use. Added to this uncertainty are diﬃculties in calculat-
ing peak and oﬀ-peak consumption; consumers do not know the energy demand of
the diﬀerent appliances that they use (Goulden et al., 2014).
This uncertainty is unsurprising given how the traditional electricity market is set
up; households are accustomed to being passive users of energy. Consumers are often
unaware of how much they pay for their electricity, or of the tariﬀ they are on. This
is particularly true of the older generation (Barnicoat and Danson, 2015). Alexan-
der (2010) discusses the implications of dynamic pricing for residential consumers
suggesting that it goes against years of policy aimed at reducing price volatility for
residential consumers in the electricity market. Alexander argues that the true cost
of dynamic pricing is not considered in ﬁeld experiments and pilot studies. In order
to implement demand response consumers require new technology which has its own
cost. Furthermore, there is a cost associated with changing consumption behaviour
which is not factored into savings calculations.
This uncertainty can lead to confusion of the beneﬁts and risks of smart meter and
dynamic pricing, leading to unrealistic expectations, (potentially in favour of energy
companies), and disappointed consumers (Krishnamurti et al., 2012).
1.2.3 Complexity of Tariﬀs
In a Norwegian ﬁeld experiment, Ericson (2011) explores households' tariﬀ choice
between their standard ﬂat-rate tariﬀ and a CPP tariﬀ when oﬀered smart me-
ter technology to automatically measure their hourly consumption. Of the 2 300
households initially approached for the study, 295 households chose the CPP rate.
Similarly, both Dütschke and Paetz (2013) and Schlereth et al. (2018) ﬁnd that when
choosing a tariﬀ, German participants (n=160, and n=779, respectively) are more
likely to select a simple TOU tariﬀ with a low variation in price, as opposed to a
dynamic RTP tariﬀ with a high price variation.
In order to determine how the complexity of tariﬀs aﬀects contract choice, Layer
et al. (2017) conduct an online choice experiment of German consumers (n = 664).
The sample is divided into those who enjoy facing complex decisions and those
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who do not. Of the four hypothetical tariﬀs proposed, ﬂat-rate, TOU, CPP, and
RTP, the former perceive the CPP and RTP tariﬀs to be complex and perceive
little complexity concerning the ﬂat-rate and TOU tariﬀs. The latter perceive all
four tariﬀs to be complex. In particular, Layer et al. (2017) ﬁnd that the more
components a tariﬀ contains10, if the tariﬀ contains odd-endings to price values, and
the use of percentages in tariﬀs leads to increased perceived complexity of tariﬀs.
It is perhaps the issues of uncertainty described above and tariﬀ complexity which
lead households to favour their existing, time-invariant tariﬀs. Yoshida et al. (2017)
ﬁnd that greater knowledge of energy conservation increases choice of TOU and
CPP tariﬀs. Furthermore, after experimenting diﬀerent tariﬀs in a smart home
laboratory11 for 8 weeks, three of the four participants in Dütschke and Paetz (2013)
preferred the dynamic tariﬀs to the static tariﬀs with the exception of the most
dynamic tariﬀ which included both varying prices and load limits.
1.2.4 Reluctance Towards Automation and Third-party Con-
trol
Another issue of contention for residential consumers is the amount of control that
smart meters will allow energy companies over their personal consumption. Con-
sumers feel that the installation of smart meters means relinquishing control of their
environment (Barnicoat and Danson, 2015). Krishnamurti et al. (2012) ﬁnd that
American consumers believe that smart meters will be used by energy companies
to control household energy use. For example, to cut oﬀ the supply to households
which consume too much electricity.
In a survey of 139 Dutch households, participants stated they preferred manual con-
trol to automatic control. They prefer to make their own decisions regarding when
to turn-oﬀ appliances, instead of allowing a smart meter to do this for them; they
are not willing to lose control for the sake of convenience (Leijten et al., 2014). On
the other hand, Dütschke and Paetz (2013) ﬁnd that German participants (n=160)
prefer a system in which smart appliances could react automatically to variations in
prices rather than making the changes themselves.
10Price components refers to the number of diﬀerently priced periods. For example, a simple
TOU tariﬀ would have two price periods: peak and oﬀ-peak.
11The smart home laboratory is a 60 metre squared house that can be lived in. It is fully
equipped with functioning appliances which can be controlled for the purposes of testing new
energy management technologies. See Allerding and Schmeck (2011) cited in Dütschke and Paetz
(2013) for more details.
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With respect to functionality Belgian participants (n=228) accept a trade-oﬀ be-
tween no automation and total automation12, preferring to monitor and self-programme
the smart meter and device to automatically turn-oﬀ appliances that have been on
stand-by for too long (Pepermans, 2014).
Though some households are unlikely to allow third-party intervention to control
their energy consumption, it may be unlikely that they make the necessary be-
havioural changes in order to reduce energy consumption (Verbong et al., 2013).
When comparing preferences for smart meter contracts, Pepermans (2014) conclude
that as third-party intervention, and thus the eﬀect on privacy, increases, the less
the participants value the smart meter. Additionally, the extent to which consumers
are willing to allow automatic control is limited by comfort; consumers do not wish
to sacriﬁce their desired comfort level.
1.3 Barriers to Adoption
Assuming that consumers have accepted the installation of smart meters in their
homes, the next issue to consider is whether consumers will use the information and
incentives delivered by smart meters to reduce their energy consumption. Feedback
from smart meters and dynamic pricing alone are not going to have an eﬀect on res-
idential energy consumption. They facilitate energy conservation by making energy
visible (Darby, 2010, Hargreaves et al., 2010, Gerpott and Paukert, 2013) and by
reﬂecting the costs of production in energy prices (Faruqui, 2012). However, house-
holds need to engage with the information and respond to the incentives provided
in order to lower their consumption.
1.3.1 Limited Motivation of Monetary Savings
Participants in studies across the UK and Australia state that their main motivation
for accepting smart meters and dynamic pricing is ﬁnancial (Hargreaves et al., 2010,
Buchanan et al., 2014, Murtagh et al., 2014, Barnicoat and Danson, 2015, Hall et al.,
2016). Indeed, British participants (n=1 892) expect to receive ﬁnancial savings
that are twice as large as the amount they are expected to pay for `smart services'
12No automation refers to a smart meter and device set-up which only allows for monitoring of
energy consumption by the consumer, whereas total automation refers to `dynamic management
of appliances', i.e. the smart meter can send information to speciﬁc appliances to turn them oﬀ or
on in response to demand or price signals (Pepermans, 2014, p.285).
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(Richter and Pollitt, 2018). In Dütschke and Paetz (2013) when choosing between
tariﬀs, German participants (n=160) were primarily motivated by monetary savings;
expecting to save 50e-150e. Actual savings during the study were in the order of
20e-60e, at the lower end of these expectations.
Households participating in various UK studies were particularly interested in taking
part in order to lower their energy bills. In focus groups led by Goulden et al.
(2014), participants stated that they were motivated to shift energy consumption
via dynamic pricing for monetary reasons. However, the authors suggest that the
monetary saving from changing the use of isolated energy consuming appliances
is likely to be too small to induce behavioural changes from ﬁnancial incentives.
Indeed, a single isolated behavioural change, such as turning an appliance oﬀ stand-
by, is unlikely to have a large monetary impact. The behavioural changes that
participants can make to lower energy consumption may have a small individual
impact, but many changes can add up to a larger ﬁnancial saving. For participants
(n=275) in Hargreaves et al. (2010) the savings were not as much as they had
envisioned; savings were in pennies rather than pounds. On the other hand, some
participants (n=21) in Murtagh et al. (2014) found that each little saving adds up,
yet others felt that they were comfortably well-oﬀ to not bother with trying to save
energy to lower their bills.
The presentation of consumption information can have an eﬀect on how individuals
engage with it. Bager and Mundaca (2017) consider how to frame consumption
information so as to encourage a greater provision of energy savings eﬀorts on the
part of consumers. They ﬁnd that presenting expenditure on energy consumption
as a salient loss compared to a statement of expenditure increases the percentage
of energy savings that households achieve. Framing information as a loss of money
invokes motivation to save energy in individuals as they do not wish to lose money
that is theirs.
1.3.2 Understanding of Information on Display
In order for consumers to make the most out of the two-way communication capa-
bilities of smart meters, they require an IHD to display their energy consumption
in real-time. Indeed, German households feel that such a device is a necessity for
dynamic pricing tariﬀs as without, they do not feel adequately informed in order to
be able to make the appropriate changes to their behaviour (Dütschke and Paetz,
2013).
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In an investigation of the eﬀectiveness of energy monitor displays, Chiang et al.
(2012) measured participants' (n=41) sensitivity to diﬀerent presentations of con-
sumption information (numerical, analogue or emotive) in both colour (red for high
consumption, and green for low consumption) and black and white. Participants re-
sponded quickest to changes in information when presented numerically, and found
the analogue information hardest to understand. Participants stated a preference
for colour but this did not improve their performance.
Participants in Hargreaves et al. (2010), Raw and Ross (2011) and Buchanan et al.
(2014) prefer consumption data to be displayed in monetary terms, rather than in
energy units or CO2 emissions, as such information is more relatable and compara-
ble. While it is understandable that monetary comparisons are more relatable for
consumers, they may not be of much value if prices have changed across diﬀerent
time periods, in this case, energy unit comparisons would be of more use (Darby,
2010).
In hypothetical consumption scenarios, UK participants (n=170) were presented
with consumption data in either monetary terms, as energy units (kWh) or as CO2
emissions and then asked to think of ways to reduce their consumption. Spence et al.
(2014) ﬁnd that participants who see their hypothetical consumption in monetary or
energy units are more likely to state ﬁnancial reasons as motivation for lowering their
demand. Those who receive consumption information in terms of CO2 emissions
are more likely to cite environmental reasons. While in this study, participants'
motivations were clearly primed by the display treatment, the ﬁndings highlight
that diﬀerent displays evoke diﬀerent motivations. Interestingly, Spence et al. ﬁnd
that those who were in the monetary display were most likely to say that lowering
their energy consumption is not worth it.
On the other hand, after interviewing 28 Australian households, Strengers (2011,
p.331) ﬁnd that IHDs focus too much on the numbers, on quantifying what can be
"saved and shaved" rather than on what households can do to change their behaviour
and ultimately to lower their consumption. However, British participants (n=21),
interviewed by Murtagh et al. (2014), say that they receive suﬃcient general energy
savings advice from other outlets that the IHDs do not add anything new.
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1.3.3 Inﬂexibility of Daily Routines
The principal objective of dynamic pricing is to lower consumption during peak
periods when demand is much higher and much more costly to produce (Faruqui
et al., 2010a). This supposes that households are willing and able to lower their
demand during such periods. However, households feel that there is little that they
can do to prevent the natural peaks of energy consumption (due to non-ﬂexible
work days or ingrained energy consumption habits) without drastically changing
their lifestyle (Naus et al., 2014, Hall et al., 2016).
Participants (n=275) in a UK study were reluctant to lower consumption below their
normal level and, in fact, when prompted to do so, participants became defensive.
They felt that they had no control over certain aspects of their energy consumption;
certain appliances were necessities no matter how much they consumed (the deﬁni-
tion of necessary appliances varied across households) and they were not willing to
sacriﬁce their quality of life to save a small amount on energy (Hargreaves et al.,
2010).
In terms of how householders react to dynamic pricing, Dütschke and Paetz (2013)
ﬁnd them willing to change certain behaviours and use certain appliances at oﬀ-peak
hours, such as dishwashers, washing machines and tumble driers. However, they
ﬁnd consumers unwilling, and potentially unable, to change the time of use of other
activities related to comfort or entertainment. Goulden et al. (2014) describe energy
consumers as willing to shift consumption of devices where energy consumption is
not at the point-of-use, i.e. white goods, and unwilling to shift use of devices where
consumption is at the point-of-use, i.e. showers and televisions.
Ericson (2011) hypothesises that consumers who have consumption patterns that are
favourable to dynamic pricing, (i.e. their consumption is low during peak periods),
are more likely to accept such tariﬀs. Yet, such dynamic pricing will not have
the desired demand reduction eﬀect for these consumers as they have less demand
to shift to begin with. These consumers will beneﬁt from dynamic pricing without
being demand responsive. This is true of both British (n=160) and German (n=779)
participants in choice experiments: those who consider that shifting consumption
is an easy task, are more likely to adopt time-variant tariﬀs (Buryk et al., 2015,
Schlereth et al., 2018).
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1.3.4 Novelty Factor of Consumption Information
A common theme in ﬁeld experiments and pilot studies using smart meters, energy
monitors and dynamic pricing is that the behavioural changes made by households
are short-lived. There is an initial novelty factor when households use the monitors
frequently to begin with. Participants use energy monitors to identify a baseline level
of consumption which a household deems to be their normal level of consumption.
Any deviations from this baseline are then identiﬁed and acted upon (Hargreaves
et al., 2010, Strengers, 2011, Hargreaves et al., 2013, Buchanan et al., 2014).
In Hargreaves et al. (2010), this identiﬁcation leads to reactive and pro-active be-
havioural changes. When energy consumption is unusually high, households identify
and turn oﬀ appliances as necessary (reactive). In the longer term, they monitor
individual appliances in order to determine which are ineﬃcient and need replac-
ing (pro-active). The use of the monitor aﬀects future consumption decisions, with
households taking energy-eﬃciency into greater consideration when purchasing new
appliances. However, follow-up interviews 12 months later with 11 of the initial
monitor users revealed that usage of the devices had greatly decreased, with three
households having stopped using them altogether. The energy monitoring devices
are rarely used by households in the longer term; they become part of the back-
ground of daily-life and are used to monitor abnormalities rather than to encourage
demand reduction (Hargreaves et al., 2013). This is corroborated by Schleich et al.
(2013) who report limited use of feedback via a web portal; 70% of German partic-
ipants (n=276) reported that they consulted the portal once a month, and also by
Ueno et al. (2006) who ﬁnd a decrease in the number interactions with an energy
monitor a few weeks after installation.
Studies on dynamic pricing are not without questions as to the durability of demand
response. Faruqui and George (2005) ﬁnd that under TOU pricing, the demand re-
sponse across two summers greatly decreases; 5.9% in summer 2003 to 0.6% in
summer 2004. As the authors state, this result should be interpreted with caution
however, as the sample size was small. Furthermore, it is not clear whether temper-
ature variations across the two summers are accounted for. An Italian experiment
ﬁnds that consumption increased under TOU pricing compared to ﬂat-rate tariﬀs
(Torriti, 2012). This could be considered as a type of rebound eﬀect where house-
holds respond to the lower oﬀ-peak price by increasing their consumption by more
than they lower their consumption in the peak period.
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1.3.5 Eﬀect on Household Dynamics
A ﬁnal barrier of smart meters and dynamic pricing worthy of discussion is their
eﬀect on household dynamics. Household energy consumption is often discussed
with the household being a single entity, however, households contain families which
have varied compositions.
In Hargreaves et al. (2010) it was mostly male household members who used the
monitors and who participated in the interviews, with the females of the household
reported as "uninterested". In fact, the monitors were seen to cause conﬂict within
households; as some individuals felt that their actions were being constantly moni-
tored - how much energy was being consumed and how much money was being spent
 by another member of the household. Other interviews with households revealed
that although the male member may be more likely to be the bill payer, it is often
the female household members who are responsible for managing the daily activities
and thus the energy consumption of the household (Murtagh et al., 2014).
Households with children and older people are less likely to sacriﬁce comfort and
convenience to lower their energy demand (Murtagh et al., 2014). These types of
households are less ﬂexible than others. Older generations in particular are more
likely to spend more time at home, and they may have certain needs or health issues
that require consuming energy (Barnicoat and Danson, 2015).
1.4 Recommendations
In order for smart meters and the incentives that they can deliver to be eﬀective
at encouraging households to lower their consumption, the barriers to acceptance
and adoption discussed above will need to be overcome. Recommendations for
overcoming some of the barriers identiﬁed above are discussed in this section.
Energy companies should increase their eﬀorts to rebuild consumer trust where it has
been lost. Such eﬀorts will need to be credible given that non-veriﬁable attempts
at trust building" are not suﬃcient to increase consumers' vote of conﬁdence in
energy companies (Stenner et al., 2017). Trust could be rebuilt by decreasing the
uncertainty around smart meters, IHDs, dynamic pricing and other incentives. As
consumers are typically unsure of how smart meters and IHDs or other monitors
diﬀer in their capabilities, being more transparent in explaining this new technol-
ogy to consumers could be one avenue for trust rebuilding. In particular, as the
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introduction of smart meters results in more reliable billing, some consumers whose
consumption was previously undermeasured and underbilled will see an increase in
their bill despite not changing their behaviour. To build trust with these consumers,
energy companies could pledge to not increase consumer bills for a certain transition
period after the installation of a smart meter due to more accurate measurement in
order to allow households to familiarise themselves with the technology. This would
be a similar practice to that of designing dynamic pricing tariﬀs to be revenue neutral
(Faruqui et al., 2009).
Given the increased complexity of dynamic pricing tariﬀs relative to ﬂat-rate tariﬀs,
consumers need to be carefully informed of the detail and educated as to how such
tariﬀs can be proﬁtable to them. In particular, energy companies should take care
to limit the complexity of tariﬀs by reducing the number of diﬀerent components,
using even-numbered prices for diﬀerent periods, and where possible providing con-
sumers with savings in absolute amounts rather than in percentage form (Layer
et al., 2017). Furthermore, previous research has shown that consumers who are
more familiar with dynamic pricing tariﬀs through educational campaigns or di-
rect experimentation are more likely to be willing to accept such tariﬀs (Dütschke
and Paetz, 2013, Yoshida et al., 2017). Consumer participation in dynamic pricing
contracts could therefore be increased through improved knowledge of these tariﬀs.
Engaging consumers with the information provided by smart meters and the in-
centives used to encourage them to lower their consumption is paramount to them
being eﬀective. Rather than encouraging energy savings eﬀorts, simply stating how
much money households are saving highlights that small monetary amounts are
saved with each energy saving action and may serve to discourage energy saving
eﬀorts (Hargreaves et al., 2010, Murtagh et al., 2014). Diﬀerent presentations of
consumption information invoke diﬀerent motivations to save energy and diﬀerent
individuals respond diﬀerently to these presentations (Spence et al., 2014). Given
this, it is unlikely that a one-size-ﬁts-all approach would be as successful at encour-
aging reductions in consumption, a more individual approach may be appropriate.
Various research has identiﬁed diﬀerent consumer segments. With regard to smart
service preferences, Kaufmann et al. (2013) identify four diﬀerent segments of Swiss
consumers: `technology minded', `safety minded', `risk-averse' and `price sensitive'.
Murtagh et al. (2014) categorise British participants into one of three groups: `mon-
itor enthusiasts', `aspiring energy savers' and `energy non-active'. Richter and Pol-
litt (2018) ﬁnd three speciﬁc clusters of British consumer types: `private data', `risk
36 CHAPTER 1: BARRIERS TO ACCEPTANCE AND ADOPTION
averse', and `open data'. Concerning choice of dynamic tariﬀs, Schlereth et al. (2018)
separate German consumers into three diﬀerent groups: `price sensitive', `ﬂexible'
and `risk averse'.
Across these diﬀerent categorisations of consumers, four clear segments can be iden-
tiﬁed. There are the technophiles who are enthusiastic about receiving data on their
consumption and managing it, and who are open to sharing their data in order for
energy companies to provide automated control of appliances. Secondly, there are
those who are conscious of how their data can be exploited, and who prefer to retain
control of their own energy consumption. The third segmentation concerns those
consumers who are risk averse. These consumers have strong preferences for a tariﬀ
with a low peak/oﬀ-peak price ratio or a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ. They do not value potential
monetary savings as highly, and are more technology-averse. The ﬁnal segment are
those who are price-sensitive. This group prefer a tariﬀ with a high peak/oﬀ-peak
price ratio and are more likely to switch to dynamic pricing contracts.
An additional segment to be considered is that of pro-environmental consumers.
Such consumers gain additional utility from using a smart meter and device due
to the pro-environmental beneﬁts of reducing energy consumption and making an
eﬀort to slow global warming. Gerpott and Paukert (2013, p.486) suggest that
certain consumers derive this additional utility due to a `warm glow' eﬀect of giving.
That is to say, consumers receive utility from the act of helping others, in this
instance, from helping the environment.
If these diﬀerent segments of consumers can be identiﬁed, then appropriate technol-
ogy and incentives can be oﬀered to them such that these consumers will have the
tools which are relevant to their characteristics, motivations and situation, which
they can successfully engage with and use to lower their consumption. Therefore,
rather than a one-size-ﬁts-all approach to energy saving, a consumer segment speciﬁc
approach is recommended.
That being said, a consumer segment that may not necessarily beneﬁt from the use of
a smart meter and device to reduce energy use is the segment of consumers for whom
energy consumption is already low, as they will have little scope to further reduce
their demand Darby (2010). Hence, these consumers may not accept smart meter
installation. Such consumers may be pro-environmental consumers who have already
reduced their consumption through other mechanisms, or low-income consumers
who may not have the means to consume large quantities of energy, nor the scope to
further reduce their consumption without becoming fuel-poor. Consideration should
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be taken when targeting this segment of consumers.
Finally, automation and third-party control was found to be a signiﬁcant barrier to
acceptance. However, this may help to overcome the barrier to adoption concerning
the inﬂexibility of daily life. Given that households may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to shift
some consumption, the recommendation here is to focus on the demand that can be
shifted, and to provide households with the technology that will allow for automatic
peak demand shifting. Introducing automation and third-party control may also
help to increase consumer trust in energy companies if the latter helps consumers
to achieve energy savings with minimal eﬀort. Such technology will not be readily
accepted by all consumers and so the focus here should be on the technophiles and
price-sensitive consumers.
1.5 Conclusion
Smart meters and dynamic pricing correct two market failures in the residential elec-
tricity market; smart meters make energy visible by providing consumption infor-
mation, and dynamic pricing limits how much energy can be consumed by charging
residential consumers prices which reﬂect actual costs at a given time. This ﬁrst
chapter has provided a qualitative review of predominately qualitative literature
on how households and consumers perceive, interact with and use smart meters,
energy monitors and dynamic pricing as tools and incentives to lower their energy
consumption. Recommendations were also made to overcome some of these barriers.
Given that households have long been passive users of electricity, smart meters and
energy monitors are the tools that households can use to become more aware of
their energy consumption and are the technology via which diﬀerent incentives can
be communicated to households in order to encourage them to lower their demand for
energy. Signals regarding the real-time price of electricity can be sent to households
which will allow for electricity pricing which is reﬂective of the real cost of electricity
production at diﬀerent times of the day and the year, thus diminishing the unlimited
quality of electricity from the point of view of households.
The review of the literature has highlighted four key barriers to acceptance and ﬁve
key barriers to adoption of both smart meters and dynamic pricing.
First and foremost, households show low levels of trust in their energy provider.
Households mistrust energy companies' intentions concerning the installation of
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smart metering technology and their use of the data collected. Should signiﬁcant
energy, and monetary savings, be made, households do not trust energy companies
to pass on these savings to the ﬁnal consumer. Given that Stenner et al. (2017) ﬁnd
a simple two-line sentence alleviates a small amount of misgivings that consumers
have regarding their energy company, utilities should consider credible methods in
which trust can be rebuilt between themselves and residential consumers.
Whether households trust their energy company or not, many remain uncertain of
what smart meters do and how dynamic pricing of electricity works. Tied in with
uncertainty is the issue of the complexity of dynamic pricing tariﬀs. Consumers
who perceive tariﬀs to be complex are more likely to opt for a simple ﬂat-rate, or
perhaps a two-period TOU tariﬀ. However, when the beneﬁts of such tariﬀs are
explained to consumers, they are more willing to accept the tariﬀs which suggests
that there is a problem of information. Through experience with the dynamic tariﬀs,
consumers have a better understanding of how they can use them to save both
energy and money, and are more likely to select such tariﬀs (Dütschke and Paetz,
2013). Energy companies should work on eﬀective communication strategies to
better inform households about both technology and incentives as doing so can be
used to build trust, and has been shown to increase consumers' willingness to accept
smart meters and smart services, and dynamic pricing.
A consumer's household is their domain, it is where they make decisions regarding
their consumption. Households perceive smart meters as a way for third-parties to
gain control of their daily life. Some consumers are concerned that energy compa-
nies will foist external control and automation on them against their will. Other
consumers prefer a degree of external control, within their personal comfort pa-
rameters, as making behavioural changes is seen to be an inconvenience. A seg-
mented approach to the implementation of diﬀerent technologies (from monitoring
to automation and control) and of diﬀerent incentives is recommended to increase
consumer participation and engagement.
The section on barriers to adoption explored how households interact with and use
smart meters and dynamic pricing to lower their energy demand. Regarding the
display of consumption information on energy monitors, households have a prefer-
ence for simple, monetary metrics. They are less interested in the amount of energy
consumed in kWh, nor in the emissions created by their consumption. Though such
information awakens consumers' environmental motivations for lowering their en-
ergy consumption (Spence et al., 2014). Some consumers would prefer less focus on
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the data and more on actions that can be taken to lower their consumption (Layer
et al., 2017).
Although households may prefer monetary information, and are mostly motivated to
lower their energy consumption for ﬁnancial reasons, some households are quickly
discouraged to make further eﬀorts to lower their consumption when they realise
that energy saving actions do not necessarily result in sizeable monetary savings.
This should be taken into consideration when designing how monetary information is
displayed on IHDs, and when communicating to households the beneﬁts of dynamic
pricing programmes as with the latter, greater monetary savings are possible.
A signiﬁcant barrier to households adoption of dynamic pricing is the lack of ﬂexi-
bility in their daily lives. Daily life is shaped in such a way that there are natural
peaks in demand which are diﬃcult for households to shift. Households who are
perhaps most likely to choose dynamic pricing tariﬀs are those who have favourable
consumption patterns and so are those who have less possibility to shift their de-
mand (Ericson, 2011). Households which have less favourable consumption patterns
could beneﬁt from the introduction of automated responses to price signals in order
to make saving energy simpler.
Finally, many studies have shown that there is a novelty factor at play in households
which use energy monitors. Initially, households interact a great deal with their
monitors in order to identify their normal level of consumption and any anomalous
levels of consumption. However, this initial interest tends to disappear as households
use their monitors less and less often. Keeping households engaged in their energy
consumption management is key to achieving energy savings.
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Incentivising Households to Reduce
Energy Consumption: A
Meta-analysis
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Abstract
A meta-analysis approach is used to analyse the results of recent
ﬁeld experiments and pilot studies which explore the eﬀects of diﬀer-
ent methods of incentivising residential consumers to lower their energy
consumption. The strategies currently used fall into one of two cate-
gories: ﬁnancial incentives (pricing strategies, monetary information),
and non-ﬁnancial incentives: informational incentives (historic feedback,
real-time information, tailored advice, generic savings tips) and `nudges'
(social norms, social approval). Heterogeneity in studies is limited by
focusing only on recent studies (2005 onwards) when there has been a
greater understanding of the risks of climate change. Both peer-reviewed
and grey literature (utility and government reports) are included to limit
publication bias. The sample includes 105 observations from 39 papers.
Results show that, on average, across studies, real-time feedback and mon-
etary information have the greatest eﬀect at reducing energy consumption.
Compared to previous meta-analysis, the results show that recent studies
use larger samples and are more robust (include a control group, subjects
are assigned randomly to treatments, demographics and weather are con-
trolled for). As a result, the eﬀect sizes observed are generally smaller
than those reported in previous meta-analyses and more indicative of the
results of a national roll-out.
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2.1 Introduction
Across the globe, countries are committing to increasing the share of production
from renewable energy sources (RES) (United Nations, 2017). This transition is
facilitated by the upgrading of the grid to a smarter, more eﬃcient, more reliable
network in which RES can be more easily integrated (Gungor et al., 2011). The
movement from a fossil fuel dependent energy system to one based on production
from RES requires a re-imagining of the way in which residential consumers interact
with the electricity grid. Rather than supply following demand, as is the traditional
operation of electricity markets, the intermittent nature of production from RES
calls for a greater level of ﬂexibility in demand in order for demand to follow supply.
Previous demand reduction strategies have focused on increasing energy eﬃciency14
as a way to lower consumption. However, despite a 33% increase in energy eﬃciency
(European Environment Agency, 2016), residential energy consumption in the EU
has increased by 9% between 1990 and 201315. The increase in consumption can be
associated to the rebound eﬀect and the focus on energy eﬃciency as end rather than
a means to achieving energy demand reduction (Maréchal and Holzemer, 2015).
Another strategy for reducing electricity demand focuses on ways to incentivise resi-
dential consumers to modify their electricity consuming behaviour. The installation
of smart meters as part of the wider smart grid infrastructure, provides two-way
communication between the household and the energy company, via the use of an
energy monitor, and allows residential consumers to take an active role in the man-
agement of their electricity consumption. In the traditional electricity market, the
residential consumer is a passive user for whom electricity is invisible and readily
available (Darby et al., 2006, Burgess and Nye, 2008, Hargreaves et al., 2010). In
the new market, the residential electricity consumer is better informed and more
conscious of how much they consume.
Consumers have long been aware of the need to turn oﬀ unused lights, to not leave
appliances on standby, to unplug chargers, to name a few, however due to a lack
of information on the impact of such actions on consumption, consumers have not
necessarily had the impetus to act. With the technological improvements being made
to the grid, consumers can receive appropriate incentives to lower their electricity
14Such energy eﬃciency measures include the installation of home insulation, and the upgrading
of old appliances to more energy eﬃcient appliances, among others.
15In 2014, the European Environment Agency (2017a) report the ﬁrst decrease in total household
energy consumption since 1990 of 4%. In all previous years, household energy consumption has
increased compared to 1990 levels, peaking in 2010.
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consumption.
The incentives that are tested in pilot studies and ﬁeld experiments fall under two
categories: monetary incentives, and non-monetary incentives. Monetary incentives
include information on monetary expenditure on energy, and pricing strategies. Such
incentives allow households to better connect their consumption with its costs and
encourage them to modify their behaviour to lower their costs. In the case of pricing
strategies such as dynamic pricing, increasing the cost of electricity should, according
to standard economic theory, incentivise households to consume less.
Non-monetary incentives can be further categorised into personal feedback on con-
sumption, and social feedback. Personal feedback refers to information on a house-
hold's own consumption, which can be delivered in real-time via an energy monitor,
made accessible on an online portal, or delivered as a monthly bill. Personal feed-
back also includes advice on how to reduce energy consumption, whether this is
general advice or advice tailored to a particular household. By providing consumers
with electricity consumption information and informing them of the consequences
of increased consumption, rational consumers will make the decision to lower their
electricity demand (Frederiks et al., 2015). In reality, individuals do not behave
rationally and so providing a greater level of information and monetary incentives
may not be suﬃcient to encourage all consumers to modify their behaviour.
The sub-category of social feedback refers to comparisons of a household's con-
sumption with that of other households. Such incentives are based on theories in
behavioural economics and psychology which suggest that individuals use heuristics,
or rules-of-thumb, to simplify complex decision making (Samson et al., 2018). In the
current context, households are informed of their consumption compared to the av-
erage consumption of their neighbours and receive social approval of their behaviour
when they consume less than their neighbours via the use of positive reinforcement
(Schultz et al., 2007).
This chapter uses a meta-analysis approach to explore the strategies and public
policies which employ such incentives in ﬁeld experiments and pilot studies in order
to evaluate the eﬀect of the diﬀerent incentives on households' energy consumption
behaviour. The objective is to combine the results of many studies to provide a
better estimate of the true eﬀect of the diﬀerent incentive types on residential energy
consumption.
The current meta-analysis adds to literature on meta-analyses which explore in-
centives for reducing household electricity consumption by including solely recent
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studies, those published from 2005 up to 2016, the time of data collection. By fo-
cusing on this time period, named the "Smart Grid Era" (McKerracher and Torriti,
2013), a more accurate estimate of the eﬀect of an incentive on current electricity
consumption is calculated. Additionally, the present analysis includes studies from
both peer reviewed literature and utility and government reports in order to have
as varied a database of studies as possible as the objectives of those carrying out
the experiments are not the same. Academic researchers have a ﬁnal objective to
publish their research, whereas those working for utilities and governments seek to
determine the return on investment in incentives. It can be argued that experi-
ments with larger sample sizes provide more robust results, often the utilities have
the means to run large trials of diﬀerent incentives. Finally, if only peer reviewed
articles are taken into consideration, there may be an issue of bias in the selection
of studies used for the meta-analysis. The issue of publication bias is assessed in
this chapter.
Compared to previous meta-analyses, a ﬁner level of detail regarding the diﬀerent
incentives is used. In particular, the incentives regarding social feedback are sep-
arated into those which provide comparative feedback alone and those which also
include approval or disapproval of behaviour as the former has been shown to result
in a boomerang eﬀect where households who consume less than their neighbours in-
crease their consumption (Schultz et al., 2007). The ﬁnal added-value of the present
meta-analysis is the inclusion of a greater level of study design variables, such as how
households are recruited into the study, and how they are assigned to the treatment
groups. Studies which recruit participants on an opt-in basis and do not randomise
assignment to treatment groups may be subject to selection bias as those households
who have favourable consumption patterns or are predisposed to lower energy con-
sumption are more likely to take part (Alexander, 2010, Ericson, 2011, Buchanan
et al., 2015).
The following section describes the diﬀerent incentives used in the experimental
literature and sets out the hypotheses which will be tested. This is followed by a
discussion of previous meta-analyses and reviews in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 de-
scribes the data collection method, the model used and the variables of interest.
Section 2.5 presents the results, Section 2.6 discusses the results and ﬁnally, Sec-
tion 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 Incentives for Lowering Electricity Consump-
tion
The principal strategies employed to incentivise households to reduce their consump-
tion can be separated into monetary and non-monetary incentives. In this section,
the diﬀerent strategies used in the literature are described and the hypotheses that
will be tested are stated.
2.2.1 Monetary Incentives
Monetary incentives can be separated into one of two categories: electricity cost in-
formation and pricing strategies. Monetary information is included here as although
it is not a direct monetary incentive, such incentives display information in mone-
tary terms thus informing households of how much they are spending on electricity
or how much they are saving. By providing households with information as to how
much their electricity consumption costs (as opposed to information on the amount
of electricity consumed) households can see the monetary beneﬁts of reducing their
electricity consumption. In interviews with households participating in electricity
conservation ﬁeld experiments, residents preferred to receive feedback in monetary
terms as this is considered to be more relatable and more comparable than energy
units (Hargreaves et al., 2010, Raw and Ross, 2011).
Further, with the installation of smart meters in residential homes, a major techno-
logical barrier to the implementation of pricing strategies such as dynamic pricing
has been lifted. Dynamic pricing provides consumers with economic incentives to
reduce (increase) their electricity consumption during peak (oﬀ-peak) periods by
better aligning the retail price of electricity with the wholesale price in order to
maintain supply and demand balance in the electricity market (Borenstein et al.,
2002). Such pricing tariﬀs are eﬀective at reducing demand during periods of high
demand but are not necessarily eﬀective at reducing overall demand (Torriti, 2012).
However, such strategies can have spillover eﬀects when behaviour to reduce con-
sumption during a peak period carries on into oﬀ-peak periods (Allcott, 2011a).
Such pricing strategies are therefore included in the present meta-analysis.
Hypothesis 1a: Pricing strategies reduce electricity demand.
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Hypothesis 1b: Monetary information reduces electricity demand.
2.2.2 Non-monetary Incentives
Non-monetary strategies refer to those which provide households with more detailed
information on their electricity consumption. In the experimental literature, this
type of incentive can be categorised into personal feedback and social feedback.
2.2.2.1 Personal Feedback
Personal feedback provides households with data on their own electricity consump-
tion with comparisons to consumption during a diﬀerent period, such as the previous
day, month, or year. Such feedback is received in a number of ways: through detailed
electricity bills (see Carroll et al., 2014, Schleich et al., 2013), online via a website
or email (see Benders et al., 2006, Ueno et al., 2006, Gleerup et al., 2010, Vassileva
et al., 2012, Mizobuchi and Takeuchi, 2013, Schleich et al., 2013, Harries et al., 2013,
Houde et al., 2013), in real-time via a monitor in the home (see Van Dam et al., 2010,
Grønhøj and Thøgersen, 2011, Alahmad et al., 2012, Carroll et al., 2014, Schultz
et al., 2015).
The provision of information on individual electricity consumption allows house-
holds to develop a greater awareness of their electricity consumption. By comparing
their consumption from one period to another, such information allows households
to see which behaviours result in increased consumption, so that they can follow
their electricity consuming activities and determine when and how they consume
the most electricity, and thus when and how to reduce their consumption.
Hypothesis 2a: Individual feedback on electricity consumption reduces electricity
demand.
Hypothesis 2b: Real-time feedback on electricity consumption reduces electricity
demand.
A further type of personal feedback that households may receive is advice on how
to lower their consumption tailored to their particular situation (both building and
household characteristics) (see Allcott, 2011b, Ayres et al., 2012, Costa and Kahn,
2013) or more general electricity savings tips (see Ueno et al., 2006, Mountain, 2008,
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Van Dam et al., 2010, Raw and Ross, 2011).
For example, Allcott (2011b) provides households with "action steps" based on their
actual energy use and household characteristics, on how they can lower their energy
consumption. In Mountain (2008, p.31), participating households are provided with
a list of 10 generic energy savings tips including, "Run your dishwasher during oﬀ-
peak hours", and "Turn monitor oﬀ instead of using a screen saver while you are
not using a computer".
Hypothesis 3a: Personalised advice on how to save electricity reduces electricity
demand.
Hypothesis 3b: Electricity savings tips reduce electricity demand.
2.2.2.2 Social Feedback
Social feedback refers to information on others' electricity consumption, such as
neighbours or similar households. It is an intervention which has been increasingly
explored in recent experimental studies and uses the notions of social and injunc-
tive norms. A social norm refers to descriptive consumption feedback of personal
consumption compared to that of other households. An injunctive norm reinforces
whether a particular behaviour is socially approved or disapproved of. In the case
of electricity consumption, an injunctive norm conﬁrms whether a household's con-
sumption is pro-social, i.e. whether the household is a low-consuming household
(Schultz et al., 2007).
These two types of social feedback have been separated in the present analysis as
there is evidence that solely descriptive comparative feedback leads to a boomerang
eﬀect where low-consuming households increase their consumption, converging to-
wards the average (Schultz et al., 2007, Allcott, 2011b, Ayres et al., 2012). The
inclusion of injunctive norms reinforces the idea that households who consume less
than average are engaged in pro-social behaviour and so they do not increase their
consumption (Cialdini et al., 1990).
Such methods of feedback may be successful via two mechanisms: by creating com-
petition within a neighbourhood, or by highlighting the social cost of energy con-
sumption. Regarding the latter, such social feedback may create a situation of
conditional cooperation where households consume more (less) after learning that
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others are consuming more (less) (Allcott, 2011b). Such behaviour is observed in
public goods (Fischbacher et al., 2001, Frey and Meier, 2004) and common pool
resource games (Ostrom, 1990, Velez et al., 2009).
Hypothesis 4a: Social norms do not have an eﬀect on electricity demand.
Hypothesis 4b: Injunctive norms reduce electricity demand.
2.3 Previous Meta-Analyses
The eﬀect of diﬀerent feedback types and monetary incentives on electricity con-
sumption has been studied by researchers and utilities alike since the 1970s, and
as such, several reviews and meta-analyses have been undertaken (see Darby et al.,
2006, Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010, Faruqui et al., 2010b, Delmas et al., 2013,
Faruqui and Sergici, 2013, McKerracher and Torriti, 2013). Table 2.1 summarises
the results of the previous reviews and meta-analyses discussed in this section.
Authors Objective Time frame Studies Eﬀect
Darby (2006)
Eﬀect of direct and
indirect feedback on
energy (gas and electricity)
consumption
1979-2006 38
Direct: -15% to -5%
Indirect: -10% to 0%
Ehrhardt-Martinez
et al. (2010)
Eﬀect of diﬀerent feedback
treatments on energy
consumption
1974-2010 57 -12% to -4%
Faruqui et al. (2010b)
Eﬀect on IHDs on energy
consumption
1989-2010 12 -13% to -3%
Delmas et al. (2013)
Reduction in energy
consumption via
diﬀerent treatments
1975-2012 59
-55% to +18%
Weighted ATE16: -7.4%
Faruqui and Sergici
(2013)
Peak demand reduction of
time-varying prices.
34 -58% to 0%
McKerracher and
Torriti (2013)
Eﬀect of IHDs on energy
consumption
1979-2015 27
-5% to -3%
ATE: -6.4%
Table 2.1: Summary of results of previous reviews and meta-analyses
Darby et al. (2006) reviews 38 feedback studies from 1979 to 2006 and concludes
that, on average, direct feedback which is received immediately after the energy
consuming behaviour is more eﬀective than indirect feedback such as an energy bill.
Both Faruqui et al. (2010b) and McKerracher and Torriti (2013) analyse the eﬀect
of real-time feedback, via an in-home display (IHD), on energy consumption. In a
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review of 12 pilot studies (1989-2010), Faruqui et al. (2010b) ﬁnd an energy reduc-
tion of 7% on average. McKerracher and Torriti (2013) perform a wider analysis of
27 peer and non peer reviewed studies between 1979-2011. The authors ﬁnd that
as sample size increases, the reported treatment eﬀect decreases. Additionally, they
classify studies via sampling selection and recruitment method and ﬁnd that studies
with more representative samples report lower percentages of energy reduction.
Hypothesis 5: With larger samples, the reduction in energy consumption due to an
incentive is smaller
Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2010) review 57 studies from 1974-2010 covering both
feedback and dynamic pricing studies using advanced metering infrastructure. The
authors conclude that feedback interventions result in a greater overall reduction
in energy consumption than dynamic pricing which is more eﬀective at decreasing
demand at peak times.
Focusing on the eﬀect of pricing strategies, Faruqui and Sergici (2013) ﬁnd that
the more dynamic the pricing strategies17, the greater the amount of peak energy
conserved, all the more so when enabling technology is used.
Delmas et al. (2013) provide the most recent analysis of studies from 1975 to 2012
ﬁnding that tailored advice and energy conservation tips are most eﬀective at re-
ducing energy consumption. The authors compare the average treatment eﬀects of
more robust studies (those which include a control group, demographic information
and control for weather changes) to studies with fewer controls. They ﬁnd that more
robust studies report a lower reduction in energy consumption (Delmas et al., 2013).
McKerracher and Torriti (2013) also look at how study design aﬀects results by con-
sidering how participants are recruited to participate in studies and how this aﬀects
their eﬀort to reduce their consumption. They group studies into three categories
by sample size, use of representative sampling, and whether participants opt-in or
opt-out. They ﬁnd that studies which use larger samples, representative sampling
and opt-out participation show a smaller reduction in energy consumption. The
present analysis goes further in exploring the eﬀect of diﬀerent levels of controls
by comparing studies which use all controls to those which use fewer, and also by
17Real-time pricing strategies are considered to be more dynamic as the price faced by ﬁnal
consumers ﬂuctuates in line with wholesale prices. Time-of-use tariﬀs are less dynamic as the
prices are ﬁxed for certain hours. Critical peak pricing and peak-time rebates fall in-between the
two.
2.4 METHOD 51
estimating the eﬀect of each individual control on energy consumption.
Hypothesis 6: More robust studies (inclusion of control group, weather controls,
demographic controls, opt-out recruitment, random assignment to treatment group)
show a smaller reduction in electricity demand.
Each of these reviews and analyses have covered studies across a long time period,
from the 70s and 80s to the present. Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2010) ﬁnd trends in
energy savings across two distinct periods; the Energy Crisis Era from the seventies
to 1995, and the Climate Change Era from 1995 to 2010. McKerracher and Torriti
(2013) identify an additional era, from 2005 onwards which they name the Smart
Grid Era. The current paper seeks to better understand the eﬀect of diﬀerent inter-
ventions on energy consumption by considering solely studies from 2005 onwards so
as to focus on the Smart Grid era. Studies conducted since 2005 are diﬀerent to those
conducted in the 70s and 80s. The more recent studies beneﬁt from technological
advances in terms of the provision of treatments and the measurement of treatment
eﬀects. It would be erroneous to include results from such varied time periods. As
Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2010, p.74) note, "studies that compare feedback-related
savings across all four decades may result in inﬂated expectations regarding poten-
tial energy savings today".
Hypothesis 7: Average eﬀect of incentives on electricity consumption is lower in
Smart Grid Era compared to previous eras.
2.4 Method
2.4.1 Data Collection
In order to ﬁnd appropriate articles for this analysis, the following databases were
searched: ScienceDirect, EconLit, Web of Science, SpringerLink, Econpapers, SSRN,
NBER, for the following sets of keywords using Boolean logic:
• Keywords concerning type of consumption: electricity consumption, electricity
demand, electricity usage, energy consumption, energy demand, energy usage,
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and;
• Keywords concerning the type of incentive:
 Incentive, behaviour
 Informational feedback: smart meter, advanced metering, feedback, nudge,
norm,
 Financial feedback: dynamic pricing, tariﬀ, time of use, critical peak
pricing, real time pricing, peak time rebate, and;
• Keywords concerning the level of consumption: residential, household, con-
sumer, and;
• Keywords concerning the study type: pilot, trial, experiment, ﬁeld.
Across all databases, after eliminating doubles, the search terms resulted in a list of
1,490 studies. The titles and abstracts of these studies were reviewed. In addition
to the database search, the reference lists and the lists of citing articles for each
selected article, as well as previous meta-analyses, were scanned for further relevant
studies. This procedure resulted in a selection of 84 articles and 27 reports on the
topic of using incentives to reduce residential electricity consumption. Each article
and report was read and a ﬁnal selection of 24 articles and 15 reports were kept for
the analysis.
The ﬁnal list of articles, those in which the treatment eﬀect is reported as the change
in electricity consumption of treated households compared to either a baseline or
control group and details on why 72 papers were excluded can be found in Appendix
A18. A coding protocol was implemented for the ﬁnal selection of 39 studies which
involved an experimentation of the above incentives. The majority of articles came
from economics, business, and energy journals. The reports are from utility and
government websites as well as from consulting companies.
Figure 2.1 displays the geographical distribution of included studies. The majority
of studies come from the United Kingdom and North America as these regions
have been at the forefront of ﬁeld experiments and pilot studies on incentives to
reduce electricity consumption. In addition, this could also be explained by the fact
that one of the inclusion criteria is that the paper be written in English and that
18The main reasons for excluding papers are: a diﬀerent treatment eﬀect measure was used
(peak demand reduction, appliance level data), sample is non-residential, or studies were based on
simulations or laboratory experiments.
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experiments carried out by national utilities and governments are likely to be written
in the native language. This restriction could result in publication bias which will
be assessed below.
1
2
3
9
12
30
39
No data
Figure 2.1: Geographical distribution of included studies
2.4.2 Model and Estimation Method
Meta-regression analysis is a quantitative method of systematically analysing the
results of empirical studies with a common objective. It goes beyond a literature
review in that it allows the analyst to calculate a mean treatment eﬀect across studies
by discovering which variables lead to diﬀerences in experiments which study the
same treatment eﬀect (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989, Nelson and Kennedy, 2009). Meta-
analyses are used to estimate a more precise estimate of the true eﬀect of a treatment
than any single study can do alone (Borenstein et al., 2009).
Using notation from Nelson and Kennedy (2009, p.8), the following meta-regression
model is estimated:
β˜i = α0 + α1xi1 + ...+ αKxiK + ei (2.1)
where (xi1, ..., xiK) is a vector of study characteristics, (α1, ..., αK) are unknown
parameters to be estimated, and ei is the normally distributed sampling-estimation
error with zero mean and variance σ2i , ∀i = 1, ..., N .
This model can be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). However, given that
in the sample of primary studies, there are treatment eﬀects from studies of varied
sample sizes, the method of estimation by OLS may lead to ineﬃcient and biased es-
timates. This bias can be mitigated by using White or Huber-White robust standard
errors (Sebri, 2014).
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Furthermore, the standard OLS approach may not be appropriate due to issues high-
lighted by Nelson and Kennedy (2009) and Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) which
are prevalent in meta regression analysis such as publication bias, heterogeneity,
heteroscedasticity and non-independence. Publication bias is an issue across much
social science research when results that show a signiﬁcant eﬀect are favoured for
publication over those which do not. Heterogeneity is present due to either dif-
ferences in the experimental design and methods used in the primary studies, or
to diﬀerences such as geographical location and historical context. The issue of
heteroscedasticity arises from the inclusion of primary studies with diﬀerent sam-
ple sizes, and ﬁnally, non-independence occurs when more than one observation is
used from a single primary study. Each of these issues are a concern in the present
meta-analysis and steps are taken to reduce their impact on the results as discussed
below.
Other approaches used in meta-regression analysis to estimate the model in eq. (2.1)
include using ﬁxed- or random-eﬀects estimation (FEE and REE respectively)19.
FEE weights each treatment eﬀect estimate by its precision squared, or the inverse
of its variance. Furthermore, FEE assumes that all primary observations of treat-
ment eﬀects are drawn from the same population (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012).
In the present sample, treatment eﬀects are taken from primary studies from dif-
ferent countries which thus have diﬀerent samples. Given such heterogeneity in the
sample, Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) suggest that the REE is a technically more
appropriate estimator as the weight used accounts for this heterogeneity.
In further research, Stanley and Doucouliagos (2015) ﬁnd that the weighted least
squares (WLS) estimator is preferable to both FEE and REE. The authors ﬁnd that
under heterogeneity, WLS outperforms FEE, and in the case of publication or small
sample bias, WLS does better than REE. Given the characteristics of the data used
in the present meta-analysis, several approaches are taken to overcome the potential
issues of publication bias, heterogeneity, heteroscedasticity, and non-independence.
Firstly, to limit issues of publication bias, both peer reviewed articles and reports
from the grey literature are included in this analysis. In addition, after a description
of the dataset and before any models are estimated, the selection of primary studies
used in the meta-analysis is assessed for publication bias. This analysis leads to the
conclusion that publication bias is present up to a factor of 2 and that using the
19These terms refer to estimators used in meta-analysis and not to those used in panel data
econometrics (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012).
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sample size as a weight mitigates this problem.
Second, to tackle the sources of heterogeneity, a set of binary variables describing the
study characteristics which are potential sources of heterogeneity are included in the
regression (section 2.4.3 describes the variables used in the analysis), and the tem-
poral context has been limited to primary studies published since 2005 representing
the Smart-Grid Era (McKerracher and Torriti, 2013).
Next, to account for heteroscedasticity, the model in eq. (2.1) is estimated by WLS.
The preferred weight is the inverse standard error of the treatment eﬀect, however,
given that these are not always reported in the primary studies, a common approach
is to proxy the standard error using the sample size (Nelson and Kennedy, 2009,
Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). As such, the square root of the sample size is
used as weights for the estimation following Delmas et al. (2013), Sebri (2014) and
Van Houtven et al. (2017) such that experiments with a larger sample are given more
weight. Experiments with larger samples are considered to be more representative
of the population and so the estimated eﬀect is a better estimate of the true eﬀect.
Finally, to address the non-independence of several treatment eﬀects coming from
the same primary study, the estimated standard errors are clustered by primary
study.
2.4.3 Variables
Dependent Variable
The variable of interest is the treatment eﬀect reported in primary studies as the
percentage change in electricity consumption as a result of the implementation of an
incentive. When a control group is present in an experiment, the percentage change
relative to the control group is used. If no control group is present, the percentage
change relative to the baseline is used20. In the following analysis the dependent
variable is referred to as the Average Treatment Eﬀect (ATE).
Independent Variables
The independent variables refer to the type of intervention tested in the primary
study and the controls used. As discussed above, there are pricing strategies : house-
holds receive a ﬁnancial reward which is directly linked to their electricity conserva-
tion eﬀort. For example, changing prices are used to inﬂuence consumers electricity
20Presence of a control group is controlled for in the analysis to come.
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consumption by aligning the retail price of electricity with the wholesale price. Or
participating households are given feedback on how much their electricity consump-
tion costs (monetary information).
Non-monetary strategies are separated into those which provide personal feedback,
and those which provide social feedback of others' electricity consumption. Individ-
ual feedback refers to interventions where participants receive information on their
current and previous consumption in energy units. This refers to consumption infor-
mation that is in addition to the standard electricity bill, be it a more detailed bill,
or consumption information on a website. Real-time feedback refers to the same type
of information which is delivered in real-time via an energy monitor21. Households
can also receive personalised advice speciﬁc to their living situation on how to lower
their electricity consumption, or generic electricity savings tips.
Studies which provide social feedback are separated into those which provide social
norms feedback: descriptive feedback of personal consumption compared to that of
other households, and injunctive norms feedback which also provides social approval
or disapproval of a household's consumption behaviour.
Finally, a set of control variables are included in the analysis: control group: pres-
ence of a control group; weather controls : whether weather is controlled for; demo-
graphic controls : the collection of demographic information; random: households
are assigned randomly to control and treatment groups as opposed to choosing an
intervention; opt-in recruitment : households choose to participate in the study; and
duration: duration of study. These control variables are included in order to capture
the heterogeneity between the diﬀerent experiments. Furthermore, studies which in-
clude such variables control for changes in behaviour which cannot be explained by
the use of an incentive alone.
21Only data that are received via an IHD or monitor are considered to be real-time feedback in
the present analysis. Real-time data are made available to households via websites (see Houde
et al., 2013), however, the data are not accessible to consumers in real-time. They must log-on to
the site in order to access the information. The incentives used in such experiments are included
in individual feedback.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
The analysis covers 105 observations from 39 unique papers giving, on average, 2.7
observations per paper. In meta-analysis it is preferable to limit the analysis to
one observation per study in order to reduce correlation between studies (Nelson
and Kennedy, 2009). However, given that some reports describe the results of more
than one experiment, and also, due to the design of the sample experiments, doing
so would greatly limit the number of observable treatment eﬀects. To account for
potential heterogeneity due to several observations being taken from one study, in
the following analysis, standard errors are clustered by study.
Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics of the independent and dependent variables
for the full sample. Within the sample of studies selected for this analysis, individual
feedback is the most experimented treatment representing 70% of the observations
and 77% of the studies. Compared with previous meta-analysis, the share of studies
involving a form of social feedback (social norms or injunctive norms) has increased.
The injunctive norms treatment represents 27% and 26% of the observations and
studies, respectively.
Concerning the design of the primary studies, the majority use a control group for
comparison and control for demographic diﬀerences in the sample population, 90%
and 85% respectively. Fewer studies (59%) control for variations in the weather. 68%
of observations randomly assign subjects to a treatment but this is not a practice
adopted in all studies, 49%. Opt-in recruitment is the more common method of
recruitment, 67% of observations and 69% of studies.
2.5.2 Average Treatment Eﬀects
Table 2.2 also provides both a non-weighted and weighted ATE by incentive. The
ATE are weighted using study sample size as frequency weights following Schmidt
and Hunter (2014) which gives more weight to studies with larger samples. The ATE
across all incentives is 3.37% reduction in consumption. The weighted ATE takes
into consideration the diﬀering sample sizes in each study and equates to a 1.85%
reduction in electricity consumption. This means that, on average, an incentive in
a typical electricity conservation study will result in electricity savings of slightly
less than 2%. In the sample of studies selected, the eﬀect of incentives on electricity
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consumption ranges from an 22.2% reduction (Kendel and Lazaric, 2015) to a 13.69%
increase (Torriti, 2012).
From table 2.2, it can be seen that real-time feedback and monetary information
have the greatest eﬀects on electricity consumption with a weighted ATE of 2.89%
and 2.86%, respectively, indicating a reduction in consumption. Pricing strategies
have the smallest eﬀect on overall electricity consumption with a weighted ATE
showing a reduction in consumption of 0.99%.
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Weighted ATE
Incentive Peer reviewed (%) Grey literature (%)
Overall -1.96 -1.71
Pricing strategies 2.31 -1.25
Monetary information -3.63 -2.77
Individual feedback -2.02 -1.72
Real-time feedback -2.83 -2.89
Personalised advice -2.01
Savings tips -3.01 -1.76
Social norms -2.36 -1.12
Injunctive norms -2.01 -1.85
Number of observations 57 48
Table 2.3: Comparison of weighted average treatment eﬀects by literature type
For comparison between the literature types, table 2.3 provides the weighted average
treatment eﬀects by study type, i.e.: whether the study is from a peer-reviewed
journal or from the grey literature. In the sample of studies collected, there are no
reports which use personalised feedback as an incentive. Across all incentive types,
on average, a peer-reviewed study shows a weighted ATE of a 1.96% reduction, and
a study from the grey literature shows a weighted ATE of a 1.71% reduction in
consumption. Studies from the grey literature tend to show a smaller eﬀect of an
incentive on electricity consumption. Among the peer reviewed studies, the weighted
ATE of the use of pricing strategies is an increase in electricity consumption of 2.31%,
indicating that such strategies are more appropriate for reducing peak demand rather
than overall demand.
The primary studies are separated into those which use a higher number of controls;
a control group, weather and demographic controls, randomly assign households to
treatments, and use an opt-out method of recruitment, as such studies are assumed
to show a more representative estimate of the true treatment eﬀect. Studies which
compare the treatment eﬀect to a control group rather than the baseline of the
same group of households, provide a more robust estimate of the treatment eﬀect.
The same applies to studies which use weather controls and collect demographic
information. Studies which adopt a random treatment assignment method and an
opt-out method of recruitment are more representative as they use samples in which
households have not chosen their treatment method nor are subject to selection bias.
Table 2.4 gives the average treatment eﬀects by robustness. More robust studies
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Weighted
Primary obs. Min (%) Max (%) ATE (%) ATE (%)
All studies 105 -22.20 13.69 -3.37 -1.85
More robust studies 23 -5.40 -1.17 -2.17 -1.98
Less robust studies 82 -22.20 13.69 -3.71 -1.67
Table 2.4: Average treatment eﬀects by study robustness
are considered to be those which include all the above controls, less robust studies
are those which include less. Of all the studies, 22% can be considered to be more
robust. These studies have an ATE of a 2.17% reduction whereas the less robust
studies have an ATE of a 3.71% reduction. These ATE are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p-
value < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed rank test). The more robust studies show a greater
reduction when sample size is taken into consideration.
Table 2.5 provides the correlations between variables. There are no strong corre-
lations between treatment eﬀect and the treatment variables as treatment choice is
typically random. Strong positive correlations can be seen between both the per-
sonalised feedback and the social norm and injunctive norm treatments, and strong
negative correlation with opt-in recruitment as for these treatments, participating
households took part in the study by default and opted-out if they did not want to
take part. These studies are typically large-scale experiments led by utilities which
have the means to carry out such studies (Allcott, 2011b, Ayres et al., 2012).
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Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of treatment eﬀects by publication year. The ma-
jority of studies were published from 2010 onwards. Almost half of the observations
in the sample were published in 2011. There does not appear to be a trend in the
eﬀects of incentives on electricity consumption over this time period.
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Figure 2.2: Treatment eﬀects by year of publication
Figures 2.3 to 2.5 are box plots of the spread of treatment eﬀects by the presence of
a control group, the use of weather controls, or the collection of socio-demographic
data. Figure 2.3 shows that the median treatment eﬀect is slightly smaller when a
control group is present, and that the spread is greater in the absence of a control
group. Whether weather eﬀects are controlled for or not, the median treatment
eﬀect is similar. The spread is slightly tighter around the median when weather
is controlled for. Concerning the collection, or not, of socio-demographic data, the
median and the spread of the treatment eﬀects are similar. From these box plots,
there is evidence of certain outlying values of the treatment eﬀects.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 are box plots showing the spread of the data by treatment
assignment method and by sample selection method. Approximately two-thirds of
the sample studies use random assignment and/or opt-in methods. In both cases, the
median values are similar, however, the spread is more closely concentrated around
the median values when treatment assignment is random and when participants must
opt-out of the study. Households can achieve greater levels of electricity consumption
reduction when they are not randomly assigned to a treatment and when they choose
to participate in a study.
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Figure 2.3: Treatment eﬀects by presence of control group
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Figure 2.4: Treatment eﬀects by use of weather controls
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Figure 2.5: Treatment eﬀects by collection of socio-demographic data
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Figure 2.6: Treatment eﬀects by treatment assignment
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Figure 2.7: Treatment eﬀects by sample selection method
Figure 2.8 shows the distribution of treatment eﬀect by duration of the study. The
majority of studies are short in duration (shorter than 12 months). There are a
cluster of studies lasting one or two years. The majority of the longer studies are
those that are led by utilities. Finally, there are a few utility led studies which last
for almost three years. From the ﬁgure, it appears that longer studies show a smaller
eﬀect of incentives on electricity savings.
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Figure 2.8: Treatment eﬀects by study duration
The above graphical analysis indicates that the treatment eﬀects reported in primary
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studies may be particularly aﬀected by the presence of a control group, treatment
assignment and sample selection methods.
In studies without a control group, the change in electricity consumption is com-
pared within the same group of households between the treatment period and a
baseline period. Whereas in studies with a control group, the change in consump-
tion is compared both within the same group of households and between groups
of households whose consumption is measured during the treatment and baseline
periods; a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence method. The latter studies allow researchers to
account for additional factors which aﬀect electricity consumption during the course
of the study and appear to show a lesser treatment eﬀect to the former.
Households who choose to participate in a study on electricity consumption may
be particularly motivated to reduce their consumption. Those who participate in
studies on an opt-out basis (which is arguably more representative of a national
roll-out of such interventions) achieve much smaller levels of electricity reduction.
When households are randomly assigned to treatment groups, they achieve smaller
electricity savings than when they are not. This would suggest that a tailored
approach to treatment design corresponding to households existing motivations to
change their electricity consumption is pertinent. Such motivations maybe mone-
tary, environmental, or other.
The inclusion of weather controls and the collection of socio-demographic data does
not appear to have a strong impact on the reported treatment eﬀects.
The impact of these study design choices on the treatment eﬀects will be further
analysed in section 2.5.4.
2.5.3 Publication Bias Analysis
According to Card and Krueger (1995) there are three potential sources of publi-
cation bias in economic research: (1) a predisposition to accept studies which are
consistent with the conventional view; (2) an inclination to report models based on
the presence of a conventionally expected results; (3) a tendency to publish only
statistically signiﬁcant results.
Potential publication bias in the sample of primary studies used in this meta-analysis
can be analysed graphically using a funnel plot, as shown in ﬁg. 2.9. These graphs
plot treatment eﬀects against a measure of precision, such as the inverse standard
error of the treatment eﬀect or the square root of the sample size of the treatment
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group. The intuition is that the accuracy of the treatment eﬀect increases with the
level of precision. Studies with larger standard errors and smaller sample sizes are
dispersed at the bottom of the graph, with the spread of treatment eﬀects decreasing
as standard errors decrease and sample sizes increase. In the absence of publication
bias, the result is a symmetrical, inverted funnel shaped graph. On the other hand,
if there is a publication bias, an asymmetrical funnel can result due to an absence of
publications of non statistically signiﬁcant results (Egger et al., 1997, Sterne et al.,
2004).
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Figure 2.9: Funnel plot of treatment eﬀects versus sample size
The funnel plot in ﬁg. 2.9 plots treatment eﬀect against the square root of sam-
ple size. The plot shows that the majority of treatments result in a reduction of
electricity consumption. No studies from the grey literature report an increase in
electricity consumption and there are more observations from peer-reviewed articles
dispersed at the bottom of the funnel. The somewhat asymmetrical nature of the
funnel plot suggests that there may be an issue of publication bias in the present
sample due to results not being included in the analysis.
Stanley et al. (2010) suggest that publication bias may be reduced and scientiﬁc
inference improved by averaging the treatment eﬀects of the top 10% of the funnel
as these are the most precise estimates. Table 2.6 shows the non-weighted and
weighted ATE for the full sample and the top decile according to the weight used22.
22Where the inverse standard error is used as a weight, there are only 42 observations in the
sample as the standard error is not available for all studies. This sub-sample is used as as a
robustness check for issues of publication bias as the standard error is the preferred weight.
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Comparing the ATE for the top 10% of the funnel and the full sample suggests
that, on average, the eﬀect of incentives on electricity consumption is overestimated
by a factor of 2. When sample size is accounted for, as the weighted ATE shows,
the distortion due to publication bias is greatly reduced and the diﬀerence is not
signiﬁcant (p = 0.8641).
As the inverse standard error is the preferred measure of precision, the non-weighted
and weighted ATE of the 42 observations for which standard errors are reported or
can be constructed are also given. The distortion due to publication bias is smaller
for this subset of the sample when comparing ATE between the top 10% and the
full sample (a factor of 1.8), and the diﬀerence in values is not signiﬁcant (p > 0.1)
once sample size is accounted for.
ATE (%) Weighted ATE (%)
Sample size 1/SE Sample size 1/SE
Top 10% of funnel plot -1.69 -1.69 -1.79 -1.62
Full sample -3.37 -3.06 -1.85 -1.75
Table 2.6: ATE correcting for publication bias
The above correction for publication bias suggests that if present, any bias is small
and not statistically signiﬁcant once sample sizes have been accounted for in calcu-
lating weighted average treatment eﬀects. Nevertheless, it is prudent to test for the
existence of such bias.
In the presence of publication bias, treatment eﬀects are positively correlated with
their standard errors (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). This suggests that the size
of an eﬀect will depend on its standard error:
treatment_effecti = β0 + β1SEi + i (2.2)
To account for diﬀerences in the primary studies, the equation is weighted by a
measure of precision, ideally the inverse of its standard error (Stanley et al., 2010):
ti = β0(1/SEi) + β1 + vi (2.3)
where ti is the t-statistic of the treatment eﬀect. As standard errors are not available
for all observations, this equation is also constructed using the square root of sample
size as the measure of precision:
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treatment_effecti/sample_size
0.5
i = β0(1/sample_sizei)
0.5 + β1 + vi. (2.4)
In the presence of publication bias, treatment eﬀects are positively correlated with
their standard errors, and negatively correlated with sample sizes, as standard errors
are inverse functions of sample size (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012, Schmidt and
Hunter, 2014). Estimates of β0 from eqs. (2.3) and (2.4) are an alternative correction
of publication bias (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). Table 2.7 shows the results of
the estimations of the models in eqs. (2.3) and (2.4) for the sub sample of 42 studies
for which the standard error is present and for the full sample using the square root
of sample size as a proxy measure of precision.
Testing H0 : β1 = 0 is a test of whether publication bias is present, the funnel
asymmetry test. If the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero then there is
publication bias. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation (eq. (2.3)), the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected. In the second and third speciﬁcations when the sample size is used
as a weight for both the sub sample and the full sample, the null hypothesis is
rejected (p-values = 0.076 and 0.096, respectively). There is thus marginal evidence
of publication bias in the full sample using the sample size as a proxy for provision.
A second test, the precision eﬀect test, of whether there is a genuine empirical eﬀect
can be tested: H0 : β0 = 0. In both models, the null hypothesis is rejected, implying
that there is a genuine empirical eﬀect which merits further analysis.
Graphically, the funnel plot suggests that there is a potential issue of publication
bias. When comparing the ATE of the full sample to the top 10% of the funnel, this
bias is of a factor 2. Testing for publication bias suggests that publication bias is
present in the full sample. However, accounting for sample sizes reduces the bias to
a small and statistically insigniﬁcant amount. Therefore, a WLS estimation will be
used to mitigate publication bias and to account for heteroscedasticity in the sample
of primary observations, as discussed in Section 2.4.2.
2.5.4 Eﬀects of Individual Incentives
The analysis of publication bias has shown such bias to be mitigated by taking
sample sizes into consideration. The square root of sample size is therefore used as
a weight in the following section in which the eﬀects of the diﬀerent incentives on
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(1) (2) (3)
Standard error
Equation (2.3)
Sample size
Equation (2.4)
Sample size
Equation (2.4)
β0 -1.578∗∗∗ -7.040∗∗∗ -7.752∗∗∗
(0.305) (0.204) (1.909)
β1 -32.499 0.015∗ 0.015∗
(40.713) (0.008) (0.009)
Observations 42 42 105
R2 0.777 0.577 0.501
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are clustered by primary study.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.7: Estimation of publication bias
electricity consumption are analysed23.
Table 2.8 shows the results of the WLS meta-regression analysis across the diﬀerent
incentive types. Speciﬁcations 1-3 focus on a particular incentive strategy (mone-
tary, personal feedback or social feedback). The fourth considers the study design
features and the ﬁnal speciﬁcation includes all variables. Each speciﬁcation includes
a variable accounting for the duration of the study and the type of literature it
is from. Finally, standard errors for each estimation are clustered by study to ac-
count for any dependence between studies. Coeﬃcients on the diﬀerent incentives
are interpreted as a change in electricity consumption relative to the consumption
of the control group, when present in the study which is the case for 90% of the
observations, or the baseline level of consumption. A negative coeﬃcient signiﬁes a
reduction in electricity consumption.
Pricing strategies have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect: electricity consumption is in-
creased by 2.8 percentage points. When all incentives are controlled for, this signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect falls out. The eﬀect ofmonetary information becomes signiﬁcant, showing
an increase in electricity consumption of 2.5 percentage points. These results are
opposite to those predicted by the theory. It may be that as pricing strategies such
as dynamic pricing provide households with the possibility of consuming at a lower
price during oﬀ-peak periods24, the rebound eﬀect of consumption outweighs the
23The results of a cluster-robust OLS estimation are provided in Appendix A as a benchmark
for the following WLS estimation.
24Studies which used such incentives were included in the present meta-analysis as the primary
authors also considered the eﬀect of the incentive on overall household electricity demand.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Monetary
Personal
feedback
Social
feedback
Study
design
All
incentives
Pricing strategies 2.790∗ 1.318
(1.462) (1.571)
Monetary information 0.662 2.492∗
(1.384) (1.414)
Individual feedback -3.115∗∗ -3.919∗∗
(1.358) (1.675)
Real-time feedback -0.651 -2.138
(1.415) (1.584)
Savings tips 4.385∗∗ 4.069∗∗
(2.104) (1.967)
Personalised advice 0.562 -0.746
(2.021) (2.425)
Social norms -4.316∗ -4.518∗∗
(2.387) (2.174)
Injunctive norms -5.000∗∗ -3.238
(1.998) (3.281)
Control group 7.278∗∗ 10.790∗∗∗ 8.483∗∗ 7.642∗∗ 11.161∗∗∗
(3.307) (3.259) (3.414) (3.489) (2.840)
Weather controls -0.095 0.804 0.856 0.671 -0.671
(1.436) (1.449) (1.385) (1.311) (1.985)
Demographic controls 1.295 1.314 2.524 1.104 2.455
(2.631) (2.857) (3.118) (2.962) (2.776)
Random assignment -1.704 -2.727 -1.642 -1.490 -2.783
(2.216) (2.446) (2.777) (2.419) (2.457)
Opt-in recruitment -1.604 0.546 -3.795∗ -0.466 -3.262
(1.554) (1.710) (2.179) (1.336) (2.840)
Duration 0.198∗ 0.265∗∗ 0.205∗ 0.170 0.325∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.119) (0.105) (0.103) (0.111)
Peer reviewed 4.638∗∗∗ 4.208∗∗ 4.831∗∗∗ 3.503∗∗ 5.801∗∗∗
(1.698) (1.840) (1.635) (1.549) (1.883)
Constant -15.394∗∗∗ -19.722∗∗∗ -14.319∗∗∗ -14.936∗∗∗ -17.496∗∗∗
(4.160) (5.760) (4.352) (4.201) (5.348)
Observations 105 105 105 105 105
Adjusted R2 0.195 0.342 0.218 0.181 0.381
Standard errors in parentheses
Inverse square roots of sample size are used as analytical weights.
Standard errors are clustered by primary study.
A negative coeﬃcient reads as a reduction in energy consumption.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.8: WLS estimation of treatment eﬀects
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savings encouraged by the higher peak price (Geelen et al., 2013, Khan et al., 2016).
An explanation as to why monetary information does not have the predicted eﬀect
is that the possible savings are too small to be motivating (Hargreaves et al., 2010,
Goulden et al., 2014), or that households expenditure on electricity is small relative
to their income (Faruqui et al., 2010b, Schleich et al., 2013).
In both the personal feedback and the full speciﬁcation individual feedback has a
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect indicating a reduction in electricity consumption of 3-
4 percentage points. When such feedback is delivered in real-time no additional
signiﬁcant eﬀects on electricity consumption are found. This could indicate that
the eﬀectiveness of feedback is captured in the individual feedback variable, or that
real-time feedback reinforces the fact that individual actions to save energy do not
amount to large savings (Hargreaves et al., 2010, Goulden et al., 2014). The use of
savings tips indicates an increase in consumption of 4 percentage points. Generic
advice on how to save electricity appears to not be eﬀective at reducing consumption.
One reason for this is that householders generally know what they should do to
reduce their consumption and that reminding them of such behaviours serves to
crowd out any intrinsic motivation they had to do so.
In this meta-analysis, social feedback is separated into social norms and injunctive
norms. Speciﬁcation 3 shows that both types of social feedback result in a reduction
in consumption of 4-5 percentage points. This provides new evidence of the eﬀec-
tiveness of such feedback compared to ﬁndings in Delmas et al. (2013) who found
no signiﬁcant eﬀect of such feedback. Since their meta-analysis, there has been an
increase in large-scale studies of such incentives.
Across the ﬁve speciﬁcations, the 10% of studies which do not use a control group
show a greater increase in electricity reduction of between 7.3 and 11.2 percentage
points compared to those that do use a control group. This suggests that when
electricity savings are calculated compared to a baseline of the same group, they
may be overestimated. Duration of the study has a small signiﬁcant positive eﬀect
on electricity consumption in speciﬁcations 1-3, and 5. This adds to the previous
evidence that electricity conservation experiments are subject to attrition of the
eﬀects of incentives over time (Delmas et al., 2013). The positive coeﬃcient on peer
reviewed suggests that peer reviewed experiments are more conservative in their
estimations of the eﬀects of an incentive on electricity consumption than those from
the grey literature.
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2.6 Discussion
The meta-analysis presented in this paper provides a comparison of diﬀerent incen-
tives used in the experimental literature to incentivise residential consumers to lower
their electricity demand. Contrary to previous analyses, it provides a comparison of
contemporary experimental studies by focusing on studies from 2005 onwards, the
"Smart Grid Era". Previous analyses risk overstating the potential of diﬀerent in-
centives by including older studies (McKerracher and Torriti, 2013). By restricting
the time frame, the intention is to limit the analysis to studies with similar available
energy monitoring technology, in order to avoid exacerbating issues of heterogeneity
due to diﬀering temporal contexts.
In order to avoid issues of publication bias, the present meta-analysis adopted a wide
search method to collect data from both peer-reviewed and grey literature studies.
To verify the extent of the publication bias issue in the sample of studies used, a
detailed analysis of the potential bias was carried out as a graphical examination
of the potential publication bias suggested that this may be an issue. However,
estimations of the amount of bias and tests of its presence have shown it to not be
a signiﬁcant issue for the present sample of studies once sample size is accounted
for. Furthermore, the precision eﬀect test shows that there is a genuine underlying
eﬀect of interest.
In addition, the experimentation of new methods of encouraging households to lower
their electricity demand are included in the present meta-analysis, namely the use
of injunctive norms in addition to social norms. Furthermore, a greater level of
study design controls are included to control for heterogeneity between studies. This
provides an opportunity to disentangle the eﬀects of such incentives and to carry out
a more extensive comparison of the eﬀects of diﬀerent study methods on residential
electricity demand.
The analysis has shown that on average and before taking into consideration pri-
mary study sample size, the diﬀerent incentives result in a reduction in electricity
consumption ranging from 2.22 to 4.69%. Across all incentives, a study on the ef-
fect of an incentive on electricity consumption can be expected to show a 3.37%
reduction in electricity consumption. This eﬀect is lower than reported in previous
meta-analyses, however it is in line with the conclusion of McKerracher and Torriti
(2013) that there is a downward trend in the size of conservation eﬀects. Account-
ing for sample sizes, as the publication bias analysis suggests, a study will show on
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average a reduction in consumption of 1.85%.
In terms of the level of controls used in the studies, compared to previous meta-
analyses, there has been an increase in the number of studies using control groups,
and controlling for demographic variables and weather variations which leads to
lower, but arguably more reliable, estimates of the eﬀect of incentives on electricity
consumption. The two diﬀering levels of study controls show a diﬀerence in esti-
mated electricity savings of 1.54 percentage points: more robust studies with more
controls result in a lower average reduction in consumption of 2.17% compared to
3.71% for less robust studies. If such incentives are to be implemented at a national
level, these more robust studies may be a better reﬂection of the level of electric-
ity savings that may be achieved. A graphical analysis showed that in studies in
which households are randomly assigned to a treatment there is a smaller spread in
treatment eﬀects.
In studies in which households choose to participate, there is a greater spread of
treatment eﬀects. These households may have motivations to take part in electricity
consumption ﬁeld experiments and pilot studies that are not necessarily accounted
for in the experiment. These participants may be predisposed to make a greater
eﬀort than if the incentive were to be implemented at a national level (Alexander,
2010, Ericson, 2011). This implies that caution should be exercised when viewing
the results of experiments in which participants self-select into a treatment.
While at the descriptive level, all incentives result in a reduction of residential elec-
tricity consumption on average, the econometric analysis shows that only certain
incentives have a signiﬁcant eﬀect once other variables are controlled for. Mone-
tary-based incentives (pricing strategies and monetary information) tend to result
in an increase in residential electricity consumption. Hypotheses 1a and 1b can be
rejected for the present sample.
Individual feedback has a signiﬁcant eﬀect at reducing electricity consumption, how-
ever, there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect of real-time feedback. Real-time feedback is eﬀective
at reducing consumption, as shown in the descriptive analysis, however when other
informational feedback and study design variables are controlled for, the eﬀect is
not signiﬁcant. Given that real-time feedback is often proposed in combination with
other incentives, it may be diﬃcult to isolate the eﬀect of real-time feedback alone.
Concerning the two types of guidance that can be given to households, personalised
advice does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on electricity consumption. However, sav-
ings tips are shown to increase electricity consumption. There is evidence to support
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hypothesis 2a, and to reject hypothesis 3b. There is inconclusive evidence to neither
support nor reject hypotheses 2b and 3a.
Next, it was hypothesised that the use of social norms would have a signiﬁcant
reduction eﬀect on residential electricity consumption only in the presence of in-
junctive norms. Both the use of descriptive social norms and injunctive norms have
a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on electricity consumption when other incentives are
controlled for. There is evidence to refute hypothesis 4a, social norms alone do have
the desired eﬀect of reducing electricity demand. There is also evidence to support
hypothesis 4b.
Hypothesis 5 refers to the eﬀect of incentives with respect to sample size: as sample
size increases, the eﬀect of an incentive on electricity consumption falls. As ﬁg. 2.9
shows, there is greater variation in ATE when sample sizes are smaller, whereas
with larger samples, the treatment eﬀect is smaller. This provides some evidence to
support hypothesis 5.
Similarly to previous meta-analyses, the sample set is separated by number of con-
trols used. More robust studies are those which are deemed to be more represen-
tative of the population (use random treatment assignment and an opt-out method
of recruitment) and which include greater controls of potential heterogeneity (use
a control group, account for weather variation and collect socio-demographic data).
The more robust studies show a statistically signiﬁcant smaller ATE than the other
studies. This provides evidence to support hypothesis 6.
Finally, hypothesis 7 refers to the downward trend in ATE over time. Previous meta-
analyses found that incentives reduced electricity consumption by upwards of 6.4%.
The present analysis found an overall ATE of 3.37%, or a weighted ATE of 1.85%.
This lends support to the hypothesis that the incentives used have a smaller eﬀect
on electricity consumption in the Smart Grid Era compared to the eras identiﬁed in
previous meta-analyses.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper has provided an analysis of the eﬀects of diﬀerent incentives used in
recent residential electricity consumption studies across the ﬁelds of economics, psy-
chology, marketing and building research. This meta-analysis provides the most
up to date assessment of recent experimental literature including newer methods of
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incentivising consumers to lower their energy consumption.
On average, an incentive designed to reduce household electricity consumption will
result in a reduction in consumption of 3.37%. Accounting for the diﬀerent sized
samples used in the individual studies, an incentive can be expected to reduce elec-
tricity consumption by 1.85%. This result indicates that electricity consumption
reductions can be attained by incentivising households to make behavioural changes
to reduce their electricity consumption.
In particular, less costly incentives such as informing households of their individ-
ual consumption25, or of the average consumption in their neighbourhood shows a
greater level of reduction on electricity consumption compared to more costly incen-
tives such as pricing strategies. This has important policy implications given that
the latter incentive is often not readily accepted by consumers (Alexander, 2010).
This indicates that lower-cost incentives may be suﬃcient and that there is not nec-
essarily a need to use costly pricing strategies when the objective is to reduce overall
electricity consumption. Much focus in recent years has been on injunctive norm
based incentives. One conclusion of this analysis is that descriptive social norms
may be suﬃcient on their own.
The present meta-analysis faces certain limits. To begin with, the meta-analysis is
as reliable as the primary studies included in the dataset. Certain primary studies
found treatment eﬀects which were much larger, in both the direction of reducing and
of consuming more electricity. Such results should not necessarily be excluded from
the dataset as they meet the criteria set out in section 2.4.1, however, they may
inﬂuence the ﬁndings and conclusions of the analysis. Secondly, few experiments
test the eﬀect of a single incentive on electricity consumption as they often combine
several incentive types. This makes it diﬃcult to separate the eﬀects of individual
incentives on electricity consumption due to confounding eﬀects. A third limit con-
cerns the diﬀerences in the design of the various studies that are not accounted for
in the present study. For example, the composition of the samples in the primary
studies is not necessarily identical: participants may have previously participated in
similar studies, or the study may focus on a particular type of household.
For future research, this analysis highlights that it is important to undertake ﬁeld
studies which are methodologically rigorous; studies which include control groups,
control for demographic information and variations in weather. Including a control
group and controlling for the weather provides a better estimate of the eﬀect of an
25Predominately via paper bills or on a website in the current sample of studies
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incentive as there may other factors which aﬀect electricity consumption in addition
to the incentive used. Furthermore, when individuals self-select into studies, and/or
treatments, the reported eﬀects of incentives are of a greater reduction in electricity
consumption than when an opt-out or random treatment assignment approach is
used. This provides support for the idea that a national roll-out of a particular
incentive may not be the best approach as greater electricity savings can be attained
if households are able to pick an incentive which is appropriate to them. A one-
size-ﬁts-all may not be the most eﬀective. However, a tailored approach may not
be feasible. More research needs to be done in this area to determine whether
households are able to pick appropriate incentives, and on the eﬀect of tailored
incentives on electricity consumption.
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Abstract
The aim of demand response is to encourage consumers to be more
ﬂexible with their energy consumption during peak periods. Using a con-
textualised common pool resource (CPR) framework, energy consumption
choices are studied. Subjects choose how much to consume by deciding
whether to use ﬁve diﬀerent appliances during 10 periods. The total con-
sumption of these activities is the CPR contribution, and payoﬀs depend
on personal consumption and the amount consumed by the group. In the
nudge treatment, subjects are nudged towards the socially optimal level
of consumption by the use of a happy or sad face if they are under-
consuming or overconsuming. In the price treatment, a price is set to
incentivise subjects to choose the level of consumption observed in the
nudge treatment. The objective is to quantify the nudge via an equiva-
lent price. Across all 10 periods, consumption is signiﬁcantly lower in
treatment groups compared to control groups. There are implications for
policy makers as the nudge treatment performs as well as an equivalent
price without the implied loss of welfare, and is understood and inte-
grated into subjects' decision making quicker than an equivalent price.
However, the nudge reinforces existing consumption behaviour as those
who over consume continue to over consume.
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3.1 Introduction
After a discussion of households experiences with smart meters and dynamic pric-
ing for both energy ﬂexibility and overall demand reduction, and an analysis of
incentives used to encourage households to lower their electricity consumption, this
chapter focuses on two particular incentives and their eﬀectiveness for lowering peak
energy demand. The meta-analysis has shown that monetary incentives are perhaps
not best used to incentivise overall demand reduction; they are more eﬀective at en-
couraging ﬂexibility (Faruqui and Sergici, 2013) and that non-monetary incentives,
such as social feedback, were shown to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect at reducing overall
electricity consumption. In this chapter, these two types of incentive are put to the
test in a laboratory-based, stylised energy consumption game.
The main research hypothesis is that the management of end-use electricity con-
sumption during peak periods is similar to the management of agents who use a
common pool resource (CPR). Here, the CPR is the limited renewable energy sources
which are sustained so long as electricity consumption does not exceed power ca-
pacities. Such an approach provides the possibility of exploring, in an experimental
setting, the impacts of demand response tools on consumers' behaviour when they
are placed in the social dilemma resulting from the need to balance supply and de-
mand, while maintaining their desired level of consumption and comfort. Following
Ostrom (1990), and more recently Melville et al. (2017) in the energy ﬁeld, this
dilemma is the conﬂict between the personal interest of consuming electricity with-
out constraint, and the collective interest of maintaining power supply reliability.
This introduction provides the background on the impacts of increasing the share
of renewable energy on power supply reliability, and consequently on the need for
demand response programmes based on monetary, and non-monetary incentives or
nudges. The principal objective of the experiment is to use a contextualised CPR
game to explore the eﬀect of nudges and peak prices on subjects' consumption choices
compared to when no policies are used, and to give a monetary value to the nudge.
The secondary objective is to compare subjects' choice of which appliances to use
and which electricity-consuming activities to take part in when faced with a need to
reduce their demand. This section sets out the theory behind the CPR game used
in the experiment, and Section 3.2 describes the experimental design. Section 3.3
presents and discusses the results, and Section 3.4 concludes and provides policy
recommendations.
82 CHAPTER 3: DEMAND RESPONSE AS A CPR GAME
3.1.1 Renewable Energy and Demand Response Programmes
In the last two decades, there has been an increase in the share of renewable energy
and in the number of distributed power generators (Renewable Energy Policy Net-
work for the 21st Century, 2016). This calls for new strategies in the management of
the electricity grid in order to maintain power supply reliability and quality, particu-
larly at times when intermittent energy sources constitute a signiﬁcant part of total
system capacity. This need is all the more important given that the European Union
has set ambitious targets to reduce greenhouse emissions and to increase the share
of renewable energy sources in the production mix by 2030 (European Commission,
2014a).
Reliable management of the electricity system requires a perfect balance between
supply and demand in real time. Given the increase in renewable energy sources,
this balance is harder to achieve as supply and demand levels can change rapidly and
unexpectedly, in particular on high demand days and when natural conditions are
unfavourable for the use of renewable energy sources. Moreover, the power genera-
tion infrastructure is highly capital intensive, such that demand side management
may be one of the cheaper tools available for balancing supply and demand. Given
the greater diﬃculty of producing peak electricity, there is a need to have a more
ﬂexible residential energy demand, particularly during peak periods. Demand re-
sponse programmes, deﬁned as the changes in electricity usage by end-use consumers
from their normal consumption patterns in response to signals, are the main tool
used or experimented in the management of the electricity grid (Balijepalli et al.,
2011).
Current methods used to incentivise households to lower their energy demand in-
clude dynamic tariﬀ structures, informational incentives, or nudge-based incentives.
Under certain tariﬀ structures consumers face ﬁnancial incentives to reduce their
energy demand as during certain hours or on days when demand is particularly
high, the price of electricity is greater than at oﬀ-peak times. This increased price is
designed to induce lower electricity use at times with high wholesale market prices
or when system reliability is jeopardised (Borenstein et al., 2002, Faruqui et al.,
2010b,a, Hargreaves et al., 2010, Raw and Ross, 2011). Informational incentives
involve providing the household with increased information on their consumption to
allow them to make a more informed decision. Such incentives include information
on how personal consumption compares from one day to another, or on a weekly or
a monthly basis (Benders et al., 2006, Houde et al., 2013, Mizobuchi and Takeuchi,
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2013, Schleich et al., 2013, Carroll et al., 2014, Schultz et al., 2015). Nudge based
incentives go beyond simple information by changing the way the information is
presented in order to exploit behavioural biases (Schultz et al., 2007, Thaler and
Sunstein, 2008, Allcott, 2011b, Ayres et al., 2012).
This experiment is particularly related to laboratory experiments which study the
eﬀect of monetary and non-monetary incentives, or nudges, on behaviour. These
areas of literature are discussed below.
3.1.2 Monetary Incentives and Nudges in the Laboratory
In CPR laboratory experiments, monetary incentives are often modelled as taxes.
These are a ﬁrst best policy for managing behaviours which result in negative exter-
nalities (Ballard and Medema, 1993). In experimental games with negative exter-
nalities, studies have shown that taxes result in subjects performing at near optimal
levels (Plott, 1983, Cochard et al., 2005). Yet, taxes are seldom accepted by the pub-
lic. This can be explained by a preference for the status quo (Cherry et al., 2014),
by tax aversion: individuals feel that negative incentives, such as taxes, impede
their free-will and are controlling, and by framing: acceptance for taxes increases
when the mechanism behind them is explained (Kallbekken et al., 2011, Heres et al.,
2013).
Given that monetary interventions such as taxes, and dynamic pricing in the con-
text of electricity consumption, can be politically diﬃcult to implement (Alexander,
2010) as well as costly, policy makers have also used non-price interventions to in-
ﬂuence households to reduce their energy consumption, such as nudges.
A nudge is deﬁned as a change to a choice setting which alters individuals' behaviour
without removing any of the choices available to them nor aﬀecting their economic
incentives. Nudges are designed to incentivise individuals to pick an option that is in
their best interest, an option which they would not necessarily choose for themselves
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). While the idea of nudges is not recent, the term has
certainly seen an increased level of interest in recent years. The nudge intervention
used in this experiment relates to both information on suggested play as the feedback
is based upon the optimal level of consumption, and on social approval as an element
of whether an individual's consumption behaviour is approved of or not is included
in the nudge.
Experiments using suggested play recommend a course of action to subjects con-
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cerning their contribution to a public good or their extractions from a common pool
resource. In a threshold public good game, Marks et al. (1999) and Croson and
Marks (2001) ﬁnd that suggesting a fair contribution to subjects before they decide
on their contribution only results in the provision of the public good when prefer-
ences are heterogeneous. Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2014) ﬁnd that suggested play works
only under the addition of an element of moral suasion; the idea that in a public
good game, increasing your contribution to the maximum amount beneﬁts everyone.
In a CPR game, Delaney and Jacobson (2015) suggest to groups what they should
do to increase their payoﬀs using both informative and normative messaging and
compare this to a subsidy. They ﬁnd that the subsidy is the most eﬀective, followed
by normative then informative messaging. The authors note that it is unusual
that the normative messaging treatment results in only a slight greater reduction in
extraction level when compared to information alone given that previous research
has found signiﬁcant eﬀects on energy and water consumption reduction through the
use of normative messages (Schultz et al., 2007, Allcott, 2011b, Ayres et al., 2012,
Ferraro and Price, 2013). They suggest that the non-signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the
results may be due to small sample sizes (n=15). However, it may also be due to
a certain level of overlap between the two treatments, as the information treatment
also contains normative language. The two treatments, information and normative
messaging should perhaps instead be viewed as a weak normative message and as a
strong normative message, respectively.
Boun My and Ouvrard (2018) explore the impact of recommended play, or a nudge,
and taxes on contributions to a public good for reducing pollution. They hypothesise
that reaction to a nudge is greater when subjects are more sensitive to environmental
issues. After measuring environmental sensitivity, subjects are split into groups ac-
cording to whether they are more or less environmentally sensitive than average and
are then faced with either a nudge; a statement of the socially optimal contribution
to the public good, or a tax; a linear tax based upon the optimal contribution.
The tax treatment shows the greatest increase in contributions for both high and low
environmentally sensitive groups, a 45% and 34% increase in contributions, respec-
tively. They ﬁnd that the nudge divides subjects according to their environmental
sensitivity, with the least sensitive reducing their contribution by 29% compared
to the baseline, and the most sensitive increasing their contribution by 14%. In
their set-up, Boun My and Ouvrard (2018) create groups of either all highly envi-
ronmentally sensitive subjects, or of less environmentally sensitive subjects. This
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is perhaps not entirely reﬂective of the situations where individuals interact with
people of diﬀering levels of environmental sensitivity.
In addition to suggested play, the nature of the nudge used in this experiment pro-
vides social approval or disapproval of an individual's behaviour in the game. The
rationale is that social approval increases optimal behaviour in CPR games as sub-
jects perceive utility (disutility) from social approval (disapproval) (Rege and Telle,
2004). There is mixed evidence as to whether social information and approval in-
creases or decreases optimal behaviour in collective action games. It has been shown
both theoretically (Holländer, 1990, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and experimentally
(Cialdini, 2003, Rege and Telle, 2004, Spraggon et al., 2015) that such social norms
can increase contributions in collective action games. In other experiments, social
approval has been shown to reduce optimal behaviour (Noussair and Tucker, 2007,
Brent et al., 2017).
The social approval used in this experiment does not come from the other subjects,
but from the regulator who informs subjects via a happy or sad face whether they
are consuming more or less than the optimal amount.
3.1.3 Theory of Common Pool Resources
In economics, goods are classiﬁed based upon their degree of excludability and ri-
valry. Table 3.1 provides a general framework of the classiﬁcation of goods according
to these two criteria. A common pool resource is both rivalrous and non-excludable;
once it has been consumed by an individual, another individual cannot consume it,
and it is costly to exclude individuals from consuming it. Such goods face a problem
of over consumption as individuals wish to consume more than the amount which
is sustainable.
Excludable Non-excludable
Rivalrous Private goods Common pool resources
Non-rivalrous Club goods Public goods
Table 3.1: A classiﬁcation of goods
Formally, a common pool resource is deﬁned as a stock of a natural or man-made
resource system from which a ﬂow of resource units can be withdrawn. The stock of
a CPR is renewable and so the stock can be sustained so long as average withdrawal
rates do not exceed average replenishment rates. The social dilemma of CPRs is that
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individuals would like to withdraw more than the sustainable amount of resource
units from the stock and as such there is a conﬂict between personal interest and
collective interest.
A game of common pool resource extraction can be modelled as follows: a group of
n players share a common resource. They each have an endowment e which can be
used to invest in the extraction of the common resource. The amount invested in
resource extraction by individual i is xi with Σxi the amount invested by the group.
Extraction of the resource earns each player a for every unit extracted personally,
minus b for every unit extracted by the group regardless of who extracts it. The
parameter a represents the utility of consuming electricity in terms of increased com-
fort, the use of appliances without constraint, whereas the parameter b represents
the disutility of all subjects' consumption of electricity in terms of voltage reduc-
tions and brief power cuts. The cost of investing in the extraction of the resource is
c. Each player's proﬁt depends on his own investment in extraction as well as the
group investment:
pii = e− cxi + xi(a− bΣxi) (3.1)
A rational, self-interested player invests an amount xi which maximises their proﬁt:
maxxipi(xi,Σxi) = e− cxi + xi(a− bΣxi) (3.2)
The ﬁrst order condition is:
− c+ a− bxi − bΣxi = 0 (3.3)
Supposing that all agents are equal, a symmetric Nash equilibrium can be found
such that xi = xj = x for all players i, j.
xi =
(a− c)
b(n+ 1)
(3.4)
This level of extraction maximises individual proﬁts regardless of the eﬀects of an
individual's extraction on the group.
The socially optimal investment in resource extraction is the amount x which max-
imises the collective proﬁt. Assuming symmetry, the player maximises:
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maxxnpi(x) = n[e− cx+ x(a− bnx)] (3.5)
The ﬁrst order condition is:
− cn+ an− 2bn2x = 0 (3.6)
which gives an optimal investment where:
xi =
(a− c)
2bn
(3.7)
This level of extraction takes into consideration the eﬀect of each individual's con-
sumption on the resource system.
The Nash equilibrium results in a higher level of extraction than the socially optimal
amount, hence the social dilemma. One option to align private earnings with the
social optimum, is to increase the cost of extraction c such that the Nash equilib-
rium and socially optimal level of extraction are equal. The cost of extraction c is
increased by an amount d and its value is found by equating the Nash equilibrium
and the socially optimal solution.
a− c− d
b(n+ 1)
=
a− c
2bn
(3.8)
d =
(a− c)(n− 1)
2n
(3.9)
This theoretical framework has been applied to residential electricity consumption
(Bäckman, 2011, Goldthau, 2014, Gollwitzer et al., 2018). The electricity network
(power stations, distribution centres, transmission lines) represents a man-made re-
source system and the resource units are the kilowatt hours which can be consumed.
In the short run, it can be considered that this system provides a stock of electric-
ity units available to households. The stock of electricity is renewable in the sense
that once electricity has been consumed it must be immediately reproduced in order
to maintain supply and demand balance. Currently, generated electricity cannot be
stored so the amount generated needs to correspond to the amount being consumed.
There is limited storage capability in generators which are able to maintain electric-
ity supply for under a minute. Beyond a minute, the supply is unstable and there is
a risk of blackouts due to drops in frequency and voltage (Pratt and Fuller, 2016).
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Given this, on on days of extreme weather, or when renewable energy resources
supply electricity, there is risk of demand outstripping supply which implies a need
to reduce the demand for electricity.
Individuals wish to consume electricity without constraint which is represented by
the Nash equilibrium level of extraction described above. However, on days in
which demand response is required, it would be better collectively if all individuals
lowered their consumption. This level of consumption is represented within the CPR
framework as the socially optimal amount.
3.2 Experimental Design
This section details the experimental design beginning with the parametric protocol
and the diﬀerent experimental treatments, followed by the hypotheses to be tested
and a description of the participants and the procedure.
3.2.1 Experimental Parameters
The game concerns electricity consumption during 10 peak periods when demand
can be greater than production. In the experiment, subjects form groups of four
(n = 4) for 10 peak periods (t = 10). Subjects remain in the same groups for
the duration of the experiment. Each group makes up an electricity consumption
system of four households which represent a neighbourhood or small society. In this
context, the demand response challenge is represented as a repeated CPR game.
At the start of each period, each subject receives an endowment e = 100 ECU29
which they can use to consume electricity (measured in energy units (EU)). In the
control and nudge treatments each EU costs 1 ECU (c = 1). The cost of each EU
changes in the price treatment (c = 3) as discussed below in section 3.2.1.2. Any
ECU that the subject does not use to consume electricity is kept by the subject
and included in their proﬁt function. For every EU consumed, the subject receives
a = 13 and every EU consumed costs b = 0.1 for all subjects in the group regardless
of who consumed it. Subjects' proﬁt function is as follows:
pii = 100− cxi + xi(13− 0.1Σxi) (3.10)
29ECU = Experimental Currency Units. The exchange rate is communicated to all subjects
during the instruction phase and is 150 ECU = 1e.
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Individually, subjects maximise their proﬁt at the Nash equilibrium, xNE = 24 for
an individual proﬁt of 158 ECU. This level of consumption is greater, and the payoﬀ
is lower than if subjects maximised the collective gains. Collectively subjects should
each consume xSO = 15 for an individual proﬁt of 190 ECU. This represents the
collective interest of lowering consumption by demand response.
In each period, subjects must decide how much of their endowment to spend on
consuming electricity by choosing whether or not to use ﬁve diﬀerent electrical items.
Table 3.2 details the diﬀerent levels of consumption that subjects can choose from.
Subjects are told that their electricity consumption brings them comfort (via a
monetary gain) of 13 ECU for every unit consumed. The total consumption of their
group leads to a reduction in personal comfort of 0.1 ECU for every unit consumed
regardless of who consumes it. This value represents the disutility of increased
collective consumption due to voltage reductions and brief power cuts when demand
is greater than supply. The greater the total consumption of the group, the greater
the reduction in comfort.
Item Consumption levels Consumption
amount (EU)
Electric heating Unchanged 15
1◦C reduction in heating 10
2◦C reduction in heating 5
Electric water heater On 5
Oﬀ 0
Washing machine/ dishwasher On 10
Oﬀ 0
Cooking equipment On 10
Oﬀ 0
Television/ Computer On 5
Of 0
Table 3.2: Electricity consumption choices
When deciding whether or not to use the diﬀerent electrical appliances proposed,
subjects are choosing to consume energy units in increments of 5. The choice of elec-
tricity consumption is made discrete to reﬂect that in real life individuals consume
electricity by turning appliances on or oﬀ. There are three levels of consumption
for the heating choice; the same, 1◦C cooler, or 2◦C cooler. Given the discretisation
of the consumption amount, the Nash equilibrium is xi = 25 EU and the social
optimum is xi = 15 EU. To assist subjects in deciding how many EU to consume, a
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simulator30 is available as well as a printed proﬁt table. At the end of each period,
subjects see how much they have consumed and their proﬁt for the period.
3.2.1.1 Nudge treatment
In the nudge treatment, subjects are told that one way to avoid power cuts is to ask
consumers to lower their consumption during peak periods. This implies a lower level
of comfort (as the individual may lower their heating or use their washing machine
at a diﬀerent time, for example) but allows all individuals, including oneself, to
avoid a much lower comfort level, i.e. a power cut, or a reduction in the quality of
electricity distribution.
At the end of each period, subjects receive additional feedback on their consumption.
If their choice of consumption is less than or equal to the level of consumption which
minimises the reduction in comfort for the group, i.e.: the socially optimal level, they
see a picture of a smiley face. If their consumption is greater than this level, then
they see a sad face.
3.2.1.2 Price treatment
In the price treatment, subjects are told that voltage reductions and brief power
cuts can be avoided by increasing the price of electricity in order to incentivise
consumers to consume less during peak periods. The price for this treatment is
calculated with respect to the average level of consumption observed in the nudge
treatment. The goal is to compare whether the price results in the same level
of consumption as the nudge when the price implemented is designed to achieve
the level of consumption observed in the nudge treatment. The average level of
consumption observed in the nudge treatment is 19.07 across all periods. Given that
subjects can only choose consumption in increments of 5, the price is calculated such
that the Nash equilibrium consumption level in the price treatment is xNE,Pi = 20.
a− c− d
b(n+ 1)
= 20 (3.11)
13− 1− d
0.1(4 + 1)
= 20 (3.12)
30The simulator is described to subjects during the explanation of the game phase.
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d = 2 (3.13)
The price increase required to incentivise subjects to consume 20 EU is equal to 2.
The price of electricity for subjects in the price treatment is thus equal to 3 ECU.
Subjects are told that each energy unit consumed during the peak period costs 3
ECU which is three times more expensive than in a normal period31.
In this treatment the subjects maximise:
maxxipi(xi,Σxi) = 100− 3xi + xi(13− 0.1Σxi) (3.14)
The feedback given at the end of each period is the subject's level of consumption
and their earnings for that period.
3.2.2 Hypotheses
Under the assumption that subjects are rational and self-interested, it is expected
that players will choose the Nash equilibrium consumption amount in all treatments,
i.e.: 25 in the control and nudge treatment, and 20 in the price treatment. Such
players would not be inﬂuenced by the nudge described above.
Previous experiments have shown that suggesting a course of action has a positive
inﬂuence on socially optimal behaviour (Dal Bó and Dal Bó, 2014, Delaney and
Jacobson, 2015, Boun My and Ouvrard, 2018). Other experiments have found that
aligning the Nash equilibrium with the social optimum via the use of a tax (framed
as a price increase in this experiment) is a ﬁrst best policy for dealing with social
dilemmas in public good and CPR games (Plott, 1983, Ballard and Medema, 1993,
Cochard et al., 2005). However, such interventions are not always well-received by
the public. In the context of electricity consumption, varying price structures or
dynamic pricing also has its opponents (Alexander, 2010). This leads to the main
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Consumption choices in the nudge treatment will be lower than in
the control treatment.
Hypothesis 2 Consumption choices in the price treatment will be lower than in the
31This is comparable to tariﬀs proposed by EDF at the time of the experiment; the highest peak
price is approximately 3.5 times the standard tariﬀ (EDF, 2016).
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control treatment.
Hypothesis 3 As the price level is ﬁxed according to the nudge result, consumption
choices in the price treatment will be equivalent to those in the nudge treatment.
Furthermore, the positive impact of suggested play or a nudge is increased when an
element of social approval or disapproval is included (Dal Bó and Dal Bó, 2014).
In the experiment, the nudge treatment is presented as an indication of what an
individual's consumption is in relation to the level at which the loss in comfort is
minimised for the whole group. The smiley and sad faces thus act as social approval
or disapproval of a behaviour which aﬀects the whole group. As such the following
is hypothesised:
Hypothesis 4 Subjects who receive `happy face' feedback will not change their con-
sumption in the following period (those who consume the optimal amount or
less).
Hypothesis 5 Subjects who receive `sad face' feedback will lower their consumption
in the following period (those who consume more than the optimal amount).
It has been shown in a previous experiment (Boun My and Ouvrard, 2018) that
subjects' reaction to a nudge in an environmental setting depends on their envi-
ronmental sensitivity. In addition, due to the nature of the CPR game and the
interlinked eﬀects of an individual's actions on the others in their group, altruism
may also inﬂuence a subject's choice of consumption. This leads to the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 6 More environmentally sensitive and altruistic subjects will consume
less than less environmentally sensitive and altruistic subjects in all treatments.
Hypothesis 7 The diﬀerence in consumption between more and less environmen-
tally sensitive subjects will be greater in the nudge treatment than in the price
treatment.
3.2.3 Participants and Procedure
240 subjects took part in the experiment, during 12 sessions32 in March and April
2017 at Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL). Each session lasted one
32During the 8th session a technical problem occurred and so the results of this session are
excluded from the analysis. The excluded session would have been in the price treatment.
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and a half hours.
Table 3.3 shows the number of subjects, groups, and sessions per treatment. The
experiment was programmed using zTree software (Fischbacher, 2007). For partici-
pating in the experiment, subjects received a 10e show-up fee. In addition, subjects
earned 7e20 to 18e00, with average earnings across sessions of 12e30. The major-
ity of subjects were undergraduate students in various disciplines (67%), 59% were
female subjects, and the average age across subjects was 22 years.
Treatment Number of subjects Number of groups Number of sessions
Nudge 100 25 5
Price 80 20 4
Control 60 15 3
Total 240 60 12
Table 3.3: Number of subjects per treatment
At the beginning of each session, subjects randomly chose a subject number and
a computer post. Once the subjects were seated, the experimenter read aloud all
instructions33. These were also displayed on two screens at the front of the room
which all subjects could see. After general instructions concerning conﬁdentiality,
anonymity of data and the code of conduct were given, the experimenter described
the context of the game. Subjects were told that the experiment would include
several phases. The ﬁrst phase of the experiment was the CPR game. The second
phase involved a risk aversion test34. (Holt et al., 2002). In the third and ﬁnal phase,
subjects completed three questionnaires: the General Ecological Behaviour (GEB)
Scale35 (Kaiser, 1998), an altruism questionnaire (Costa and McCrae, 1992) and
ﬁnally a demographic questionnaire. The GEB questionnaire is used to determine an
individual's level of environmental sensitivity as this may impact their consumption
choices in the game. A questionnaire on altruism is included as the nature of the
game requires making a decision that aﬀects other people, thus altruistic tendencies
can be controlled for in the analysis.
The instructions for each phase were read aloud then the subjects completed the
phase before listening to the instructions on the following phase. Before the begin-
33An English translation of instructions is available in Appendix B.
34Analyses on risk attitudes were not conclusive and so are not discussed further in the rest of
the analysis.
35Following Boun My and Ouvrard (2018), a shorter version of the GEB scale is used including
28 items. See Appendix B for details of the GEB and altruism questionnaires.
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ning of the CPR game phase, subjects completed a questionnaire to determine their
understanding of the game. Subjects were informed of any wrong answers and had
to correct them before advancing to the ﬁrst period of the game.
3.3 Results and Discussion
In this section, the results are described and discussed, beginning with descriptive
statistics and a graphical analysis of group level consumption decisions, followed by
non-parametric testing. Next, subjects' individual choices analysed, for all treat-
ments and speciﬁcally for the nudge treatment according to the message received.
The eﬀect of treatment on subjects' welfare is also considered. Then, the results of
the questionnaires used at the end of the experiment are described and the consump-
tion decisions by type as identiﬁed by the questionnaires. Finally, the equipment
choices made by subjects are assessed.
3.3.1 Average Consumption at the Group Level
The dynamics of average group consumption by treatment for each period is repre-
sented in ﬁg. 3.1. Table 3.4 summarises the average group consumption by treatment
overall and in periods 1 and 2, as this is pre- and post- initial feedback. To fur-
ther analyse the results, non-parametric tests on average group level consumption
between and within treatments compared to the corresponding Nash equilibrium
and to the social optimum are performed. The second part of table 3.4 gives these
results.
In the absence of any policies, the control groups consume 23.49 on average. Though
this level of consumption is close to the Nash equilibrium level of the initial game,
it is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 25 EU (p-value=0.0355, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
When average consumption per period is tested, average consumption in the control
group is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the NE in all but 3 periods. In periods 1,
5 and 9, average consumption is at its lowest and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 25 for
the control groups (p-values<0.05, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
Result 1: In the absence of policy, subjects do not achieve the socially optimal
level of consumption.
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Treatment Period 1 Period 2 Overall
Nudge 21.80 18.20 19.07
(4.43) (3.08) (4.45)
Price 21.56 22.00 21.09
(3.71) (3.17) (3.66)
Control 21.67 23.58 23.49
(3.67) (4.11) (4.18)
Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Between treatment p-values)
Nudge = Price 0.9083 0.0004 0.0046
Nudge = Control 0.9216 0.0005 0.0001
Price = Control 0.9194 0.2027 0.0035
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Within treatment p-values)
Nudge = Social optimum (15 EU) 0.0000
Nudge = Nash equilibrium (25 EU) 0.0000
Control = Social optimum (15 EU) 0.0007
Control = Nash equilibrium (25 EU) 0.0355
Price = Nash equilibrium (20 EU) 0.0057
Standard deviations in brackets
Between treatment p-values are p-values of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.
Within treatment p-values are p-values of Wilcoxon signed rank tests.
Table 3.4: Mean group consumption by treatment
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Figure 3.1: Dynamics of average consumption by treatment
The use of a nudge results in the lowest level of consumption of 19.07 on average
across all 10 periods. This is to be expected given that the objective of the nudge is
to encourage subjects to consume the optimal level of consumption of 15. In the ﬁrst
period, all treatments start at a similar level of average consumption36. Given that
in the nudge treatment, subjects do not receive feedback until after having made
their consumption decision, it is to be expected that average group consumption in
the ﬁrst period will be similar between the nudge and control groups. In the nudge
treatment, post-feedback, consumption is consistently lower compared to the control
groups (p<0.01, Wilcoxon rank-sum test), thus supporting hypothesis 1. In ﬁg. 1.
it can be seen that after the initial feedback, the average consumption immediately
decreases and from period 2, there is a signiﬁcant and permanent eﬀect of the nudge
policy as the average level of consumption under the nudge treatment is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent to those of control groups.
Result 2: Average consumption in the nudge treatment is signiﬁcantly lower than
in the control groups.
36This diﬀerence is insigniﬁcant as tested non-parametrically using the Kruskal-Wallis test
(p=0.9899).
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In the price treatment, when the price is increased such that consumers are in-
centivised to consume 20, (i.e. the observed level of consumption in the nudge
treatment), the average group level of consumption is 21.09. This observed level of
consumption is lower than that of control groups thus providing evidence to support
hypothesis 2. In this treatment, subjects are aware of the price change prior to any
decision making. Therefore, a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between consumption decisions
in the price treatment compared to control groups in the ﬁrst period should be ex-
pected, but this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (p-value = 0.9194, Wilcoxon rank-sum
test). The average group consumption is only consistently and signiﬁcantly diﬀer-
ent from the seventh period. It is also signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in periods 3 and 5
(p-value<0.05, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). This suggests that it takes several periods
for the subjects to integrate the price increase into their decision making and that
it is not until the seventh period that the price is fully integrated into their decision
making process.
Result 3: Average consumption in the price treatment is signiﬁcantly lower than
in the control groups from the seventh period.
Given that the price increase is designed to incentivise subjects to consume the
amount observed under the nudge treatment, there should not be signiﬁcant dif-
ferences between the average group consumption decisions from the second period
onwards between the nudge and price treatments. However, signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
levels of consumption in periods 2 and 3 (p<0.01, Wilcoxon rank-sum test) are ob-
served. This suggests that subjects do not immediately integrate the price increase
into their decision making. They require a few periods of play before they take into
consideration the eﬀect of the price increase on their consumption level. This result
provides partial support for hypothesis 3, as consumption under the price increase is
greater initially, and consumption choices in the two treatments are at similar levels
from period 4.
Result 4: Consumption in the nudge and price treatments are statistically similar
from the fourth period.
Finally, for all 10 periods, consumption across the three treatments is signiﬁcantly
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diﬀerent (p<0.01, Kruskal-Wallis test). In both the nudge treatment and the control
groups, the observed average levels of consumption are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
both the Nash equilibrium of 25 and the social optimum of 15 (p<0.05, Wilcoxon
signed-rank test). Groups in the nudge and price treatments have an average level of
consumption that is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the control groups (p<0.01, Wilcoxon
rank-sum test). Moreover, the average consumption observed in the nudge treatment
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that observed in the price treatment (p<0.01, Wilcoxon
rank-sum test).
The results described in this section are robust to panel data estimation as shown in
table 3.5 which presents regression estimates of treatment eﬀects. The speciﬁcations
have been estimated using panel data random eﬀects estimation. Panel data meth-
ods are used as there are n subjects making a consumption decision in t periods.
Random eﬀects estimation is preferable to OLS or ﬁxed eﬀects estimation as it is
more eﬃcient than ﬁxed eﬀects estimation, and given that the experiment uses a
between-subject design, random eﬀects estimation allows for the estimation of the
time-invariant treatment variables (Moﬀatt, 2015).
The value of the constant represents the average group contribution controlling for
diﬀerent variables. All speciﬁcations show a clear signiﬁcant eﬀect of both the nudge
and price treatments compared to the control groups. In speciﬁcations 2 and 4, a
period variable is included to control for variation during the game, however, the
coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant. In speciﬁcations 3 and 4, dummy variables are added
to specify whether the group under or over consumed compared to the optimal
consumption in their treatment37. At the group level, there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect
on consumption due to under or overconsuming in the previous period. Given that
feedback on under or over consumption is provided at the individual level and in
the nudge treatment, this eﬀect is explored in more detail in the following section.
3.3.2 Average Consumption at the Individual Level
Table 3.6 shows the regression estimates of random eﬀects speciﬁcations of treatment
and covariates on individual consumption choice. Speciﬁcation 1 shows a signiﬁcant
treatment eﬀect for both the nudge and the price treatment at the individual level.
In even numbered speciﬁcations, proﬁt in t-1 is included and has a signiﬁcant but
small positive eﬀect on average individual consumption. As the amount earned in
37The share of each type of group (under, optimal or overconsuming) is shown in table B.1 in
Appendix B
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nudge -4.427∗∗∗ -4.427∗∗∗ -4.740∗∗∗ -4.731∗∗∗
(0.830) (0.830) (0.807) (0.808)
Price -2.398∗∗∗ -2.398∗∗∗ -2.272∗∗∗ -2.254∗∗∗
(0.702) (0.703) (0.716) (0.718)
Period -0.018 0.058
(0.052) (0.055)
Group under consumed (t-1) -0.757 -0.744
(0.683) (0.681)
Group over consumed (t-1) 0.288 0.340
(0.590) (0.609)
Constant 23.492∗∗∗ 23.588∗∗∗ 23.415∗∗∗ 23.015∗∗∗
(0.607) (0.670) (0.795) (0.935)
Observations 600 600 540 540
R2 Overall 0.153 0.154 0.208 0.210
R2 Within 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001
R2 Between 0.362 0.362 0.471 0.474
Standard errors in parentheses
Robust standard errors clustered by group.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.5: Average group consumption (random eﬀects estimation)
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t-1 increases, subjects increase their consumption in t. This could be indicative of
a rebound eﬀect where subjects who earn more, increase their consumption.
Speciﬁcations 3, 4 and 7 show that individuals who underconsumed in t-1, reduce
their consumption in t compared to optimally consuming individuals. Those who
overconsume in t-1 continue to do so compared to optimally consuming individuals.
Once individual consumption type is controlled for, the signiﬁcant eﬀect of the
price treatment falls out as the price treats all individuals equally and does not
diﬀerentiate according to how an individual consumes (under, optimally, or over).
Finally, in speciﬁcations 5-7, variables concerning subjects' sensitivity towards the
environment and their level of altruism38 are included. Individuals who are more
sensitive to environmental issues consume less. Given the context of the CPR game
as an electricity consumption decision, such individuals may have additional moti-
vation to choose a lower level of consumption so as to decrease their hypothetical
impact on the environment. There is no signiﬁcant eﬀect of altruism on individual
consumption choice.
38The construction of these variables is explained in section 3.3.4
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The eﬀect of the nudge on individual consumption decisions is also examined39.
The estimates are shown in table 3.7. Speciﬁcation 1 includes only the feedback
type, and subjects' level of environmental sensitivity and altruism is also included
in speciﬁcation 2. There is a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of the happy face feedback,
and a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of the sad face feedback in both speciﬁcations.
Subjects who under consume receive happy face feedback and subjects who over
consume receive sad face feedback. Compared to optimally consuming groups, this
feedback has the eﬀect of reinforcing an individual's behaviour in the previous pe-
riod. With regard to the feedback received by subjects in the nudge treatment, both
hypotheses 4 and 5 are rejected, as rather than nudging subjects towards the socially
optimal level of consumption, the nudge employed in this experiment reinforces sub-
jects' existing behaviour. Subjects who under (over) consume in the previous period
tend to decrease (increase) their consumption in the present period. This suggests
that while the nudge shows a decrease in average consumption at the group level,
at the individual level the nudge may serve to reinforce behaviours that are already
present. Individuals who overconsume and see a sad face in their feedback may feel
that the nudge is a threat to their freedom to consume as they wish and so react to
the feedback by demonstrating the behaviour that the nudge was trying to discour-
age (Brehm, 1966, Steindl et al., 2015).
Result 5: The feedback in the nudge treatment reinforces subjects' existing con-
sumption behaviour.
At the individual level in the nudge treatment, environmental sensitivity and level
of altruism have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on consumption choice. More environ-
mentally sensitive and altruistic individuals consume less compared to less environ-
mentally sensitive and altruistic individuals.
3.3.3 Welfare Analysis
In this section we analyse the eﬀect of the diﬀerent treatments on subjects' welfare,
at both the group and the individual level. Table 3.8 compares the average observed
welfare by treatment at the group and individual level.
We can see that both individually and at the group level, subjects are worst oﬀ in
39Table B.3 in Appendix B shows the distribution of feedback types in the nudge treatment.
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(1) (2)
Under consumption :-) (t-1) -2.317∗∗∗ -2.241∗∗∗
(0.791) (0.792)
Over consumption :-( (t-1) 4.067∗∗∗ 3.753∗∗∗
(0.765) (0.846)
High Environmental sensitivity -2.453∗∗∗
(0.673)
High Altruism -1.732∗∗
(0.846)
Constant 17.203∗∗∗ 19.770∗∗∗
(0.408) (1.021)
Observations 900 900
R2 Overall 0.115 0.142
R2 Within 0.004 0.004
R2 Between 0.825 0.601
Standard errors in parentheses
Robust standard errors clustered by group.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.7: Eﬀect of feedback on individual consumption in nudge treatment
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price treatment, and better oﬀ in the nudge treatment. The increase in the peak
price of electricity consumption results in a loss of welfare for individual subjects,
or households, and for the group of subjects, or neighbourhood or society. Given
that in the nudge treatment, there is no change in price, subjects' welfare is not
aﬀected. As such subjects are nudged towards the optimum and so their welfare,
both individually and at the group level, is greater than for control groups.
Treatment Average observed Welfare at Welfare at Welfare at a
welfare social optimum Nash equilibrium consumption of 20
Group level
Nudge 702 760 600 720
Price 510 - - 560
Control 617 760 600 720
Individual level
Nudge 175 190 150 180
Price 128 - - 140
Control 154 190 150 180
We do not provide a welfare level for the price treatment for the socially optimal and Nash equilibrium
levels of consumption as the price is designed such that the Nash equilibrium level of consumption is
equal to 20 as observed in the nudge treatment. We provide the welfare associated with this level of
consumption in the ﬁnal column.
Table 3.8: Welfare analysis at the group and the individual level
3.3.4 Questionnaire Results
In this section, the results of the questionnaires completed after the CPR game
regarding environmental sensitivity and altruism are detailed.
3.3.4.1 General Ecological Behaviour Scale
The GEB questionnaire measures an individual's environmental sensitivity (Kaiser,
1998). Of the 28 items in the questionnaire, the mean score per item is 3.34 (std.
dev. = 0.22). Cronbach's α = 0.7340. The GEB scale is therefore acceptable.
The average environmental sensitivity level of subjects overall, and per treatment
is presented in table 3.9a, followed by the between treatment Wilcoxon rank-sum
40Boun My and Ouvrard (2018) found a Cronbach's α = 0.74.
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tests in table 3.9b. The p-values indicate that the levels are statistically diﬀerent
from one another between the nudge and the price treatments, and the nudge and
control groups. Subjects are slightly more environmentally sensitive in the nudge
treatment compared to the price treatment and control groups.
Nudge Price Control Overall
108.8 106.5 107.1 107.6
(10.25) (10.64) (9.61) (10.00)
Standard deviations are in brackets.
(a) Average environmental sensitivity
Price Control
Nudge 0.0001 0.0000
Price 0.7534
(b) Between treatment p-values
Table 3.9: Environmental sensitivity questionnaire results
Table 3.10a shows the average consumption decisions of individuals in each treat-
ment according to their sensitivity to environmental issues. High environmental
sensitivity is classed as greater than the average of the sample41. As can be seen
from the table, overall and for each treatment, more environmentally sensitive sub-
jects choose to consume less. The diﬀerence in consumption level by environmental
sensitivity is the greatest in the nudge treatment. This diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant as shown in table 3.10b (p<0.01, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
Treatment Low High Total
Nudge 20.68 17.90 19.07
Price 21.38 20.86 21.09
Control 24.14 22.88 23.49
Total 21.85 20.04
(a) Average individual consumption by treat-
ment and by level of altruism
High
Nudge Price Control
Nudge 0.0000
Low Price 0.2036
Control 0.1770
(b) Between treatment p-values
Table 3.10: Average individual consumption by treatment and by environmental
sensitivity
In line with Boun My and Ouvrard (2018), subjects' consumption choices in the
nudge treatment vary according to their level of environmental sensitivity. When
comparing behaviour under each treatment by level of environmental sensitivity, in
the nudge treatment subjects consume less than in the price treatment. These re-
sults provide support for hypotheses 6 and 7.
41In the nudge, price and control groups, 58%, 55% and 52% of subjects have high environmen-
tally sensitivity, respectively.
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Result 7: Individuals are aﬀected diﬀerently by the nudge according to their level
of environmental sensitivity. In the price and control groups, there is no diﬀerence
according to environmental sensitivity.
3.3.4.2 Altruism Questionnaire
The altruism questionnaire is used to measure how altruistic subjects are. The
mean score per item is 3.28 (std. dev. = 0.33). Cronbach's α is 0.68. The altruism
questionnaire is moderately acceptable.
The average altruism scores are reported in table 3.11a across all subjects and by
treatment and the associated p-values of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests in table 3.11b.
The average scores on the altruism tests are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across the nudge
and price, and the nudge and control treatments. They are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
between the price and control treatments.
Nudge Price Control Overall
32.89 31.76 32.35 32.38
(4.35) (4.56) (3.44) (4.24)
(a) Average individual altruism score
Price Control
Nudge 0.0000 0.0000
Price 0.5779
(b) Between treatment p-values
Table 3.11: Altruism questionnaire results
Table 3.12a shows the average individual consumption by treatment according to
level of altruism and table 3.12b the associated Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. High
altruism is greater than the average of the sample42. In the nudge treatment highly
altruistic individuals choose to consume less than less altruistic individuals. The
levels are similar across altruism types in the control groups, and the opposite is ob-
served in the price treatment. With regard to statistical signiﬁcance, the diﬀerences
are only signiﬁcant in the nudge treatment. As with environmental sensitivity, it
appears that a nudge based policy can separate subjects based upon their level of
altruism, thus providing further support for hypothesis 6.
42In the nudge, price and control groups, 58%, 55% and 52% showed a high altruism level,
respectively.
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Result 8: Individuals are aﬀected diﬀerently by the nudge treatment according to
their level of altruism. In the price and control groups, there is no diﬀerence accord-
ing to their level of altruism.
Treatment Low High Total
Nudge 20.57 17.97 19.07
Price 20.88 21.27 21.09
Control 23.66 23.34 23.49
Total 21.51 20.32
(a) Average consumption by altruism level
High
Nudge Price Control
Nudge 0.0000
Low Price 0.6936
Control 0.6117
(b) Between treatment p-values
Table 3.12: Average individual consumption
3.3.5 Equipment Choices
This section looks at the hypothetical choices of subjects with regard to which
electricity consuming activities they are willing to shift during peak periods. The
consumption choices available to subjects are presented above in table 3.2. Figure 3.2
shows the share of subjects willing to lower the temperature of their heating by
treatment type across periods. Figure 3.3 shows the percentage of subjects willing
to turn oﬀ each of the other appliances, by treatment, in each period. The results in
this section reﬂect the results found in the ﬁeld, namely that individuals are willing
to shift their use of appliances for which consumption is not at the point-of-use, and
unwilling to shift their use of appliances for which consumption is at the point-of-use
(Goulden et al., 2014).
Figure 3.2 shows that the majority of subjects are willing to lower their heating by
2◦. In the nudge treatment, after feedback has been received, there is an increase in
the number of subjects choosing to lower their consumption by 2◦ from 47% to 59%,
and a decrease in those lowering the temperature by 1◦. The same can be observed
for control groups but to a lesser extent. Of the subjects who choose to keep their
heating at the same temperature, a greater percentage are present in the control
groups and fewer in the nudge treatment.
In ﬁg. 3.3, across all treatments, subjects are most willing to shift their use of
washing machines or dishwashers. Across the 10 periods of the game, just under
80% of subjects choose to turn oﬀ these machines across treatments. This share is
108 CHAPTER 3: DEMAND RESPONSE AS A CPR GAME
Figure 3.2: Dynamics of heating usage by treatment
Figure 3.3: Dynamics of appliance usage by treatment
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slightly higher for the nudge and price treatment compared to control groups. There
appears to be a small eﬀect of treatment on washing equipment use. In the control
groups, there is a large decrease in the share of subjects who decide to shift their
use of such equipment during the course of the game, compared to the treatment
groups.
Figure 3.3 shows electricity consuming entertainment activities to be the activity
that subjects are least willing to shift, at least initially with three-quarters of subjects
choosing to turn on their televisions and computers in the ﬁrst period, across all
treatments. However, as the game progresses this appliance choice sees an increase
in the share of subjects shifting its use.
The share of subjects willing to shift their use of cooking equipment is greater in
the nudge treatment than in the price treatment and control groups, and remains
around the 60% mark post initial feedback.
Concerning subjects use of water heating, there is an increase in the share of subjects
who turn oﬀ their water heater in the nudge and price treatments. Whereas, the
share remains lower in the control groups.
Across treatments, the shift in use of appliances is most apparent in the nudge
treatment. With a marked increase in the share of subjects turning oﬀ appliances
post feedback in period 2. This trend is also visible to a certain extent in the price
treatment, and much less so in the control groups.
3.4 Conclusion and Policy Implications
The experiment described in this chapter explored subjects' responses to a nudge
and a peak price based intervention in a contextualised CPR game. The experi-
mental design allowed for a comparison of behaviour under a nudge policy and an
equivalent price increase to an absence of policies. The nudge policy experimented
concerned feedback on an individual's consumption choice in the form of a happy
face if they consume the socially optimal amount or less, and a sad face if they con-
sume more than the socially optimal amount. In addition, the experimental design
provided an opportunity to examine subjects' consumption choices regarding their
use of diﬀerent appliances as subjects were asked to decide whether or not to use
ﬁve diﬀerent appliances when deciding upon their level of consumption. The results
of the experiment may be of interest to policy makers when considering the imple-
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mentation of a nudge or a price based intervention designed to reduce households'
energy consumption during peak periods.
In the absence of energy conservation policies, individuals do not achieve the socially
optimal level of consumption. When a policy is introduced, a nudge or price increase,
individuals signiﬁcantly reduce their consumption and it remains lower than that
of individuals who do not experience any policy measures. Both the nudge and
price increase result in a level of consumption that is halfway towards the optimal
level compared to no policies. However, the nudge does so without the loss of both
individual and group welfare that is associated with the price increase. Therefore,
while both the nudge and price increase lead to a lower level of comfort due to the
reduction in consumption, it can be concluded that although the nudge in itself is
not suﬃcient to achieve the social optimum, it performs as well as an equivalent
price increase without the implied loss of welfare.
The experiment showed that the nudge was quickly and easily understood, and
resulted in an immediate reduction in consumption in the period following initial
feedback. On the other hand, individuals took longer to understand the eﬀect of the
increased price on their consumption and so took longer to integrate it into their
decision making process.
The advantage of a nudge policy is that, at the group level, it results in an immediate
and signiﬁcant reduction in consumption, however caution must be taken as the
nudge in the present experiment reinforces the existing behaviour of individuals and
divides the population into those who under or over consume, or who are more or
less environmentally sensitive or altruistic.
In response to a happy face, individuals who under consumed previously tended
to further decrease their consumption compared to individuals who consumed opti-
mally, whereas, those who received a sad face tended to increase their consumption.
Collectively, these individuals compensate for one another's behaviour and so the
nudge has an eﬀect on average consumption. However, individually the nudge ap-
pears to encourage those who already under consume to consume less, and those who
over consume to consume more. In practice, this could lead to a situation where
low consuming households are further reducing their consumption to compensate
for the increasing consumption of high consuming households. While this result has
been obtained in a hypothetical consumption game, it is worth consideration when
implementing such nudges in the ﬁeld.
It may be that overconsuming individuals see the nudge as a threat to their freedom
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to consume as they wish and so they react by demonstrating the discouraged be-
haviour. The nudge in the present experiment could be considered as an exogenous
nudge; it is an outsider (the experimenter) who provides feedback in relation to an
exogenously optimal level of consumption. The experimenter deﬁnes the parame-
ters of the game and thus the optimal amount. Whereas in ﬁeld experiments an
endogenous nudge (household consumption in relation to the average of the neigh-
bourhood) is often tested. Given that nudges are a tool of "libertarian paternalism"
and that it is a third party who is nudging individuals towards a decision that is
in their best interest, further research could look into how individuals respond to
exogenous and endogenous nudges.
In addition to reinforcing existing consumption behaviour, the nudge had a greater
reduction eﬀect on individuals who are environmentally sensitive and show altruistic
traits. Such individuals consumed less than their less environmentally sensitive and
less altruistic counterparts. The price increase showed no such eﬀect. It would
appear that the increase in price crowds out any existing motivation to reduce
consumption due to environmental or altruistic tendencies.
Finally, the appliances that subjects are willing to shift their use of in order to reduce
their consumption are considered. Subjects are most willing to turn oﬀ their wash-
ing appliances and prefer to continue to use their entertainment devices. Subjects
are also willing to lower their heating in order to reduce their total consumption.
Further research could look into specialised nudges according to the types of electric
appliances in each household.
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Abstract
When trying to save energy, households are required to perform small,
repetitive tasks, e.g.: turning oﬀ lights, or turning appliances oﬀ standby.
Each individual action has little eﬀect on energy consumption and on
household bills, however, they can add up to sizeable savings. This pa-
per explores diﬀerent methods of framing incentives to motivate subjects
to perform a simple yet repetitive, real-eﬀort task for a piece-rate pay-
oﬀ. Each individual eﬀort does not earn much for the individual, but
combined the payoﬀ is signiﬁcant. A 2 by 3 design is used: either gain
framed or loss framed incentives, crossed with either a control treatment
with a ﬁxed payoﬀ, an ex-ante treatment with a low or high payoﬀ with
equal probability, revealed to individuals prior to the task, or an ex-post
treatment where the low or high payoﬀ with equal probability is revealed
after completing the task. Individuals are expected to perform better un-
der loss-framing. Results show little diﬀerence in performance across
treatments. Knowledge of the higher payoﬀ improves performance in the
gain-framed, ex-ante treatment, and subjects perform signiﬁcantly better
when the payoﬀ is higher in both ex-ante treatments.
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4.1 Introduction
Smart meters are a key piece of technology in the implementation of various incen-
tives used to encourage households to lower their consumption. An in-home display
(IHD) retrieves data from a smart meter and provides households with feedback
on their energy consumption in relation to the various incentives that can be im-
plemented. Without such an interface between the consumer and the smart meter,
it is diﬃcult for households to act upon the information that the smart meter can
provide (Dütschke and Paetz, 2013).
For the data displayed on IHDs to have the desired eﬀect of reducing residential
household consumption, an important consideration in the design of IHD interfaces
is how to frame the incentives to make them more eﬀective. Should households be
incentivised with the carrot - shown how much they are saving, or with the stick -
shown how much they are paying?
Previous experiments exploring the eﬀect of feedback provided by IHDs typically
present information factually and consider the units of measurement of consump-
tion information, whether to use energy units (kilowatt-hours) (Parker et al., 2008,
Van Dam et al., 2010, Nilsson et al., 2014), combined with monetary units (Schleich
et al., 2013, Alahmad et al., 2012, Carroll et al., 2014), or whether to use normative
information by comparing a household's consumption to that of other similar house-
holds (Schultz et al., 2007, Allcott, 2011b, Schultz et al., 2015). This information is
presented factually, in terms of amount consumed or amount spent on consumption,
however, little research has compared the framing of energy consumption informa-
tion in terms of salient losses and gains.
To date, and to the best of the author's knowledge, two studies have explored the
eﬀect of explicitly framing expenditure on energy consumption as a loss. Bager and
Mundaca (2017) ﬁnd that households under salient loss framing make more eﬀort to
shift their consumption than households under factual feedback. They reduce their
overall demand by 7-11% compared to households without framed feedback. Bradley
et al. (2016) create a loss frame by creating an incentive account for each household in
their study in which an amount of money representative of each household's monthly
budget is held. Households must then shift their energy consumption from peak to
oﬀ-peak periods in order to retain as much of the incentive account as possible.
The authors ﬁnd that households in the incentive account treatment shifted more
consumption during the experimental period compared to the pre-experiment period
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when they paid for consumption as normal and had no incentive account. Both
of these studies have used salient, loss-framed feedback to incentivise households
to shift and/or lower their energy consumption compared to either groups with a
factual presentation of consumption feedback, or to a pre experimental period.
A characteristic of residential energy consumption is that eﬀorts made to save energy
often result in small savings. Indeed, households using IHDs have found that the
information on daily expenditure is too small to encourage energy consumption
reduction as a single behavioural change has a small impact on daily expenditure
(Goulden et al., 2014). It is the accumulation of many small actions which amount
to a larger eﬀect on monetary savings. For some individuals the small individual
monetary savings are not enough to encourage them to provide an eﬀort (Hargreaves
et al., 2010), whereas others appreciate that many, repeated actions can add up to
signiﬁcant monetary savings (Murtagh et al., 2014).
In the more general (non energy related) experimental literature on gain and loss
framing, there is evidence showing that individuals provide more eﬀort under loss
framing than under gain framing in both the laboratory (Hannan et al., 2005, Gold-
smith and Dhar, 2011, Armantier and Boly, 2015, Imas et al., 2016), and the ﬁeld
(Fryer Jr et al., 2012, Hossain and List, 2012, Armantier and Boly, 2015), to name
a few.
Larger or lump-sum payoﬀs encourage greater eﬀort provision under loss framing
than under gain framing. In both hypothetical (Hannan et al., 2005) and real-life
(Hossain and List, 2012) contract tasks, subjects perform better under a loss-framed
lump-sum payoﬀ for meeting a target. In an artiﬁcial, real-eﬀort task, Imas et al.
(2016) ﬁnd that endowing subjects with a t-shirt and taking it back if they do not
meet a certain target is more eﬀective than receiving the t-shirt after having met
the target.
Similar results have also been found in the ﬁeld: in experiments in education,
Fryer Jr et al. (2012) ﬁnd that endowing teachers with an incentive of $4000 has
a larger eﬀect on increased student grades than oﬀering teachers the incentive at
the end of the school year. In an experiment incentivising graders to grade papers,
Armantier and Boly (2015) ﬁnd that penalties out perform bonuses, and that a
combination of both is most successful. They ﬁnd a U-shaped relationship between
framing and eﬀort; their subjects increase their eﬀort initially for both bonuses and
penalties, but provide less eﬀort when penalties are large. A large penalty has the
eﬀect of discouraging eﬀort.
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On the other hand, recent studies exploring the eﬀect of gain and loss framing to
motivate eﬀort for small payoﬀs are less conclusive. De Quidt et al. (2017) and Essl
and Jaussi (2017) do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects on eﬀort provision due to framing.
This is of particular interest for the present experiment as, as discussed above,
encouraging residents to lower their energy consumption means motivating small
eﬀorts for small rewards.
Both of these studies provide subjects with immediate feedback on their performance
akin to the real-time feedback that IHDs provide on energy consumption. While
De Quidt et al. (2017) and Essl and Jaussi (2017) do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of
framing with feedback, other experiments using immediate feedback have found a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of loss-framing on eﬀort compared to gain framing (Goldsmith and
Dhar, 2011).
A further characteristic of residential energy consumption is that many variables
aﬀect household consumption, such as building characteristics, appliance character-
istics, external factors (location, weather, temperature, etc.) in addition to occupant
behaviour (Kavousian et al., 2013). This can mean that similar sized households, in
buildings with similar characteristics can have substantially diﬀerent levels of elec-
tricity consumption (Gram-Hanssen, 2013). Given the multitude of variables that
aﬀect energy consumption, when households make eﬀorts to lower their demand,
their eﬀorts may not necessarily have the intended eﬀect.
For example, a household may decide to lower their thermostat in order to save
energy on heating during winter. However, factors outside of the households control
may aﬀect the payoﬀ of such an action. Suppose the household in question lives in
an apartment surrounded by other apartments. They may save energy, and money,
as a result of lowering their consumption, yet the temperature of their apartment
may not fall drastically due to the residual heat from neighbouring apartments. On
the other hand, suppose the household lowers the thermostat on a day which is
colder than forecast. The household may not save as much energy as hoped. While
these examples are admittedly anecdotal, they highlight that when acting to lower
energy consumption, there is an element of risk as to whether the action will result
in the desired monetary savings.
Furthermore, with the increasing share of renewable energy sources in the produc-
tion mix, the future price of electricity is set to become more variable than at
present. These diﬀering prices for consumption at diﬀerent times of the day vary
in the amount of risk households will bear and the reward they provide households
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(Faruqui, 2012).
Abeler et al. (2011) explore the eﬀect of risk on eﬀort provision in the gain domain.
Abeler et al. manipulate subjects' reference points by proposing a payoﬀ in the form
of either a piece-rate payoﬀ or higher/lower ﬁxed amount (with equal probability)
in order to inﬂuence subjects' expectations of earnings. In a similar task to the
present experiment, subjects provided more eﬀort when the possible ﬁxed amount is
higher. However, regardless of the size of the ﬁxed payoﬀ, subjects provide eﬀort up
to the level of the ﬁxed amount though they could earn more under the piece-rate
payoﬀ. The authors ﬁnd that expectations of payoﬀs form individuals' reference
points such that if individuals expect to receive a low payoﬀ when they receive it,
it is not perceived as a loss.
In two mixed frame experiments where subjects faced risky payoﬀs, subjects received
a piece-rate for performing simple additions to which a known amount was either
added or taken away, with equal probability. Both Sloof and Van Praag (2010) and
Corgnet and Hernán-González (2018) ﬁnd that subjects provide more eﬀort when
the additional gain/loss is higher, i.e.: when there is greater variability in the payoﬀ.
According to expected utility theory, there is no diﬀerence in framing incentives
positively (savings) or negatively (amount spent) as under isomorphic framing, the
two incentives types should motivate the same provision of eﬀort. On the other
hand, prospect theory predicts that individuals make more eﬀort when faced with
negatively framed incentives than with positively framed ones as "losses loom larger
than gains" (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p.279). This can be explained by the
endowment eﬀect (Thaler, 1980) or reference point bias (Kahneman et al., 1991),
whereby an individual considers a gain or a loss relative to their current endowment
or reference point.
Prospect theory suggests that individuals derive greater utility from avoiding a loss
than they do from gaining the same amount. Furthermore, the theory posits that in-
dividuals are risk-averse in gains and risk-seeking in losses (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). In a meta-analysis of 136 experimental papers, Kühberger (1998) corrobo-
rates the theory. Kühberger ﬁnds that risk aversion in gains and risk seeking in
losses is particularly strong when reference points rather than outcomes are manip-
ulated, i.e.: when starting points rather than ﬁnal earnings are manipulated. In the
present experiment, starting points are manipulated by giving individuals in loss
treatments an endowment from which their losses are subtracted.
These experiments have highlighted that individuals provide a greater level of eﬀort
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under loss-framing when payoﬀs are relatively large. When piece-rate payoﬀs are
used the evidence is less clear. The particularity of energy consumption is that an
individual, energy saving action has little impact on overall consumption (as such
it is akin to a piece-rate payoﬀ), yet together many repeated energy saving actions
can amount to more substantial savings. When risk is added to payoﬀ structures,
individuals provide more eﬀort when the additional amount that they can gain or
lose is greater.
The present experiment contributes to this literature by exploring how individuals
respond to riskless, and risky payoﬀs under both gain and loss framing, when they
can earn small payoﬀs for small eﬀorts in an artiﬁcial, real-eﬀort, number counting
task. Subjects are provided with immediate feedback which highlights the cumula-
tive gains or losses as a result of subjects' eﬀort. The present experiment captures
some of the principal characteristics of residential energy consumption feedback via
an IHD: small payoﬀs for small eﬀorts which cumulate to sizeable earnings, direct
feedback on performance, and both riskless and risky payoﬀs to reﬂect outside fac-
tors which can aﬀect the reward of a particular eﬀort.
The results of the present experiment suggest that framing has little eﬀect on eﬀort
provision when small eﬀorts are rewarded with small payoﬀs. Under riskless payoﬀs,
subjects provide more eﬀort for larger payoﬀs regardless of the treatment frame.
Concerning subjects' eﬀort throughout the game, their performance is lowest at the
beginning of the game, then improves towards the end. Subjects' eﬀort provision
increases most signiﬁcantly in the riskless treatments when payoﬀs are revealed to
subjects prior to eﬀort provision.
Given that reducing energy consumption through changes in residential behaviour
requires small, repetitive eﬀorts for small rewards, the present experiment has shown
that in order for subjects to provide an eﬀort, any risk on the realisation of payoﬀs
should be reduced, in particular under loss framing.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: in section 4.2 describes the real-eﬀort
task and experimental treatments, followed by a presentation of the hypotheses in
section 4.3. Section 4.4 provides the results of the experiment and ﬁnally section 4.5
concludes.
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4.2 Experimental Design
The experiment was designed to allow for a precise measure of eﬀort provision which
is exogenously inﬂuenced by gain and loss framing, and by risky payoﬀs. A tedious,
artiﬁcial, real-eﬀort task was used. Subjects counted the number of ones in 9 by
9 tables of randomly ordered ones and zeros (Abeler et al., 2011, Essl and Jaussi,
2017). The number of ones in each table varied between 28 and 45 (with 36 ones per
table on average), and was randomly drawn prior to the ﬁrst experimental session
and was the same for all subjects. All subsequent experimental sessions faced the
same order of tables. The advantages of this task are that no special knowledge
is required, learning possibilities are limited, and eﬀort is easily measurable. In
addition, experimenter demand eﬀects are minimised as the task is artiﬁcial and the
outcome is of no intrinsic value to the experimenter.
The experiment consisted of 2 stages. At the beginning of the ﬁrst stage, instruc-
tions45 were read aloud to subjects, and subjects answered control questions. Prior
to beginning the ﬁrst stage, subjects were informed that the second stage of the
experiment involved answering a questionnaire.
In the ﬁrst stage of the experiment, subjects played 28 periods in each of which they
had 80 seconds to count the number of ones in ﬁve tables. Once subjects had entered
a number for the table on display, a new table appeared whether their answer was
correct or not. If subjects ran out of time before completing the ﬁfth table of the
period, then the period was over. Subjects were not informed of the current period
number and nor was there a timer present. In total, subjects saw up to 140 tables.
After each period of ﬁve tables, subjects received feedback on their performance for
the period: how many tables they correctly counted and how much they earned, and
feedback for the game so far: how much they earned. The number of tables which
subjects correctly completed is used as a proxy for their eﬀort provision.
In the second stage subjects completed a questionnaire containing socio-demographic
questions.
4.2.1 Treatments
A 2x3 experimental design was used to create six treatment groups. The treatments
were divided into two frames: incentives were framed as either a gain or a loss. In
45An English translation of instructions can be found in Appendix C.
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the gain treatments subjects increased the size of their pot of earnings by correctly
counting the number of ones in each table. In loss treatments subjects were endowed
with the maximum earnings possible and their pot decreased for every incorrect
or incomplete table. In other words, they maintained their pot if they correctly
counted the number of ones in each table. The experimenter in each loss-framed
session distributed the maximum earnings of 21e to each subject in real money and
this was left on their table throughout the duration of the task. Within each frame,
there were three payoﬀ structures: a ﬁxed payoﬀ known prior to eﬀort provision,
a low or high payoﬀ (with equal probability) known prior to eﬀort provision, and
a low or high payoﬀ (with equal probability) known after eﬀort provision. Each of
these payoﬀ structures will be described below.
Control
In the control treatments subjects could earn a ﬁxed payoﬀ for each correct table.
In the gain-control (GC) treatment subjects began with a pot of 0e and earned 15
cents per correct table. In the loss-control (LC) treatment, subjects began with a
pot of 21e and lost 15 cents for each incorrect or incomplete table. Subjects gained
or avoided losing money by counting the correct number of ones in each table.
Ex-ante
In the gain-ex-ante (GEA) treatment subjects earned either 5 cents or 25 cents per
correct table, with equal probability. In the loss-ex-ante (LEA) treatment subjects
lost either 5 cents or 25 cents per incorrect or incomplete table, with equal probabil-
ity. The per table payoﬀ remained the same for the 5 tables in a given period. The
payoﬀ for a given in period was randomly drawn for each subject before subjects
completed the tables and was displayed on the task screen.
In the ex-ante treatments, subjects were informed of the payoﬀ for the period before
counting the number of ones. They knew the possible payoﬀ before making any
eﬀort.
Ex-post
In the gain-ex-post (GEP) treatment subjects earned either 5 cents or 25 cents per
correct table, with equal probability. In the loss-ex-post (LEP) treatment subjects
lost either 5 cents or 25 cents per incorrect or incomplete table, with equal prob-
ability. The payoﬀ stayed the same for all 5 tables in each period. The payoﬀ for
a given period was randomly drawn for each subject before subjects completed the
tables and was displayed on the feedback screen at the end of each period.
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In the ex-post treatments, subjects were informed of the payoﬀ for the period after
counting the number of ones, once the period had ended. They knew the payoﬀ
after having made an eﬀort.
Table 4.1 summarises the diﬀerent payoﬀs in each treatment.
Gain Loss
Endowment 0e 21e
Control 0.15e -0.15e
Ex-Ante risk 0.05 or 0.25e -0.05 or -0.25e
Ex-Post risk 0.05 or 0.25e -0.05 or -0.25e
Table 4.1: Payoﬀs by treatment
4.2.2 Participants and Procedure
The experiments took place during April and May 2018 at Grenoble Applied Eco-
nomics Laboratory. 259 students took part in experiments across 16 sessions. There
were 13-20 students per session and each session lasted one and a half hours. The
experiment was programmed using zTree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Table 4.2
details the characteristics of subjects in each treatment. In addition to the amount
earned during the experiment, subjects received a 5e show-up fee.
Treatment n Average age Female (%) Undergraduate (%) Average earnings
GC 31 21 55 71 13e55
LC 29 21 66 79 12e86
GEA 48 21 54 79 14e13
LEA 48 21 58 69 13e20
GEP 52 21 58 81 13e27
LEP 51 21 43 73 12e70
Table 4.2: Description of subjects per treatment
At the start of their session, subjects chose a subject number at random and a com-
puter post. All instructions were read aloud by the experimenter and were displayed
on two screens at the front of the room. Subjects were told that the experiment
would consist of two phases: (1) the experimental task, (2) the questionnaire. The
ﬁrst phase began with a comprehension questionnaire which was corrected collec-
tively before subjects started the experimental task. Instructions for the second
phase were read aloud once all subjects had completed the ﬁrst phase.
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4.3 Hypotheses
According to expected utility theory, if subjects were rational and unaﬀected by the
framing of incentives and the risk associated to payoﬀ, then the above diﬀerences
in treatments would result in no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in eﬀort. The gain or loss
framing would have no eﬀect as the expected outcome is the same under each frame.
The diﬀerent payoﬀ structures would have no eﬀect on eﬀort as the expected outcome
is the same under each structure. The risk on payoﬀs in the ex-post treatments would
have no eﬀect as the expected payoﬀ is the same as in the control groups.
That being said, the above discussion of the literature has shown that individuals
are inﬂuenced by framing. Previous experiments have conﬁrmed this idea (Hannan
et al., 2005, Goldsmith and Dhar, 2011, Fryer Jr et al., 2012, Hossain and List, 2012,
Armantier and Boly, 2015, Imas et al., 2016). However, some more recent studies
have found no evidence of framing eﬀects (Hong et al., 2015, De Quidt et al., 2017,
Essl and Jaussi, 2017).
Prospect theory predicts that individuals behave diﬀerently when faced with a gain
or a loss; individuals attach a greater utility to avoiding a loss than they do to
receiving an equivalent gain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Loss aversion may explain why framing incentives as gains and as losses aﬀects be-
haviour diﬀerently (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). When an incentive is negatively
framed, an individual is given a payment from which an amount is withdrawn if
their performance is not up to standard. This initial increase in income or utility
provides the individual with an endowment. When faced with losing part or all
of that endowment, prospect theory predicts that individuals will work harder to
retain their endowment than if they were to begin with nothing and to make an
eﬀort to increase their endowment through bonuses. The loss of utility from moving
away from the endowment amount is greater than the increase in utility of moving
towards the same amount. This behavioural bias is known as the endowment eﬀect
(Kahneman et al., 1990).
With positively and negatively framed incentives the reference point is diﬀerent; in-
dividuals start from nothing or little and increase their income by making an eﬀort.
Or they start with a certain endowment and make an eﬀort to not lose it. The
individual's point of reference for making their decision to make an eﬀort or not is
diﬀerent under each incentive type. Each individual will also have a diﬀerent refer-
ence point with regard to the base payment and the bonus or penalty (Kahneman,
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1992).
Figure 4.1: A hypothetical value function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p.279)
Figure 4.1 provides a visual representation of a hypothetical value function46. The
centre of the graph represents the reference point and x a movement away from that
point in both the gain and loss domain. The change in utility due to the gain or
loss of x is not equal in the two domains. The disutility of losing x is greater than
the utility of gaining x : V L(x) > V G(x). As such, prospect theory predicts that
individuals will expend more eﬀort to avoid a loss of x than they will to gain x.
This leads to hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1: Subjects provide more eﬀort under loss framing than under gain
framing: subjects' eﬀort provision will be greater in LC compared to GC, LEA com-
pared to GEA, and in LEP compared to GEP.
Given the design of the present experiment, the only diﬀerence in eﬀort that a
rational individual would provide is in the ex-ante treatments; individuals would
46The value function used here is slightly modiﬁed from the original for explicative purposes
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
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provide more eﬀort when the payoﬀ is higher. Indeed, the above studies which
found signiﬁcant treatment eﬀects are predominately studies which use large, rather
than piece-rate incentives. This is further supported in Abeler et al. (2011) whose
subjects provided more eﬀort for higher payoﬀs.
This leads to hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2: Subjects provide more eﬀort when payoﬀ amounts are higher: sub-
jects' eﬀort provision will be greater for GEA0.25 compared to GEA0.05, and LEA0.25
compared to LEA0.05.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) posit that individuals are risk averse towards gains
and risk seeking towards losses. As Kühberger (1998) shows, this framing eﬀect due
to risk preferences is greater when reference points are manipulated. In the present
experiment, under gain framing, subjects' initial reference point is 0e whereas under
the loss frame, their initial reference point is an endowment of 21e.
This leads to hypotheses 3:
Hypothesis 3a: Subjects will provide more eﬀort under risky payoﬀs compared to
ﬁxed payoﬀs in the loss domain: subjects' eﬀort provision will be greater in LEP
compared to LEA and LC.
Hypothesis 3b: Subjects will provide less eﬀort under risky payoﬀs compared to
ﬁxed payoﬀs in the gain domain: subjects' eﬀort provision will be smaller in GEP
compared to GEA and GC.
4.4 Results and Discussion
This section presents and discusses the results of the experiment in relation to the
hypotheses set out above in section 4.3. The presentation of the results begins with
the global treatment eﬀects by frame, payoﬀ amount and by risk. This is followed
by a discussion of the evolution of eﬀort provision over time.
4.4.1 Eﬀort Provision by Frame
The main variable of interest in the experiment is the number of correct tables in a
given period. This variable is used as a proxy for the eﬀort provided by subjects in
the experiment.
Table 4.3 provides the average number of correct tables and standard deviation in
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each treatment for all periods. The ﬁnal column shows the associated p-values of
Wilcoxon rank sum tests of the diﬀerence in the average number of correct tables
between treatments over all periods47.
Treatment Average Std dev. p-value
GC 3.23 1.14
0.459
LC 3.06 1.32
GEA 3.27 1.16
0.298
LEA 3.10 1.24
GEP 3.10 1.18
0.349
LEP 3.01 1.11
Table 4.3: Number of correct tables overall and across all periods
Across all periods, subjects correctly completed most tables in the GEA and GC
treatments, and least in the LEP treatment. Comparisons of average eﬀort provision
within payoﬀ structures and between framing show that there are no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in eﬀort provision due to framing.
Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of the average number of correct tables. A comparison
is made between the payoﬀ structures within a treatment frame: loss or gain. The
diﬃculty as measured by the average distribution of ones in the ﬁve tables of a period
is underlaid and represented in grey. The peaks and troughs in the average number
of correct tables correspond to relatively easy (fewer ones) and diﬃcult (more ones)
periods.
There is no clear trend in the evolution of average number of correct tables across
treatments. Graphically, the trend lines are more disparate in the gain treatments,
and more similar in the loss treatments.
Figure 4.3 displays the cumulative distribution functions of the total number of
correct tables by completed by subjects in each treatment. The best subjects in
each treatment correctly complete between 85 and 94% of the tables. There is more
variation at the lower end of eﬀort: the fewest number of tables correctly completed
varies from 10 - 35%. There is substantial overlap in the six CDFs, further indicating
small diﬀerences in eﬀort provision across treatments. Graphically, the CDF of the
LEP treatment stands out most: fewer subjects complete higher number of tables
compared to the other treatments.
47The average number of correct tables, standard deviations and associated Wilcoxon rank sum
tests for periods 1 and 28 and for the ﬁrst and second half of the experiment are provided in
Appendix C.
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of average number of correct tables and average diﬃculty per
period by treatment (comparison by frame)
Result 1: There is no framing eﬀect: there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
GC and LC, between GEA and LEA, nor between GEP and LEP (bar the ﬁnal
period).
4.4.2 Eﬀort Provision by Payoﬀ Amount
Given that there are two payoﬀ amounts in each of the Ex-Ante and Ex-Post treat-
ments48, the average number of correct tables has been calculated for each payoﬀ
amount (standard deviations in brackets). Table 4.4 shows the averages and the
standard deviations of the variable of interest by payoﬀ amount for each of these
treatments, as well as the results of Wilcoxon signed rank tests of signiﬁcant diﬀer-
48The expected payoﬀ in each of the four treatments with varying payoﬀs is ±0.15 in either
a gain or a loss frame. The expected payoﬀ across all periods in each treatment is statistically
indiﬀerent from ±0.15.
128 CHAPTER 4: GAIN AND LOSS FRAMING OF INCENTIVES
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
Total number of correct tables
Cu
m
u
la
tiv
e
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity
Treatment
GC
LC
GEA
LEA
GEP
LEP
Cumulative distribution functions of number of correct tables in each treatment
Figure 4.3: Cumulative distribution functions of number of correct tables in each
treatment
ences between payoﬀ amounts within each treatment.
Subjects perform better in the both GEA and LEA treatments when the gain or loss
amount is greater. The diﬀerence in eﬀort is signiﬁcant (p < 0.01, Wilcoxon signed
rank test) for both treatments. Subjects make more eﬀort to earn, or to avoid los-
ing, the larger payoﬀ amount when it is known. As expected, there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in performance in the GEP and the LEP treatments as subjects are only
aware of the payoﬀ amount after having made an eﬀort. The diﬀerence in eﬀort
provision within the gain frame between payoﬀ amounts is not signiﬁcantly greater
than that of the loss frame. Subjects in the GEA treatment do not provide signiﬁ-
cantly more eﬀort for higher versus lower payoﬀs compared to the LEA treatment.
Result 2: Subjects provide more eﬀort for higher payoﬀs than for lower payoﬀs
(when payoﬀs are known prior to eﬀort provision).
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Payoﬀ amount Diﬀerence49
± 0.05 ± 0.25
GEA 3.15 3.38 0.23***
(0.76) (0.66)
LEA 3.03 3.19 0.16***
(0.85) (0.80)
GEP 3.06 3.13 0.07
(0.74) (0.81)
LEP 2.99 3.02 0.03
(0.64) (0.61)
Table 4.4: Average number of correct tables by payoﬀ amount in Ex-ante and Ex-
post treatments
4.4.3 Eﬀort Provision by Risk
As described in Section 4.2.1, in treatments GEP and LEP subjects face risky pay-
ments of 5 or 25 cents per table in a given period with equal probability. The payoﬀ
is revealed to subjects after they have completed the task. In treatments GEA and
LEA, subjects face the same payoﬀ structure, however, the payoﬀ amount is revealed
at the start of each period.
Table 4.5 displays average eﬀort per treatment over all periods. Subjects perform
marginally better in each ex-ante treatment compared to its corresponding ex-post
treatment. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in eﬀort provision according to risk50.
Treatment Average Std dev.
GEA 3.27 1.16
GEP 3.10 1.18
LEA 3.10 1.24
LEP 3.01 1.11
Table 4.5: Number of correct tables overall and across all periods
Result 3: Within a frame (gain or loss) there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in eﬀort
provision between payoﬀ structures due to risk.
49The signiﬁcance stars in the Diﬀerence column refer to Wilcoxon signed rank tests of signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in eﬀort provision within a treatment by payoﬀ amount.
50Table C.6 in Appendix C gives the p-values of Wilcoxon rank sum tests of diﬀerences in these
average between payoﬀ structures
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4.4.4 Evolution of Eﬀort Provision
The above comparison of eﬀort during the game shows few diﬀerences across treat-
ments. In order to further assess subjects' eﬀort during the experiment, the average
number of correct tables is calculated for each block of 7 periods to provide 4 mea-
sures of eﬀort across the experiment as shown in table 4.6.
Treatment Periods 1 - 7 Periods 8 - 14 Periods 15 - 21 Periods 22 - 28
GC 2.94 3.32 3.19 3.45
(1.20) (1.10) (1.12) (1.07)
LC 2.74 3.13 3.03 3.34
(1.26) (1.30) (1.31) (1.35)
GEA 2.89 3.32 3.25 3.60
(1.15) (1.15) (1.19) (1.07)
LEA 2.78 3.10 3.12 3.40
(1.22) (1.25) (1.26) (1.14)
GEP 2.70 3.11 3.09 3.50
(1.14) (1.11) (1.13) (1.21)
LEP 2.64 3.16 3.04 3.19
(1.06) (1.01) (1.12) (1.17)
Table 4.6: Number of correct tables across diﬀerent stages of the game (standard
deviations in brackets)
Figure 4.4 displays the average number of correct tables by treatment for a block
of 7 periods, along with the associated conﬁdence intervals. Across all treatments,
subjects' eﬀort provision is lowest in the ﬁrst block of 7 periods and highest in the
ﬁnal block. In the second and third blocks, subjects' eﬀort is relatively stable in
treatments GEA, LEA and GEP, and decreases slightly in treatments GC, LC and
LEP.
Table 4.7 provides regression estimates of the average number of correct tables in
the blocks of 7 periods with respect to the second block.
The coeﬃcients on Periods 1-7 conﬁrm the above discussion of ﬁg. 4.4, subjects'
eﬀort is lower in periods 1-7 compared to periods 8-14. The coeﬃcients on Periods
15-21 are not signiﬁcant in any of the treatments. There is no signiﬁcant change
in subjects' eﬀort between these two blocks of 7 periods. In the ﬁnal 7 periods,
subjects' eﬀort is signiﬁcantly greater in treatments GEA, LEA, and GEP compared
to periods 8-14. In the other treatments, GC, LC, and LEP, subjects' eﬀort increases
in the second block compared to the ﬁrst, then remains at a similar level for the
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Figure 4.4: Evolution of average number of correct tables by block of 7 periods by
treatment
duration of the experiment.
Subjects' improvement in correctly counting the number of ones in tables at the
beginning and the end of the experiment, as well as across the two halves provides
evidence of learning eﬀects. As the experiment progressed, subjects became more
adept at counting the number of ones in each table as the eﬀort provision became
routine.
Result 4: Subjects' performance increases between periods 1-7 and periods 8-14,
before plateauing (GEA, LEA, GEP) or diminishing (GC, LC, LEP) in periods 15-
21. Subjects' performance is highest in periods 22-28.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GC LC GEA LEA GEP LEP
Periods 1-7 -0.382∗∗∗ -0.394∗∗∗ -0.429∗∗∗ -0.324∗∗∗ -0.409∗∗∗ -0.521∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.114) (0.091) (0.100) (0.067) (0.086)
Periods 15-21 -0.129 -0.099 -0.068 0.024 -0.025 -0.120
(0.079) (0.118) (0.065) (0.103) (0.066) (0.082)
Periods 22-28 0.129 0.207 0.277∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.089) (0.126) (0.057) (0.086) (0.078) (0.089)
Constant 3.323∗∗∗ 3.133∗∗∗ 3.321∗∗∗ 3.101∗∗∗ 3.110∗∗∗ 3.160∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.186) (0.111) (0.140) (0.112) (0.080)
R2 0.028 0.027 0.047 0.032 0.057 0.039
Observations 868 812 1344 1344 1456 1428
Standard errors in brackets are clustered by subject
Table 4.7: Regression estimates of average eﬀort provision over blocks of 7 periods
4.4.5 Individual Determinants of Eﬀort Provision
This ﬁnal results section discusses which individual and study design characteristics
have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on eﬀort provision. The dependent variable is the number
of correctly counted tables in the period. For robustness, both a cluster-robust OLS
regression (odd numbered speciﬁcations) and a panel data regression (even numbered
speciﬁcations) using random-eﬀects estimation are run. Clustering standard errors
by subject adjusts for dependence in observations. Using a panel data speciﬁcation
accounts for the fact that in the present data, there are n subjects making decisions
in t periods. A random-eﬀects estimator is used in order to account for the inﬂuence
of time-invariant variables on eﬀort provision (Moﬀatt, 2015). Table 4.8 provides
the regression estimates51
Speciﬁcations 1 and 2 control only for treatments. As seen in the descriptive analysis,
there are no signiﬁcant treatment eﬀects. Speciﬁcations 3 and 4 include design and
individual variables which may have an eﬀect on the dependent variable.
As suggested in section 4.4.4, subjects' eﬀort provision increases during the game;
the period variable has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect indicating that as subjects gain
experience with the task, their performance improves. The average number of ones
per period controls for the diﬃculty of the task; the more ones in the table, the harder
the table. As expected, the coeﬃcient on this variable is signiﬁcantly negative; the
harder, on average, the tables in a period are, the fewer tables subjects complete in
51A correlation table is provided in table C.7 in Appendix C.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cluster spec. Panel spec. Cluster spec. Panel spec.
LC -0.165 -0.165 -0.108 -0.108
(0.207) (0.190) (0.158) (0.155)
GEA 0.039 0.039 -0.006 -0.006
(0.156) (0.170) (0.131) (0.138)
LEA -0.127 -0.127 -0.170 -0.170
(0.168) (0.170) (0.144) (0.138)
GEP -0.128 -0.128 -0.088 -0.088
(0.161) (0.167) (0.131) (0.136)
LEP -0.219 -0.219 -0.185 -0.185
(0.149) (0.168) (0.128) (0.137)
Period 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
Average number of 1's per period -0.073∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Ability (t=1) 0.391∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.034)
Degree of risk taking -0.043 -0.043
(0.043) (0.040)
Female -0.073 -0.073
(0.076) (0.076)
Age -0.015 -0.015
(0.017) (0.015)
Constant 3.227∗∗∗ 3.227∗∗∗ 5.100∗∗∗ 5.100∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.132) (0.447) (0.409)
Observations 7252 7252 7252 7252
R2 0.006 0.188
R2 Overall 0.006 0.188
R2 Within 0.000 0.082
R2 Between 0.016 0.361
Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered regression: Robust standard errors clustered by subject. Panel regression: balanced panels by subject and period.
GC treatment used as reference level. Average number of ones per period: diﬃculty measure.
Ability: performance in ﬁrst period. Degree or risk taking: from 1 risk averse to 5 risk lover.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.8: Regression estimates of eﬀect of individual characteristics on average
eﬀort provision
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the period.
The ﬁnal variables included in the regression refer to individual characteristics. Abil-
ity, as measured by subjects' performance in the ﬁrst period, is a key indicator of
performance throughout the game. Subjects who do better in the ﬁrst period are
more likely to correctly complete more tables in the rest of the experiment. Degree
of risk taking is a subject's response, on a scale from 1 (I avoid taking risks) to 5 (I
love taking risks). This variable has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the number of correctly
completed tables. Finally, gender and age of the subject are controlled for. Neither
of these variables have a signiﬁcant eﬀect. These results show that there are no
signiﬁcant treatment eﬀects due to framing. This may be due to the small sample
sizes.
4.5 Conclusion
The objective of this chapter was to explore how incentives can be framed to en-
courage individuals to make small, repetitive eﬀorts in a real-eﬀort task, in a similar
vein to encouraging households to make small, repetitive eﬀorts to lower their energy
consumption. Thus, the objective of this experiment was to better understand how
the framing of incentives as either gains or losses aﬀects subjects' eﬀort provision
under piece-rate and risky payoﬀs. Subjects were asked to complete a repetitive and
tedious task which required no particular skills: counting the number of ones in a 9
by 9 table.
Under gain framing, subjects received a piece-rate payoﬀ for each completed table. In
the loss-framed groups, subjects were endowed with 21e and lost a piece-rate amount
for every incorrect or incomplete table. An element of risk on payoﬀs was added
to four treatments. Payoﬀs were either high or low with equal probability and the
true payoﬀ was revealed to subjects either before or after eﬀort provision according
to the treatment. The diﬀerent treatments presented subjects with identical payoﬀs
under expected utility theory. However, they were framed in diﬀerent ways in order
to manipulate subjects' reference points via an endowment and via risk on the payoﬀ
amount.
Based on ﬁndings in previous experiments, and on prospect theory, subjects were
expected to provide more eﬀort under loss framing, in particular in the loss framed
ex-post treatment, as individuals derive more utility from avoiding a loss than from
gaining the same amount. In addition, individuals are more risk seeking in the loss
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domain, and more risk averse in the gain domain.
Results show that there is no overall eﬀect of framing on eﬀort provision in the
present experiment; subjects provide the same level of eﬀort between framing types
within a payoﬀ structure. One explanation for such a result could be that most
subjects are not susceptible to a loss frame as they realise it is a frame and so
evaluate their earnings as a net payment rather than as a loss (Harrison et al.,
2016). Harrison et al. ﬁnd that this is more apparent when subjects use "house
money" rather than earned money.
In the present experiment, every eﬀort was made to endow subjects with real money
prior to beginning the loss-framed task; the money was left on subjects' tables
throughout the duration of the experiment. Subjects were aware that the 21e en-
dowment would be exchanged for their actual earnings at the end of the experiment.
Subjects' evaluation of payoﬀs as a net payment rather than an avoided loss may
explain why there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in eﬀort between each gain and corre-
sponding loss treatment in the present experiment. However, previous experiments
have employed the same approach of endowing subjects with real money at the be-
ginning of the experiment and have found that participants in loss-framed treatments
provide signiﬁcantly more eﬀort (Hannan et al., 2005, Goldsmith and Dhar, 2011,
Imas et al., 2016). Furthermore, experiments in which subjects in loss-framed treat-
ments have not been endowed with real money have also found signiﬁcantly more
eﬀort is provided under loss than under gain-framing (Hossain and List, 2012).
In line with previous research, subjects in ex-ante treatments provided more eﬀort
for the higher payoﬀ when it was made known to them prior to eﬀort provision than
for the lower payoﬀ. Subjects display rationality and so when faced with a higher
payoﬀ per table, they provided more eﬀort and correctly counted more tables than
when faced with a lower payoﬀ, in both gain and loss-framed treatments.
Regarding subjects' behaviour under riskless and risky payoﬀs, the results of the
present experiment do not show any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in eﬀort provision when
payments are risky compared to when they are riskless under the same framing.
Perhaps subjects correctly anticipated an expected payoﬀ of 15 cents, or the diﬀer-
ence in payoﬀs was not suﬃcient and so subjects did not provide additional eﬀort
under risky payoﬀs.
Finally, subjects demonstrated learning and improvement during the experiment
as their eﬀort provision increased during the course of the experiment. This is
particularly true of the ex-ante and ex-post treatments. However, subjects' eﬀort
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provision plateaus or stagnates over the middle 50% of the game.
4.5.1 Implications, Limitations and Recommendations
The results of the present experiment have shown that there are limited framing
eﬀects on eﬀort provision due to gain and loss framed incentives with and without
risky payoﬀs. In particular, loss framing with risky payoﬀs is the least incentivising
payoﬀ structure, and gain framing with risky payoﬀs revealed prior to eﬀort provision
is the most incentivising. This suggests that in designing IHDs, the element of risk
regarding the size of energy savings needs to be controlled for as much as possible.
Households will make an eﬀort for a higher payoﬀ and so in the context of energy
saving behaviours, subjects need to know whether a particular action will result in
a lower or a higher payoﬀ as this will aﬀect their willingness to provide an eﬀort.
The laboratory setting of the present experiment provides a high level of internal
validity which allows the experimenters to focus solely on the variable they wish to
manipulate in order to ascertain its eﬀect on eﬀort provision. Subjects concentrated
solely on the task of counting the number of ones in each table, any outside factors
were controlled for. The only variables which were diﬀerent from one treatment to
another, were the framing and the payoﬀ structure.
In reality, when trying to save energy there are many other factors that will aﬀect an
individual's ability to provide the necessary eﬀort to save energy. The use of risky
payoﬀs attempted to reﬂect such situations. Given the diﬀerences in the laboratory
setting and the context of energy consumption behaviour, it is diﬃcult to generalise
the results outside of the laboratory. That being said, if no signiﬁcant results were
found in a controlled environment where subjects were solely focused on the task at
hand, will there be signiﬁcant diﬀerences in eﬀort due to framing in the context of
energy saving when there are many additional factors at work? On the other hand,
the task was the only activity for subjects to do for one and a half hours. Subjects'
complete concentration on the task regardless of framing may explain the lack of
signiﬁcant treatment results.
The next steps for the present research are to increase the sample size in each of the
treatments and to increase the saliency of the loss-frame by having subjects work
for their endowment prior to completing the experimental task. By doing so, the
hypothesis is that subjects will attach a greater utility to avoiding a loss of their
endowment because they have had to work for it. This will avoid the possible issue
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of subjects evaluating the net value of framing rather than seeing the loss-frame as
a loss of their money.
Additionally, this experiment can be moved to the ﬁeld to determine whether sub-
jects make an increased eﬀort to avoid spending their own money on energy con-
sumption when the loss is salient. This can be compared to the eﬀort made under
a salient gain frame and to a factual presentation of consumption information.

Conclusion
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This thesis has explored the diﬀerent incentives that are used to encourage residential
consumers to lower their energy consumption in order to determine whether house-
holds accept these incentives and the technologies that deliver them, and whether
these incentives are eﬀective at reducing their consumption. This subject is of partic-
ular importance given that human activity is causing the atmosphere of our planet
to heat up considerably which is having disastrous impacts across the globe. To
limit humankind's future impact, governments across the world have set objectives
to lower emissions, to increase the share of renewable energies in the production mix
and to achieve energy savings. Residential consumers can do their part by lowering
their overall demand, and in particular, their peak demand.
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in the use of behavioural in-
centives to encourage households to lower their consumption. Given the recency
of the application of such incentives to residential energy consumption, there is a
smaller amount of research on such incentives in an energy consumption context
compared to traditional, ﬁnancial incentives. What's more, there are fewer studies
which have collated the existing evidence on behavioural incentives. Furthermore,
there are concerns as to the eﬃcacy of behavioural incentives to motivate signiﬁcant
and lasting changes to consumer behaviour. The present thesis has added to this
body of research by exploring the previous literature and assessing the eﬀective-
ness of traditional and behavioural incentives on consumption, and by more closely
scrutinising behavioural incentives in the laboratory.
To answer the central question, how do residential consumers respond to incentives
used to encourage them to lower their consumption, the thesis was divided into four
chapters. Firstly, a qualitative review of the existing literature answered the question
of what are the main barriers to the acceptance and adoption of smart meters and
the incentives that they can deliver. Secondly, a meta-analysis provided an updated
exploration of the eﬀectiveness of incentives at encouraging households to lower their
consumption, and an examination of how the design of experiments can inﬂuence
the results. Given the ﬁndings of the ﬁrst two chapters, the third chapter sought
to further analyse consumer responses to both ﬁnancial and behavioural incentives
in a controlled, laboratory setting in order to ascertain whether such incentives are
able to encourage more socially optimal behaviour, and to quantify the response to a
behavioural incentive. The fourth and ﬁnal chapter built on ﬁndings from previous
research which suggest that individuals make more eﬀort to avoid losses than to
receive gains, and looked at whether this is applicable to eﬀort provision for saving
energy which is characterised by small eﬀorts for small rewards. This experiment
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explored ways in which information can be framed in order to incentivise eﬀort
provision.
In response to the research questions, Chapter 1 found that there exist many barriers
to encouraging households to lower their consumption through incentives delivered
via smart meters. These barriers need to be overcome in order for households to
accept the installation of smart meters and associated technology in their home in
the ﬁrst instance, and in the second, in order for them to be eﬀective at motivating
consumers to reduce their energy demand. If these barriers remain, households
will not engage with smart meters and incentives, and the cost of investing in this
technology will not be recuperated through energy and monetary savings.
Chapter 2 looked in detail at the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent incentives using a meta-
analysis approach to combine the results of recent ﬁeld experiments and pilot studies
which have tested the eﬀect of various incentives on residential energy consumption.
The meta-analysis found that accounting for sample size in primary studies provides
more accurate estimates of the eﬀect of incentives, and as such, on average, an
incentive will show a reduction in consumption of the order of 2%. Incentives such
as pricing strategies, which are primarily aimed at reducing peak demand, can also be
eﬀective at reducing overall demand so long as the incentive to reduce consumption
during peak periods is not oﬀset by the incentive to increase consumption during oﬀ-
peak periods. Reductions in peak demand are necessary to avoid the use of higher
cost, polluting generators, however, if overall demand increases as a result of pricing
strategies, the objectives of energy savings may not be met. Incentives based upon
behavioural economics such as social feedback are also eﬀective at encouraging a
reduction in consumption on average. Such incentives are eﬀective whether they are
merely descriptive, or whether injunctive norms are also used. However, the latter
shows a slightly larger reduction eﬀect.
The estimate of the eﬀectiveness of incentives was found to be greatly inﬂuenced
by the design of the study. In particular, the exclusion of a control group provides
inﬂated estimates of reductions in consumption than if a control group is present.
Studies without control groups compare the consumption of a same group of house-
holds before and after the implementation of an incentive and so do not perform a
simultaneous control for additional factors which may aﬀect consumption. Studies
which use a control group provide both a comparison between households' consump-
tion before and after the implementation of an incentive, and a comparison of a group
of households during the same time period whose consumption is not inﬂuenced by
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an incentive. The use of a control group provides a more robust estimate of the
eﬀectiveness that incentives would have in a natural, non-experimental setting.
Additionally, it is important to note that the ﬁndings of ﬁeld experiments and pilot
studies may overstate the eﬀect that particular incentives would have in the case of a
nation-wide roll-out. In particular, when there are small samples of households who
opt-in to the study, these households may be particularly disposed to make an eﬀort
to lower their consumption, whether this be for monetary, or environmental reasons,
or even due to an interest in the enabling technology oﬀered as part of the study.
As Spence et al. (2014) have suggested, the type of incentive used, or the choice of
unit used for the presentation of consumption information aﬀects individuals' stated
motivations to lower their consumption, and as shown in Chapter 3, this can also
aﬀect their consumption decisions.
In Chapter 3, individuals were either nudged to lower their consumption, or incen-
tivised to do so by an increase in the price of hypothetical consumption within an
experimental CPR game. The price incentive was most eﬀective relative to the level
of consumption each incentive was designed to encourage. However, the nudge had
an immediate eﬀect as the information was immediately understood by individu-
als. In the price treatment, individuals took longer to integrate the price into their
decision making. This is reﬂective of ﬁndings from the literature discussed in Chap-
ter 1 that pricing strategies such as dynamic pricing are complex for individuals to
comprehend (Layer et al., 2017).
While both of these incentives were more eﬀective at encouraging consumers to lower
their consumption than an absence of policies, ex-post evaluations of individual char-
acteristics including concern for the environment showed that such characteristics
were aﬀected by the incentive used to encourage individuals to lower their con-
sumption. The consumption choices in the nudge treatment diﬀered according to
individual environmental sensitivity; those who were more sensitive to environmen-
tal issues had previously chosen to consume less. The use of a monetary incentive
had no such eﬀect and appeared to crowd out environmental characteristics, as in-
dividuals who were more sensitive chose to consume the same amount as those who
were less sensitive to environmental issues. This ﬁnding, along with the discussions
of Chapters 1 and 2, highlights how incentives can aﬀect motivations and individ-
ual characteristics to lower energy consumption. If the use of monetary incentives
crowds out any environmental characteristics or motivations to lower consumption,
then this is of concern as Chapter 1 showed that consumers ﬁnd monetary displays
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of energy savings to not be particularly motivating as the monetary savings are often
small (Hargreaves et al., 2010, Murtagh et al., 2014).
The discussion and analysis of the literature in Chapters 1 and 2 highlighted po-
tential problems with the use of behavioural incentives to encourage energy con-
sumption reduction, namely that when told that they are consuming less than the
average consumption of their neighbourhood, households increased their consump-
tion (Schultz et al., 2007). This boomerang eﬀect was mitigated by the inclusion
of a smiley face to conﬁrm to individuals that consuming less than the average is
socially desirable (Allcott, 2011b). The nudge experimented in Chapter 3, which
is presented diﬀerently to the ones used in the ﬁeld, found another concerning im-
pact. The nudge was successful at encouraging a reduction in average consumption,
however it reinforced individuals' existing behaviour such that those who undercon-
sumed compensated for those overconsumed. This is of particular concern as the use
of such nudges may serve to divide consumers: those who are low-consumers make
increased eﬀorts to lower their consumption and those who are high-consumers do
not.
As discussed above, monetary savings are not necessarily suﬃcient to encourage
energy saving eﬀorts. With this in mind, Chapter 4 explored experimentally how
the framing of information on earnings can encourage a greater provision of eﬀort
and found that individuals provide, on average, the same level of eﬀort when incen-
tivised to make a small eﬀort for a small reward, however the earnings information
is framed. When possible rewards are relatively larger, framing does not aﬀect the
eﬀort provided by individuals in one direction or the other. When individuals are
not sure of how much they will earn after an eﬀort is made, i.e.: when earnings are
risky, they tend to provide slightly less eﬀort under loss framing. These ﬁndings
have shown that in order to encourage individuals to make small eﬀorts for small
rewards, as is typical of energy saving behaviours, the framing of the reward is not
of utmost importance, rather it would be more eﬀective to focus on the size of the
amount that can be saved. In order to encourage, households to make an eﬀort to
lower their consumption, emphasis should be put on the fact that several eﬀorts lead
to a larger saving, as individuals provided more eﬀort when the potential earnings
were relatively higher. In addition, eﬀorts should be made to minimise the risk on
earnings so that households know that by doing a certain action they are sure to
earn a ﬁxed amount.
The ﬁndings of the present research have helped to respond to the central research
144 CONCLUSION
question: how do residential consumers respond to incentives used to encourage
them to lower their consumption? Despite barriers to the implementation of smart
meters and the incentives that they can deliver, residential consumers do respond
to incentives and they are eﬀective at encouraging a reduction in consumption. The
diﬀerent incentives are more or less eﬀective depending on the reduction objective.
Monetary incentives, namely pricing strategies, are more suited to reducing peak
demand than overall demand. In order for them to be truly eﬀective, there needs
to be an eﬀort to better explain the tariﬀs so that perceived complexity does not
slow their adoption, nor consumers' responsiveness. Behavioural incentives are an-
other eﬀective incentive, especially when injunctive norms are used alongside social
norms. These incentives have the advantage over pricing strategies of being quickly
understood but there may be unwanted consequences. When individuals are aware
that they are being nudged towards a socially optimal behaviour, then they may re-
act by performing exactly the behaviour that is undesirable. Information on energy
and monetary savings is also eﬀective, at least initially. However, there are limits
to monetary motivation. Eﬀorts to save energy result in small monetary rewards
which are not necessarily suﬃcient to be motivating. Diﬀerent methods of framing
small monetary rewards for small eﬀorts does not increase eﬀort provision.
4.5.2 Limitations
When undertaking this research, certain limitations were met. The methodology of
meta-analysis used in Chapter 2 means being exhaustive in including all studies on
the topic yet is limited by the availability of studies and the potential for available
studies to only be those which show signiﬁcant eﬀects. If studies which do not
show signiﬁcant eﬀects are not included in the meta-analysis, then the results of the
analysis are biased. This limitation was overcome by analysing the extent to which
publication bias was an issue in the sample of studies used, and by using methods
to correct for it. The method of giving more weight in statistical analyses of those
studies with larger samples was found to signiﬁcantly mitigate the publication bias
issue.
Chapter 3 concerned energy consumption choices in a contextualised CPR game.
Subjects made decisions in a computer laboratory, and although their decisions had
monetary consequences designed to reﬂect the utility and disutility of consumption
choices, their decisions did not impact actual consumption. On the other hand, in
Chapter 4 an entirely decontextualised game mimicking in a stylised manner certain
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characteristics of energy consumption and saving was used. Laboratory experiments
beneﬁt from high internal validity - individuals make decisions in a highly controlled
setting, however, they can lack external validity.
The ﬁndings of the laboratory experiments presented in this thesis have provided
an insight into behaviours in response to nudges and prices, and in response to the
framing of information. They are not a substitute to the ﬁeld experiments and pilot
studies analysed in Chapter 2, but rather, are a complementary approach to better
understanding individual behaviour. The experiment in Chapter 3 highlighted an
unexpected consequence of a nudge on diﬀerent groups on individuals, and showed
how responses to incentives can inﬂuence individual characteristics. The experiment
in Chapter 4 explored the provision of eﬀort for small rewards in a less complex
environment compared to real-life where eﬀorts to save energy have wider impacts
including impacts on comfort and on other individuals. The lack of framing eﬀects
in the laboratory environment raises the question of whether such framing eﬀects
will be found when the provision of eﬀort is more complex. However, subjects in the
experiment had only to focus on the task of counting the number of ones in a series
of tables and so may not have been susceptible to framing as they were focused only
on the task in hand.
An important requirement to verify the robustness of laboratory experiment results
is replication. While, the experiment in Chapter 4 has replicated aspects of previous
experiments and has drawn similar conclusions, namely that framing eﬀects are not
always found when earnings are small, the results of the experiment in Chapter 3
should be further researched. In particular, the eﬀect of the nudge of reinforcing
existing behaviour.
4.5.3 Implications
The implications of the present research are three-fold. Firstly, the diﬀerent incen-
tives are eﬀective at encouraging households to lower their consumption to varying
degrees. When policy makers decide which incentive or incentives to implement, they
must ﬁrst consider the objective: overall demand reduction or peak demand reduc-
tion. The incentives should then be adapted to that objective bearing in mind that
pricing strategies are most eﬀective at reducing peak demand and that additional
incentives should be used to counter any extraordinary increases in demand during
the oﬀ-peak periods. Additionally, policy makers should consider that information
on consumption in the form of nudges is quickly understood by consumers and so
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can have an immediate eﬀect on consumption whereas prices take a little longer to
be integrated into individuals' decision making. This is of interest to policy makers
as increased prices may cause individuals to be worse oﬀ for a time if they are un-
able to lower their consumption immediately in response to the price. Consumers
may suﬀer welfare losses before they are fully able to adjust their consumption in
response to the price increase.
Secondly, policy makers should be aware of the barriers to the implementation of
the diﬀerent incentives and their potential undesirable consequences. In particular,
they should be concerned by the individual eﬀect of nudges typically used: as seen
in the previous literature, descriptive comparisons may encourage low-consuming
households to increase their consumption to the average amount, or, as seen in the
present research, the inclusion of injunctive norms may reinforce existing behaviours
such that low-consuming households reduce their consumption, compensating for
high-consuming households who continue to increase their consumption.
Finally, the present research also has implications for the design of devices which
display consumption information to households: the presentation of earnings in
terms of gains or losses does not encourage greater eﬀort provision under one or
other framing. It is the size of potential earnings and the reduction of risk on
earnings which is of importance. This lack of framing eﬀect for small earnings
also has implications for theory, as it would seem that loss aversion does not cause
individuals to provide greater eﬀort under loss framing in the case of small earnings.
The amount that the individual can earn is simply too small to be aﬀected.
4.5.4 Future research
The opening chapter of this thesis identiﬁes barriers to the use of incentives to
encourage demand reduction of which some are then further analysed in the following
chapters. Given that several barriers were identiﬁed, there is much scope for further
research into the topic of this thesis.
Individuals are generally unaware of their consumption, or of the electricity tariﬀ
that they are on. In turn this aﬀects their decisions to opt-in into dynamic pricing
contracts as individuals prefer to have a simpler contract as they are unaware of
whether such a tariﬀ would be beneﬁcial to them and how they can change their
behaviour to take advantage of the cheaper oﬀ-peak prices. An avenue for future
research could be to see how individuals' tariﬀ choices change upon being informed
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of their own consumption and how they can make use of the diﬀerent pricing levels,
building on the research of Dütschke and Paetz (2013), Buryk et al. (2015) and
Layer et al. (2017).
Monetary motivation has not been found to be a strong driver of changing consump-
tion behaviour as the savings are generally small (Hargreaves et al., 2013, Murtagh
et al., 2014). Furthermore, the choice of diﬀerent presentations of information awak-
ens diﬀerent motivations to save energy (Spence et al., 2014). Another avenue for
further research could be to provide individuals with displays of energy consumption
information presented in diﬀerent ways (monetary savings, energy savings, environ-
mental savings, ...) then, via a choice experiment, measure their preferences for the
diﬀerent displays. This could then be further researched in the ﬁeld by compar-
ing responses to incentives to lower consumption which are based on non-monetary
calculations of the impact of saving energy on the environment, or on health, or
other.
In addition to the barriers identiﬁed in Chapter 1, the experiments carried out in this
thesis also opened up avenues for further research. In Chapter 3, the nudge resulted
in the unintended eﬀect of reinforcing existing behaviour. A possible explanation
was found in reactance theory: individuals feel that their freedom to do as they
wish is threatened and so they do the behaviour that is not encouraged (Brehm,
1966). Yet, this eﬀect was not found in the ﬁeld experiments reviewed in Chapters
1 and 2. There is a diﬀerence in the creation of the nudge used in the ﬁeld, and
the one used in the present experiment. In the ﬁeld, behaviour is compared to an
endogenous level, the average consumption of the neighbourhood, whereas in the
laboratory experiment, behaviour is compared to an exogenously deﬁned optimal
level of consumption which is calculated by the experimenter. Individual responses
to endogenous and exogenous nudges merits further research.
This thesis set out to explore how residential consumers respond to incentives used
to encourage them to lower their consumption. Residential consumers respond pos-
itively to the various incentives used in that they result in average reductions in
peak or overall demand. The research highlighted that there may be unwanted
consequences of various incentives on consumption at the individual level, and that
diﬀerent incentives trigger diﬀerent characteristics which can aﬀect how consumers
respond to the incentives.
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Included studies
Author Year Publication Information
Alahmad et al. 2012 IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics
59(4), 2002-2013
Allcott 2011 Resource and Energy Economics
33(4), 820-842
Allcott 2011 Journal of Public Economics
95(9), 1082-1095
Ayres et al. 2013 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization
29(5), 992-1022
Benders et al. 2006 Energy Policy
34(18), 3612-3622
Carroll et al. 2014 Energy Economics
45, 234-243
Costa and Kahn 2013 Journal of the European Economic Association
11(3), 680-702
Department of Energy & Climate Change 2015 Department of Energy & Climate Change
Dougherty 2013 Opinion Dynamics Corporation
DNV KEMA Energy and Sustainability 2014 DNV KEMA Energy and Sustainability
D'Oca et al. 2014 Energy Research and Social Science
3, 131-142
Faruqui and Sergici 2011 Journal of Regulatory Economics
40(1), 82-109
Gleerup et al. 2010 Energy Journal
113-132
Grønhøj and Thøgersen 2011 International Journal of Consumer Studies
35(2), 138-145
Harries et al. 2013 European Journal of Marketing
47(9), 1458-1475
Houde et al. 2013 Energy Journal
34(1), 87-102
Kendel and Lazaric 2015 Journal of Strategy and Management
8(3), 231-244
Kua and Wong 2012 Energy Policy
47, 49-56
Martin and Rivers 2015 (working paper)
Mizobuchi and Takeuchi 2013 Energy Policy
63, 775-787
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Author Year Publication Information
Mountain 2006 Hydro One Network Inc.
Mountain 2008 Hydro One Networks Inc.
Mountain 2012 Research Institute for Quantitative Studies
in Economics and Population
Nilsson at al. 2014 Applied Energy
122, 17-23
Parker et al. 2008 Florida Solar Energy Center
Provencher et al. 2015 Navigant
Raw and Ross 2011 Energy Demand Research Project:
Final Analysis
Schleich et al. 2013 Energy Policy
61, 1097-1106
Schultz et al. 2015 Energy
90, 351-358
Schumatz and Dimetrosky 2014 NMR Group Inc and Tetra Tech
Shen et al. 2016 Energy Policy
98, 19-32
Sullivan et al. 2013 Freeman, Sullivan & Co.
Sullivan et al. 2016 Nexant
Torriti 2012 Energy
44(1), 576-583
Ueno et al. 2006 Applied Energy
83(2), 166-183
Van Dam et al. 2010 Building Research and Information
38(5), 458-469
Van Elburg 2014 Dutch Energy Savings Monitor
for the Smart Meter
Vassileva et al. 2012 Applied Energy
93, 575-582
Xu et al. 2015 Energy Procedia
75, 2694-2699
Table A.1: Studies included in analysis
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Reasons for study exclusion
Reason for exclusion Number of papers excluded
Diﬀerent eﬀect size measure 28
(e.g.: peak demand reduction,
appliance level data, median % change )
Non-residential sample 17
Not a ﬁeld experiment 11
or pilot study
(e.g.: a simulated study
or laboratory experiment)
Included under a diﬀerent title 8
Gas and electricity consumption combined 4
Experimental issues leading to missing data 3
Secondary data 1
Total 72
Table A.2: Reasons for studies exclusion from the analysis
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OLS estimation of treatment eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Monetary
Personal
feedback
Social
feedback
Study
design
All
incentives
Pricing strategies 2.075 1.651
(1.354) (1.055)
Monetary information -0.333 1.980
(1.009) (1.523)
Individual feedback -1.754 -2.116
(1.260) (1.273)
Real-time feedback -1.253 -2.565∗
(1.048) (1.310)
Savings tips 1.195 1.455
(1.338) (1.292)
Personalised advice -1.690 -2.252
(1.993) (2.069)
Social norms -1.161 -3.462∗
(1.875) (1.976)
Injunctive norms -3.113 -1.942
(2.825) (2.557)
Control group 3.420 4.983 4.070 3.499 5.586∗
(3.131) (3.116) (3.026) (3.201) (2.854)
Weather controls -0.003 0.294 0.380 0.405 -0.778
(1.053) (1.095) (1.342) (1.182) (1.339)
Demographic controls -1.640 -1.665 -1.576 -2.419 0.094
(1.623) (1.706) (1.802) (1.901) (1.603)
Random assignment -0.189 -0.343 0.154 0.135 -1.116
(0.990) (1.083) (1.302) (1.049) (1.299)
Opt-in recruitment -1.441 -1.652 -3.063 -0.847 -4.224
(1.495) (1.470) (2.739) (1.038) (2.799)
Duration 0.144∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.038) (0.045) (0.043) (0.056)
Peer reviewed 1.982∗ 2.302∗∗ 2.301∗ 1.601 3.603∗∗
(1.112) (1.106) (1.146) (0.971) (1.391)
Constant -7.597∗∗ -7.410 -6.166 -6.732∗ -7.455∗
(3.395) (4.423) (4.082) (3.765) (4.016)
Observations 105 105 105 105 105
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.157 0.114 0.109 0.194
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are clustered by primary study.
A negative coeﬃcient reads as a reduction in energy consumption.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.3: OLS estimation of treatment eﬀects
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English Translation of Experiment Instructions
In black are the instructions which are common to all treatments. In green are
the instructions speciﬁc to control groups, in red are the instructions for the nudge
treatment, and ﬁnally, in blue are the instructions for the price treatment.
Study
This study concerns individual electricity consumption. It is carried out by Grenoble
Applied Economics Laboratory as part of a public research programme.
Conﬁdentiality
In order to maintain your anonymity during any future data analysis, we will not
ask for any personal information such as your name. The data collected during
this study will remain anonymous and be used for research publications or other
analyses. It will not be used for commercial purposes.
Code of conduct
Communication between participants is strictly forbidden. Including discussions of
what should or should not be done during the study. Remain concentrated on your
screen for the duration of the experiment. If you have any questions, or problems,
raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you.
Payment and earnings
On your desk is an envelope containing 10e in exchange for your participation in
this study. This amount belongs to you. In addition to this amount, and according
to the decisions you make in the game, you can earn more money. You will be
informed of your ﬁnal earnings at the end of the experimental session.
Organisation of the session
This session is composed of several phases. Before the start of each phase, instruc-
tions on the phase will be read aloud. A new phase will begin once all participants
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have completed the preceding phase. The session will not last longer than 1 hour
30 minutes.
Are there any questions?
Phase 1: Electricity consumption behaviour
Electricity consumption
We consume electricity to satisfy our daily needs:
• To heat or to cool our homes via our central heating, or an air conditioner.
• To use our household appliances
• To use heat our meals or to keep them cool
• To recharge our electronic equipment (mobile phones, computers)
We are all electricity consumers, in particular in our homes, to a varying degree
according to our daily needs and habits. To meet the demand for electricity, there
are diﬀerent actors in the electricity network, from production to distribution in
residential homes. Regardless of the actors of production or distribution, there must
always be a balance between production and consumption in order to maintain the
functioning of the system. If there is an imbalance, then the system is interrupted
and this could result in a power cut. For example, during the winter, the increased
consumption by households could result in power cuts.
The study
This study focuses on such periods, known as peak periods when there is a risk that
consumption is greater than the available production. These periods generally last
for 4-8 hours, during the afternoon and evening.
Interruptions in the electricity network (voltage reductions, brown outs or black
outs) equates to a reduction in comfort for all.
In order to avoid such interruptions in the electricity network (voltage reductions,
brown outs or black outs), one solution is to ask consumers to reduce their consump-
tion during the peak period. Of course, this reduction in consumption equates to a
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reduction in individual comfort. However, it avoids a greater reduction in comfort
for all due to greater interruptions in the system.
In order to avoid such interruptions in the electricity network (voltage reductions,
brown outs or black outs), one solution is to incentivise consumers to reduce their
consumption by increasing the price during the peak period. Of course, this reduc-
tion in consumption equates to a reduction in individual comfort. However, it avoids
a greater reduction in comfort for all due to greater interruptions in the system.
For this study, imagine that you are in a situation where you must decide on how
much electricity to consume during a peak period. You will have to make this
decision during 10 peak periods. This decision is based on whether or not you use
the diﬀerent electricity consuming appliances during the peak period. For the 10
peak periods, you will be placed in a group with three other people which constitutes
an electricity consumption system.
Your task during the period
In each period, you will decide how much electricity to consume using your initial
endowment of 100 Experimental Currency Units (ECU). In order to do so, you
must decide whether to use or not several electricity consuming appliances, to each
of which is associated a certain level of consumption. The consumption levels of
each appliance will be presented on the next screen.
Electricity consumption choices
In each period, you must choose whether to use, or not, the following appliances:
1. Electricity heating, with three levels of use:
• No change = 15 Energy Units (EU)
• Lower temperature by 1◦C = 10 EU
• Lower temperature by 2◦C = 5 EU
2. Water heating:
• On = 5 EU
• Oﬀ = 0 EU
APPENDIX B: APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 159
3. Washing machine or dishwasher:
• On = 10 EU
• Oﬀ = 0 EU
4. Cooking equipment (oven, hot plate)
• On = 10 EU
• Oﬀ = 0 EU
5. Television or computer
• On = 5 EU
• Oﬀ = 0 EU
For each period, you can therefore consume between 5 and 45 EU.
Earnings per period
Regardless of appliance usage, each EU is billed at the price of 1 ECU for all peak
periods.
Regardless of appliance usage, each EU is billed at the price of 1 ECU for all peak
periods.
Regardless of appliance usage, each EU is billed at the price of 3 ECU, which is 3
times more expensive compared to normal periods. With your initial endowment,
you can consume up to 30 EU.
Your electricity consumption provides you with comfort via a monetary gain for
each period: 13 ECU per consumed EU. However, your consumption in addition
to the consumption of the three other people in your group has an impact on the
equilibrium of the electricity network and thus on potential interruptions in supply.
The total consumption of the group results in a lower level of comfort for every one
(including yourself). The greater the total consumption of the group, the greater
the reduction in comfort. Your earnings for the period thus depend on your own
consumption and the impact that the total consumption has on the system.
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Earnings simulator
To assist you in making your decisions, you have at your disposal a simulator with
which you can simulate your earnings. You have 1 minute to do as many simulations
as you wish before making your ﬁnal decision for the period. The use of the simulator
is described in the following slide. In addition to the simulator, there is a table
summarising all the possible earnings depending on your consumption choice (by
column) and the total consumption of the other three people in your group (by
row).
(Presentation of table)
(Presentation of simulator)
The end of the period
At the end of each period, your earnings will be displayed on the screen. The part
of your endowment which was not used for your consumption is integrated in this
amount. At the end of the period, your earnings will be saved and you will start a
new peak period, with a new endowment of 100 EU.
At the end of each period, your earnings will be displayed on the screen. The part
of your endowment which was not used for your consumption is integrated in this
amount. You will also be informed of how your consumption compares to the level
of consumption which minimises the reduction in comfort felt by the group. This
level is the same for all people in the group and is used as a reference for your own
consumption. At the end of the period, your earnings will be saved and you will
start a new peak period, with a new endowment of 100 EU.
At the end of each period, your earnings will be displayed on the screen. The part
of your endowment which was not used for your consumption is integrated in this
amount. At the end of the period, your earnings will be saved and you will start a
new peak period, with a new endowment of 100 EU.
Your consumption during the period
You will be informed via a smiley if your consumption for the peak period is:
• Equal or below the level which minimises the reduction in comfort felt by the
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group: :-)
• Above the level which minimises the reduction in comfort felt by the group:
:-(
At the end of the period, your earnings will be saved and you will start a new peak
period, with a new endowment of 100 EU.
At the end of the 10 peak periods
Phase 1 of the study is composed of 10 peak periods. In each period you have the
same decisions to make with the same people in your electricity consumption group.
At the end of the study, your earnings in ECU for the 10 peak periods, will be
added together and converted into euros at the following exchange rate : 150 ECU
= 1e 
These earnings will be added to those of phase 2 and paid at the end of the
study.
Are there any questions?
Before we begin, please answer a few questions to verify your understanding of the
instructions.
Phase 2: Lottery
In phase 2, you can earn an additional sum. You will see on your screen a table
with 10 rows. For each row, 2 options are presented: Option A and Option B. You
will decide at which row you wish to move from Option A to Option B. You can see
that for Option A the same earnings are possible at every row (2e or 1e60), and
for Option B (3e85 or 0.10e). Only the probabilities associated to each amount in
each Option change.
Principle of the lottery
For each option, you know the probability associated to each amount. You must
decide at which row you wish to move from Option A to Option B. For example, for
decision 1 in row 1, choosing Option A gives a 1 in 10 chance of winning 2e and a 9
in 10 chance of winning 1e60, whereas as choosing Option B gives a 1 in 10 chance
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of winning 3e85 and a 9 in 10 chance of winning 0.10e. By clicking on the button
associated with the chosen row, all the rows of Option A above your chosen row
become green, and all the rows of Option B below your chosen row become blue.
The colour, green or blue, indicates that if that row is chosen randomly, you will
win according to the probabilities in colour. Once you have made and conﬁrmed
your decision, the computer will randomly choose a row among the 10 rows. Then
the computer will randomly choose one of the winnings of the option chosen for that
row, according to the probabilities presented in the table. Your earnings will be
displayed on the screen.
Are there any questions?
(Questionnaires and organisation of payment)
Thank you for participating in this experiment.
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General Ecological Scale Questions (Kaiser, 1998)
1. I use energy-eﬃcient bulbs.
2. If I am oﬀered a plastic bag in a store, I take it.
3. I kill insects with a chemical insecticide.
4. I collect and recycle used paper.
5. When I do outdoor sports/activities, I stay within the allowed areas.
6. I wait until I have a full load before doing my laundry.
7. I use a cleaner made especially for bathrooms, rather than an all-purpose
cleaner.
8. I wash dirty clothes without pre-washing.
9. I reuse my shopping bags.
10. I use rechargeable batteries.
11. In the winter, I keep the heat on so that I do not have to wear a sweater.
12. I buy beverages in cans.
13. I bring empty bottles to a recycling bin.
14. In the winter, I leave the windows open for long periods of time to let in fresh
air.
15. For longer journeys (more than 6h), I take a plane.
16. The heater in my house is shut oﬀ late at night.
17. I buy products in reﬁllable packages.
18. In winter, I turn down the heat when I leave my house for more than 4 hours.
19. In nearby areas, I use public transportation, ride a bike, or walk.
20. I buy clothing made from all-natural fabrics (e.g. silk, cotton, wool, or linen).
21. I prefer to shower rather than to take a bath.
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22. I ride a bicycle, take public transportation, or walk to work or other.
23. I let water run until it is at the right temperature.
24. I put dead batteries in the garbage.
25. I turn the light oﬀ when I leave a room.
26. I leave the water on while brushing my teeth.
27. I turn oﬀ my computer when I'm not using it.
28. I shower/bathe more than once a day.
Altruism Questionnaire (Costa and McCrae, 1992)
1. Some people think that I am selﬁsh and egotistical.
2. I try to be courteous to everyone I meet.
3. Some people think of me as cold and calculating.
4. I generally try to be thoughtful and considerate.
5. I'm not known for my generosity.
6. Most people I know like me.
7. I think of myself as a charitable person.
8. I go out of my way to help others if I can.
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Proportion of groups by consumption type (under,
optimal or over-consuming)
Group consumption
Under Optimal Over Total
Nudge 42 17 191 250
16.8% 6.8% 76.4% 100.0%
Treatment Price 66 26 108 200
33.0% 13.0% 54.0% 100.0%
Control 0 4 146 150
0.0% 2.7% 97.3% 100.0%
Total 108 47 445 600
18.0% 7.8% 74.2% 100.0%
For the nudge and control groups, the optimal consumption
level is 60. In the price treatment, it is 80.
Table B.1: Number of groups by consumption level (across all periods)
Proportion of individuals by consumption type (un-
der, optimal or over-consuming)
Individual consumption
Under Optimal Over Total
Nudge 190 316 494 1,000
19.0% 31.6% 49.4% 100.0%
Treatment Price 234 295 271 800
29.3% 36.9% 33.9% 100.0%
Control 75 79 446 600
12.5% 13.2% 74.3% 100.0%
Total 499 690 1,211 2,400
20.8% 28.7% 50.5% 100.0%
For the nudge and control groups, the optimal consumption
level is 15. In the price treatment, it is 20.
Table B.2: Number of groups by consumption level (across all periods)
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Distribution of messages received in nudge treatment
Period
Message received (t-1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
Under consumption :-) (t-1) 9 18 22 19 18 20 24 20 24 174
5.2% 10.3% 12.6% 10.9% 10.3% 11.5% 13.8% 11.5% 13.8% 100.0%
Optimal :-) (t-1) 19 28 30 33 35 32 34 36 35 282
6.7% 9.9% 10.6% 11.7% 12.4% 11.3% 12.1% 12.8% 12.4% 100.0%
Over consumption :-( (t-1) 72 54 48 48 47 48 42 44 41 444
16.2% 12.2% 10.8% 10.8% 10.6% 10.8% 9.5% 9.9% 9.2% 100.0%
Table B.3: Distribution of messages received in nudge treatment by period
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
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English Translation of Experiment Instructions
In black are the instructions in common for all treatments.
In brown are the additional instructions for the Gain Control treatment.
In green are the additional instructions for the Loss Control treatment.
In red are the additional instructions for the Gain Ex-ante treatment.
In blue are the additional instructions for the Loss Ex-ante treatment.
In orange are the additional instructions for the Gain Ex-post treatment.
In purple are the additional instructions in the Loss Ex-post treatment.
Study
This study is carried out by Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory. During the
study you will be asked to make decisions. If you have any comprehension problems,
please do not hesitate to let us know.
Conﬁdentiality
In order to maintain your anonymity during the study and during any future data
analysis, you were attributed a subject code. No personal data will be collected
meaning it will be impossible to connect your answers during the study to your
name. The data collected during this study will remain anonymous and be used for
research publications or other analyses.
Code of conduct
Communication between participants is strictly forbidden. Including discussions of
what should or should not be done during the study. Remain concentrated on your
screen for the duration of the experiment. If you have any questions, or problems,
raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you.
Organisation of the session
This study is composed of two phases. The ﬁrst phase includes:
1. The reading of the instructions
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2. The completion of the task
3. The display of your earnings.
The second phase includes:
1. A questionnaire
2. The organisation of the end of the session
The second phase will begin once all participants have completed the ﬁrst phase.
The session will not last longer than 1 hour 30 minutes.
Payment and earnings
On your desk is an envelope containing 5e in exchange for your participation in this
study. This amount belongs to you. In addition to this amount, and according to
the decisions you make in the game, you can earn more money. Your earnings in
this study will depend upon your pot of earnings in the ﬁrst phase. At the end of
the session, you will receive your earnings in a separate room in order to maintain
conﬁdentiality.
Phase 1
Your task
Your task is to count the number of 1's in a table similar to the one below.
A table is successfully completed if you count the correct number of 1's.
The phase
There are 28 periods in the ﬁrst phase. In each period, you are asked to count the
number of 1's in 5 consecutive tables. You have 80 seconds for each period. After
each period, you must reply to the following question: How many tables do you
think you successfully completed?
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Figure C.1: Example table used in task
Your pot of earnings
At the start of the ﬁrst phase, the total of your pot is 0e. For each period, the
gain associated to each correctly completed table is 0e15. You win 0e15 when you
correctly complete the table, i.e.: when you count the correct number of 1's in a
table. You earn 0ewhen you incorrectly complete the table, i.e.: when you have
not counted the correct number of 1's or when you have not given an answer. Your
earnings for the period are therefore: Number of correct tables x 0e15
At the start of the ﬁrst phase, the total of your pot is 21e. For each period, the loss
associated to each incorrectly completed table or table without an answer is 0e15.
You lose 0e15 when you incorrectly complete the table, i.e.: when you have not
counted the correct number of 1's or when you have not given an answer. You earn
0ewhen you correctly complete the table, i.e.: when you count the correct number
of 1's in a table. Your earnings for the period are therefore: Number of correct
tables x -0e15
At the start of the ﬁrst phase, the total of your pot is 0e. For each period, the gain
associated to each correctly completed table is 0e05 with 50% probability, or 0e25,
with 50% probability. The random draw of the gain is valid for the ﬁve tables within
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a period. You win 0e05 or 0e25 when you correctly complete the table, i.e.: when
you count the correct number of 1's in a table. You earn 0ewhen you incorrectly
complete the table, i.e.: when you have not counted the correct number of 1's or
when you have not given an answer. Your earnings for the period are therefore, with
50% probability: Number of correct tables x 0e05 OR Number of correct
tables x 0e25
At the start of the ﬁrst phase, the total of your pot is 21e. For each period, the
loss associated to each incorrectly completed table or table without an answer is
0e05 with 50% probability, or 0e25, with 50% probability. The random draw of the
gain is valid for the ﬁve tables within a period.. You lose 0e05 or 0e25 when you
incorrectly complete the table, i.e.: when you have not counted the correct number of
1's or when you have not given an answer. You earn 0ewhen you correctly complete
the table, i.e.: when you count the correct number of 1's in a table. Your earnings
for the period are therefore: Number of correct tables x -0e05 OR Number
of correct tables x -0e25
At the start of the ﬁrst phase, the total of your pot is 0e. For each period, the gain
associated to each correctly completed table is 0e05 with 50% probability, or 0e25,
with 50% probability. The random draw of the gain is valid for the ﬁve tables within
a period. You win 0e05 or 0e25 when you correctly complete the table, i.e.: when
you count the correct number of 1's in a table. You earn 0ewhen you incorrectly
complete the table, i.e.: when you have not counted the correct number of 1's or
when you have not given an answer. Your earnings for the period are therefore, with
50% probability: Number of correct tables x 0e05 OR Number of correct
tables x 0e25
At the start of the ﬁrst phase, the total of your pot is 21e. For each period, the
loss associated to each incorrectly completed table or table without an answer is
0e05 with 50% probability, or 0e25, with 50% probability. The random draw of the
gain is valid for the ﬁve tables within a period.. You lose 0e05 or 0e25 when you
incorrectly complete the table, i.e.: when you have not counted the correct number of
1's or when you have not given an answer. You earn 0ewhen you correctly complete
the table, i.e.: when you count the correct number of 1's in a table. Your earnings
for the period are therefore: Number of correct tables x -0e05 OR Number
of correct tables x -0e25
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Random draw
The random draw is done by the computer before each period (5 tables) in order to
determine the gain associated to a correctly completed table. You are informed of
the result of this random draw before doing the task.
The random draw is done by the computer before each period (5 tables) in order to
determine the loss associated to an incorrect or incomplete table. You are informed
of the result of this random draw before doing the task.
The random draw is done by the computer before each period (5 tables) in order to
determine the gain associated to a correctly completed table. You are informed of
the result of this random draw after doing the task.
The random draw is done by the computer before each period (5 tables) in order to
determine the loss associated to an incorrect or incomplete table. You are informed
of the result of this random draw after doing the task.
Feedback at the end of each period
At the end of each of the 28 periods, you will be informed of:
• The number of correctly completed tables
• The gain associated to each table (if in gain treatments: GC, GEA, GEP)
The loss associated to each table (if in loss treatments: LC, LEA, LEP)
• Your earnings for the period (if in gain treatment: GC, GEA, GEP)
Your losses for the period (if in loss treatment: LC, LEA, LEP)
• Your total earnings for all the previous periods
Are there any questions?
To start, please enter your subject code. Before we begin, please answer a few
questions to verify your understanding of the instructions.
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Answers to comprehension questions
Your task is to count the number of 1's in the table TRUE
There are 28 periods TRUE
A period lasts for 80 seconds TRUE
There are 5 tables in a period TRUE
You have 80 seconds to count the number of 1's in 5 tables TRUE
In each period, the gain associated to each correct table is 0e15 TRUE
In each period, the loss associated to each incorrect or incomplete table is
0e15 TRUE
In each period, the gain associated to each correct table is 0e05 with 50%
probability, or 0e25, with 50% probability TRUE
The random draw is valid for the 5 tables in a period TRUE
You know the random draw before the start of a period TRUE
In each period, the loss associated to each correct table is 0e05 with 50%
probability, or 0e25, with 50% probability TRUE
The random draw is valid for the 5 tables in a period TRUE
You know the random draw before the start of a period TRUE
In each period, the gain associated to each correct table is 0e05 with 50%
probability, or 0e25, with 50% probability TRUE
The random draw is valid for the 5 tables in a period TRUE
You know the random draw after the start of a period TRUE
In each period, the loss associated to each correct table is 0e05 with 50%
probability, or 0e25, with 50% probability TRUE
The random draw is valid for the 5 tables in a period TRUE
You know the random draw after the start of a period TRUE
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Reminder
(This slide was on display throughout the duration of phase 1.)
• Count the number of 1's
• 28 periods
• 1 period = 5 tables during 80 seconds
• Gain associated to each correct table = 0e15
Loss associated to each incorrect or incomplete table = 0e15
Gain associated to each correct table = 0e05 or 0e25
Loss associated to each correct table = 0e05 or 0e25
Gain associated to each correct table = 0e05 or 0e25
Loss associated to each correct table = 0e05 or 0e25
Phase 2
(Questionnaires and organisation of payment)
Thank you for participating in this experiment.
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Wilcoxon rank sum tests
GC LC GEA LEA GEP
LC 0.459
GEA 0.908 0.331
LEA 0.498 0.817 0.298
GEP 0.489 0.723 0.310 0.994
LEP 0.098* 0.768 0.023** 0.452 0.349
Table C.1: Wilcoxon rank sum tests between treatments for all periods (p-values)
GC LC GEA LEA GEP
LC 0.683
GEA 0.778 0.376
LEA 0.726 0.362 0.753
GEP 0.705 0.874 0.453 0.305
LEP 0.741 0.848 0.365 0.293 0.950
Table C.2: Wilcoxon rank sum tests between treatments in period 1 (p-values)
GC LC GEA LEA GEP
LC 0.763
GEA 0.652 0.991
LEA 0.871 0.794 0.794
GEP 0.670 0.513 0.375 0.582
LEP 0.041** 0.175 0.060* 0.041** 0.015**
Table C.3: Wilcoxon rank sum tests between treatments in period 28 (p-values)
GC LC GEA LEA GEP
LC 0.407
GEA 0.790 0.418
LEA 0.345 0.958 0.324
GEP 0.260 0.914 0.231 0.839
LEP 0.152 0.833 0.075* 0.674 0.840
Table C.4: Wilcoxon rank sum tests between treatments in period ﬁrst (p-values)
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GC LC GEA LEA GEP
LC 0.739
GEA 0.626 0.388
LEA 0.752 0.821 0.344
GEP 0.839 0.734 0.394 0.833
LEP 0.120 0.531 0.027** 0.270 0.162
Table C.5: Wilcoxon rank sum tests between treatments in period last (p-values)
All periods Period 1 Period 28 First half Second half
GC = GEA 0.908 0.778 0.652 0.790 0.626
GC = GEP 0.489 0.705 0.670 0.260 0.839
GEA = GEP 0.310 0.453 0.375 0.231 0.394
LC = LEA 0.817 0.362 0.794 0.958 0.821
LC = LEP 0.768 0.848 0.175 0.833 0.531
LEA = LEP 0.452 0.293 0.041** 0.674 0.270
Table C.6: Wilcoxon rank sum tests of signiﬁcant diﬀerences in eﬀort between payoﬀ
structure (p-values)
Correlation table
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Introduction
Transition énergétique et consommateurs résidentiels
L'un des principaux déﬁs du XXIe siècle est le passage à une société verte, neutre
en CO2, renouvelable et durable. En 2017 par rapport à l'ère préindustrielle, la
température de notre planète a augmenté de 1,1◦C et 2013-2017 ont été les cinq
années les plus chaudes jamais enregistrées à ce jour. Ce réchauﬀement de la planète
a eu des conséquences d'une portée considérable dans le monde entier, allant de
violentes tempêtes et inondations, à des sécheresses mortelles et des incendies de
forêt, avec des eﬀets économiques majeurs sur la vie humaine. L'inﬂuence humaine
est le principal facteur à l'origine de l'augmentation des températures mondiale et
régionales(World Meteorological Organization, 2018).
Aﬁn de lutter contre la hausse des températures, les gouvernements du monde en-
tier se sont ﬁxé des objectifs pour réduire notre impact sur la planète. L'Union
européenne a proposé des objectifs à atteindre à certaines dates, à savoir une réduc-
tion de 20% des émissions de gaz à eﬀet de serre (GES) par rapport aux niveaux de
1990, une part de 20% d'énergies renouvelables (EnR) dans le mix de production et
une amélioration de 20% de l'eﬃcacité énergétique52. L'UE dans son ensemble est
en bonne voie pour les atteindre en 2020. D'ici 2030, l'UE poursuivra sa stratégie
énergétique en visant à réduire ses émissions de GES de 40%, à avoir une part d'au
moins 27% des sources d'EnR dans le mix de production et à réaliser des économies
d'énergie d'au moins 25% dans tous les secteurs (industrie, commercial, transports,
résidentiel)53.
En ce qui concerne les émissions de GES, l'UE a atteint son objectif 2020 en 2014,
et les estimations pour 2016 suggèrent que les émissions de GES dans l'UE sont de
23% inférieures aux niveaux de 1990. Cependant, l'UE est actuellement en deçà
de sa trajectoire pour 2030 (European Environment Agency, 2017c). De même, la
52Voir https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2020_en
53Voir https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2030_en
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France est en bonne voie d'atteindre son objectif d'émissions de GES pour 2020,
mais le rythme de réduction des émissions devrait ralentir. Il est ainsi peu probable
que la France atteigne son objectif 2030 (European Environment Agency, 2017d).
En ce qui concerne les énergies renouvelables, l'UE est en bonne voie pour atteindre
son objectif 2020. En revanche, la croissance de la part des EnR ralentit, ce qui
rend l'objectif 2030 plus diﬃcilement atteignable (European Environment Agency,
2017b). La France quant à elle s'est engagée à atteindre une part de 23% des EnR
d'ici 2020. Cependant, en 2016, la part des EnR en France était de 15,6%, et au
rythme actuel de progression, la France ne réalisera son objectif 2020 qu'en 202954.
En ce qui concerne les économies d'énergie, en 2014, dans l'UE-28, la consommation
d'énergie du secteur résidentiel représentait le troisième secteur le plus consomma-
teur avec 25% de la consommation ﬁnale d'énergie55. Entre 2005 et 2014, la con-
sommation ﬁnale d'énergie dans le secteur résidentiel a diminué de 14,8% (European
Environment Agency, 2017a). Cependant, en France, la consommation d'électricité
résidentielle est le secteur qui consomme le plus, représentant 36% de la consomma-
tion ﬁnale d'électricité. Entre 2001 et 2017, la consommation d'électricité du secteur
résidentiel en France a augmenté de 12%, restant relativement stable à partir de 2011
(Réseau de Transport d'Electricité, 2018). En 2014, la France devait réduire sa con-
sommation ﬁnale d'énergie (tous secteurs confondus) de 7,5% supplémentaires aﬁn
d'atteindre son objectif 2020 (European Environment Agency, 2017a).
Étant donné que le secteur résidentiel est le secteur qui consomme le plus et que la
France est en bonne voie d'atteindre un seul des objectifs de l'UE 2020 d'ici l'année
prochaine (celui des GES) (European Environment Agency, 2017d), il existe un
potentiel clair de réduction de la consommation dans le secteur résidentiel en France
aﬁn d'atteindre les objectifs nationaux et européens de transition énergétique.
54Ceci est calculé par rapport à la part des énergies renouvelables en France d'après la
Commission Européenne (voir
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/
eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester_en)
55Les secteurs de transport et de l'industrie sont les plus consommateurs avec respectivement
33% et 26% de consommation ﬁnale d'énergie.
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Une façon de réduire les émissions de GES consiste à diminuer l'utilisation de généra-
teurs coûteux, ineﬃcaces et polluants et de privilégier plutôt les énergies provenant
de sources renouvelables. Ces générateurs sont généralement utilisés pendant les
périodes de pointe, lorsque la demande est particulièrement élevée. En 2008, en
France, seulement 6% de la capacité de pointe a été utilisée pendant 1% des heures
(Faruqui et al., 2010a). L'augmentation de la part des EnR, qui est intermittente
par nature, signiﬁe que l'électricité ne sera disponible qu'à certaines périodes de la
journée et de l'année (lorsque le soleil brille et que le vent soue). Ces deux élé-
ments impliquent un changement dans le fonctionnement traditionnel du marché de
l'électricité, de sorte que la demande suit l'oﬀre plutôt que l'oﬀre suit la demande
(Strbac, 2008).
A l'avenir, l'intégration croissante de l'électricité produite à partir des EnR sera
stockée pour être utilisée pendant les périodes de pointe. Les consommateurs charg-
eront leurs véhicules électriques à des moments où l'électricité est abondante et moins
chère, pour être utilisés à des moments où l'oﬀre est limitée et où une forte demande
signiﬁe des prix élevés. Actuellement, les capacités de stockage de l'électricité sont
limitées et coûteuses (Stephens et al., 2015) et d'autres méthodes pour encourager
la demande à suivre l'oﬀre sont donc nécessaires.
En l'absence de stockage d'électricité, la maîtrise de la demande en énergie (MDE)
est une méthode de redistribution de la demande des périodes de pointe aux péri-
odes creuses. Dans le secteur résidentiel, les consommateurs peuvent être encour-
agés à réduire leur consommation pendant les périodes de pointe pour éviter de
raccorder au réseau des générateurs ineﬃcaces. Ils peuvent également être encour-
agés à augmenter leur consommation pendant les périodes creuses, lorsqu'il existe un
approvisionnement en EnR. La méthode de la MDE dans le secteur résidentiel exige
que la demande des consommateurs soit ﬂexible et qu'ils réagissent aux incitations
mises en place pour modiﬁer leur comportement. Des économies signiﬁcatives, tant
monétaires qu'environnementales, peuvent être réalisées si les ménages sont incités
à réduire leur demande en période de pointe.
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L'intégration des EnR dans le système de production d'énergie et la réduction de
la demande en période de pointe sont importants pour atteindre les objectifs de
réduction de GES, et pour l'intégration des ER. En revanche ces deux facteurs
n'entraînent pas nécessairement une réduction de la demande globale. Or celle-ci
est nécessaire pour atteindre le troisième objectif de l'UE, à savoir les économies
d'énergie. L'eﬀet sur la demande globale dépendra des retombées de l'utilisation
d'incitations pour réduire la demande en période de pointe. C'est-à-dire, s'il y aura
une réduction prolongée sur les périodes quand la demande est plus faible (Allcott,
2011a), ou si au contraire, les consommateurs augmentent leur demande pendant
les périodes creuses après avoir été encouragés à réduire leur demande en période de
pointe (Torriti, 2012).
Une réduction de la demande globale fait référence à une diminution de la consom-
mation totale d'énergie à tout moment de la journée ou de l'année. Bien que de
telles réductions puissent être réalisées grâce à l'amélioration de l'eﬃcacité énergé-
tique (normes pour les bâtiments à énergie zéro, modernisation des vieux bâtiments
et utilisation d'appareils à basse consommation), le comportement des occupants est
un facteur important de réduction de la consommation d'énergie en secteur résiden-
tiel. Les caractéristiques des bâtiments peuvent représenter 42% de la consommation
d'énergie d'un bâtiment, tandis que les caractéristiques et le comportement des oc-
cupants ne représentent que 4,2% (Santin et al., 2009). Même si cela ne semble pas
être une grande proportion, la consommation d'électricité des ménages vivant dans
des maisons similaires (selon les caractéristiques du bâtiment) peut varier d'un fac-
teur 5 et la consommation de chauﬀage peut varier d'un facteur 2-3 (Gram-Hanssen,
2013). En outre, il existe un écart d'eﬃcacité énergétique lorsque les gains d'eﬃcacité
réalisés sont inférieurs aux gains prévus. Cet écart est dû d'une part aux barrières
comportementales (Hirst and Brown, 1990), et d'autre part, aux eﬀets de rebond.
C'est-à-dire, lorsque la consommation augmente à la suite d'une amélioration de
l'eﬃcacité énergétique (Greening et al., 2000). Compte tenu de la variation de la
consommation d'énergie et de l'augmentation de la consommation après les gains
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d'eﬃcacité, il est nécessaire d'inﬂuencer le comportement des consommateurs et de
les encourager à réduire leur consommation énergétique. Sur le marché traditionnel
de l'électricité, les consommateurs sont passifs et ignorent leur consommation. Ainsi,
inﬂuencer leur comportement est un déﬁ signiﬁcatif. Toutefois, l'introduction des
compteurs intelligents dans le secteur résidentiel constitue un progrès technologique
important qui permet la mise en place d'incitations pour encourager les ménages à
réduire leur consommation d'énergie.
European Commission (2014a, p.8) L'Union européenne a déclaré que dans des
"secteurs comme le logement [. . . ], il sera nécessaire d'intensiﬁer considérablement
les eﬀorts actuellement déployés pour tirer parti des nombreuses possibilités inex-
ploitées. Cela nécessitera d'importants investissements dans le secteur de la con-
struction (en vue d'abaisser les frais d'exploitation), des conditions générales et une
information des consommateurs propres à les inciter à adopter des produits et ser-
vices innovants, ainsi que des instruments ﬁnanciers appropriés pour faire en sorte
que tous les consommateurs d'énergie bénéﬁcient des changements ainsi occasionnés.
 Dans toute l'UE, les États membres ont investi dans l'installation de compteurs in-
telligents dans les foyers résidentiels. La ﬁg. C.2 montre les stratégies de déploiement
des États membres d'ici 2020. Faruqui et al. (2010a) estiment que le déploiement
des compteurs intelligents dans l'UE coûtera 51 milliards d'euros et que les avan-
tages opérationnels56 représenteront de 26 à 41 milliards d'euros. L'investissement
manquant de 10 à 25 milliards d'euros dans la technologie des compteurs intelligents
peut être récupéré par une réduction de la demande d'énergie du secteur résidentiel,
en particulier en période de pointe. Les compteurs intelligents constituent un pro-
grès technologique clé pour un marché de l'électricité dans lequel les consommateurs
jouent un rôle plus actif dans la gestion de la consommation d'énergie. Cependant,
les compteurs intelligents seuls ne suﬃsent pas à eux seuls à encourager les consom-
mateurs à réduire leur demande. Pour motiver un changement de comportement,
56Les avantages opérationnels comprennent : le relevé à distance des compteurs, la détection
plus rapide des pannes d'électricité et la détection des fraudes, entre autres.
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les consommateurs doivent être incités de manière appropriée.
Figure C.2: Stratégies de déploiement de compteurs intelligents dans l'UE-27 d'ici
2020 à compter de juillet 2013, (European Commission, 2014b)57
57La carte présente les résultats des analyses coûts-avantages (ACB) des États membres, qu'elles
soient positives, négatives, non disponibles ou non concluantes, ainsi que l'état d'avancement du
déploiement des compteurs intelligents. A partir de 2013, les pays en vert foncé ont oﬃciellement
commencé l'installation de compteurs intelligents, ceux en vert hachuré prévoient d'installer des
compteurs intelligents (une fois une décision oﬃcielle a été prise), ceux en rouge ont décidé de ne
pas installer des compteurs intelligents après une ACB négative ou non concluante, ceux en orange
foncé n'ont pas encore pris une décision et ceux en orange hachuré ont commencé une installation
sélective. Par exemple, en Allemagne, l'installation des compteurs intelligents se limite aux maisons
neuves ou rénovées, aux  consom'acteurs  et aux ménages à forte consommation (Edelmann and
Kästner, 2013).
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Technologies et mesures incitatives
Grâce à l'utilisation de compteurs intelligents, diﬀérentes incitations peuvent être of-
fertes aux consommateurs en fonction de mesures précises de la consommation. Les
incitations qui ciblent la réduction globale de la demande sont traditionnellement
basées sur l'information (Darby et al., 2006) - informations sur la consommation
historique ou de feedback en temps réel - ou, plus récemment, sur les connaissances
de l'économie comportementale (Allcott, 2011b). Les compteurs intelligents facili-
tent l'utilisation d'incitations ﬁnancières tels que la tariﬁcation dynamique qui est
utilisée pour encourager une baisse de la demande en période de pointe (Faruqui
and Sergici, 2013). Les sections suivantes donnent un aperçu de la littérature sur
ces diﬀérentes mesures incitatives.
Feedback
L'un des principaux avantages des compteurs intelligents est la possibilité de com-
muniquer des données de consommation en temps réel aux consommateurs. En
fournissant aux ménages des informations sur leur consommation d'énergie, ils de-
viendront plus conscients de leurs habitudes de consommation et feront des eﬀorts
pour la réduire. Sensibiliser les ménages à leur consommation d'énergie est le pre-
mier pas vers un changement des habitudes de consommation (Attari et al., 2010).
La facture papier est la méthode de feedback traditionnellement utilisée pour in-
former les consommateurs de leur consommation et de leurs dépenses énergétiques.
Darby et al. (2006) soulignent qu'un tel feedback est utile pour évaluer l'impact sur
la consommation des investissements dans l'eﬃcacité énergétique plutôt que pour
évaluer les eﬀets dus aux changements de comportement. Ce genre d'information ne
fournit pas de feedback approprié sur les eﬀorts déployés pour réduire la consomma-
tion d'énergie, car les données sont reçues trop longtemps après le changement de
comportement. Pour que le feedback ait un eﬀet, la relation entre l'action et l'eﬀet
doit être claire pour les ménages aﬁn qu'ils puissent voir comment les changements
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de comportement aﬀectent la consommation d'énergie (Fischer, 2008).
Pour que les consommateurs puissent vraiment bénéﬁcier des informations sur leur
consommation fournies par le compteur intelligent, ils doivent pouvoir accéder à
celles-ci peu de temps après la mise en ÷uvre du changement de comportement.
Les données disponibles en ligne fournissent des informations plus détaillées sur les
niveaux de consommation et peuvent potentiellement combler l'écart d'action et
d'eﬀet, mais elles exigent que les consommateurs disposent d'un appareil avec une
connexion Internet et qu'ils se connectent pour accéder aux données. Des études
évaluant ce type de feedback et son eﬀet sur la consommation d'énergie révèlent que
peu de personnes se connectent aux portails en ligne et que le nombre de connexions
diminue au cours de l'étude (Benders et al., 2006, Vassileva et al., 2012, Schleich
et al., 2013).
Pour combler l'écart action-eﬀet, les ménages peuvent utiliser un dispositif capable
de s'interfacer avec leur compteur intelligent qui peut leur fournir des informations
en temps réel et accessibles sur la consommation. Ces dispositifs sont communément
appelés moniteurs d'énergie. Ce sont des plates-formes dédiées qui fournissent des
données de consommation en temps réel, assurant ainsi un lien direct entre l'action
et l'eﬀet. L'utilisation de ces moniteurs peut encourager une réduction de la con-
sommation à condition qu'ils soient placés dans des endroits visibles de la maison
pour un accès facile et rapide aux données disponibles. Cependant, ce n'est pas
toujours le cas et le facteur nouveauté de consulter sa consommation en temps réel
tend à s'atténuer au ﬁl de l'utilisation (Hargreaves et al., 2010, 2013). Aﬁn de faire
participer les ménages à l'utilisation des données fournies, il faut prêter attention à
la façon dont les données sont présentées, qu'il s'agisse de termes monétaires ou én-
ergétiques (Buchanan et al., 2014), d'aﬃchages numériques ou graphiques (Chiang
et al., 2012), de dépenses présentées de façon factuelle ou sous forme de perte (Bager
and Mundaca, 2017). Ces présentations et leurs eﬀets sur l'eﬀort sont examinés plus
en détail au chapitre 4.
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Tariﬁcation dynamique
La tariﬁcation dynamique fait référence à l'ajustement des prix de détail de l'électricité
pour mieux reﬂéter les coûts de la production d'énergie. En période de pointe, les
coûts de production sont plus élevés, ce qui entraîne une hausse des prix de dé-
tail qui incite les ménages à réduire leur demande pendant les périodes de pointe
et, dans certains cas, à augmenter leur demande pendant les périodes creuses, aﬁn
de maintenir l'équilibre entre l'oﬀre et la demande (Faruqui et al., 2009). Il existe
diﬀérentes structures tarifaires plus ou moins dynamiques, allant d'une tariﬁcation
variable dans le temps, mais statique, les tariﬁcations heures pleines-heures creuses,
à une tariﬁcation dynamique en temps réel. Ces diﬀérents programmes de tariﬁca-
tion diﬀèrent selon le degré de risque et le rendement possible (Faruqui and Palmer,
2011). Un tarif standard dans lequel les prix sont ﬁxés quel que soit le moment de
la consommation est "sans risque" car tous les kWh sont consommés au même prix.
Le risque associé à une tariﬁcation heures pleines-heures creuses est légèrement plus
élevé, mais le risque demeure beaucoup plus faible que celui d'une tariﬁcation de
pointe critique ou d'une tariﬁcation dynamique en temps réel. La ﬁg. C.3 montre
l'arbitrage risque-rendement des tariﬁcations dynamiques où le risque fait référence
à l'exposition des consommateurs à la volatilité des prix du marché de gros de
l'électricité (Faruqui, 2012).
Les tariﬁcations dynamiques sont eﬃcaces pour réduire la consommation d'énergie,
en particulier les tariﬁcations du type Critical Peak Pricing ou Real-time Pricing
lorsqu'ils sont combinés à des moniteurs d'énergie (Faruqui and Sergici, 2013). En
eﬀet, pour que les ménages puissent réagir avec succès à une tariﬁcation dynamique,
les consommateurs ont besoin d'un moniteur pour les informer de l'évolution des prix
(Dütschke and Paetz, 2013), en particulier dans le cas de tariﬁcation en temps réel.
Toutefois, les opposants à une tariﬁcation dynamique défendent qu'il ne faut pas de-
mander aux consommateurs du secteur résidentiel de soutenir la volatilité des prix de
l'électricité, en particulier les consommateurs vulnérables aux changements de l'oﬀre
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Figure C.3: Trade-oﬀ risque/récompense en matière de tariﬁcation dynamique
(adapté de Faruqui (2012, p.17))
d'électricité (jeunes enfants, personnes âgées, personnes handicapées) (Alexander,
2010). De plus, les pics de demande sont naturels, en raison de l'organisation de la
vie quotidienne, diﬃcilement déplaçables (Naus et al., 2014, Hall et al., 2016).
Nudging
L'installation de compteurs intelligents et de moniteurs n'est pas suﬃsante pour in-
citer les consommateurs à modiﬁer leurs comportements. La majorité des ménages
montrent un manque d'intérêt pour les moniteurs. On constate que ce sont souvent
seulement ceux qui sont déjà concernés par leur consommation d'énergie qui s'y in-
téressent le plus (Buchanan et al., 2015). La tariﬁcation dynamique a tendance à
n'avoir un impact que sur les consommateurs qui sont pleinement informés et at-
tentifs aux changements de prix (Jessoe et al., 2016). Ainsi, les outils d'économie
comportementale sont de plus en plus utilisés pour accroître la réaction des consom-
mateurs aux mesures incitatives. Ces mesures incitatives sont appelées des nudges
ou des coups de coude et reposent principalement sur les travaux des lauréats du
prix Nobel Richard Thaler (2017) et Daniel Kahneman (2002).
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) déﬁnissent un nudge comme suit : " Un nudge (...)
est tout aspect de l'architecture de choix qui modiﬁe le comportement des gens
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d'une manière prévisible sans interdire aucune option ou modiﬁer sensiblement leurs
incitations économiques. Pour compter comme un simple nudge, l'intervention doit
être facile et peu coûteuse à éviter. Les nudges ne sont pas des mandats."
Le nudging est basé sur l'idée du paternalisme libertaire qui est une approche qui
oriente les individus vers des choix qui sont dans leur meilleur intérêt et qui aug-
menteront leur bien-être sans limiter leur liberté de choix. Le nudging reconnaît
que les individus font des choix qui ne sont pas dans leur meilleur intérêt, des choix
qu'ils ne feraient pas s'ils avaient une information complète et des capacités cogni-
tives illimitées (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003).
Les ménages ont été encouragés à réduire leur consommation d'énergie par le biais
de normes sociales et injonctives. Les normes sociales sont un type de feedback qui
compare la consommation d'énergie d'un ménage à celle de ses voisins (Schultz et al.,
2007, Nolan et al., 2008). Les normes injonctives ajoutent de l'approbation sociale de
la consommation d'un ménage par rapport à celle de ses voisins (Schultz et al., 2007).
Par exemple, Opower58 met cela en pratique avec des factures papier qui compare
la consommation d'un ménage avec la consommation moyenne des ménages voisins
(norme sociale). On y trouve également un visage content (norme injonctive) si le
ménage consomme moins que ses voisins (Allcott, 2011b). La ﬁg. C.4 fournit un
exemple de l'utilisation de normes sociales et injonctives dans un facture d'Opower.
Figure C.4: Une facture "Home Energy Report" d'Opower
En absence de normes injonctives, c'est-à-dire avec uniquement des comparaisons
58Opower était une société américaine qui fournissait des logiciels aux compagnies d'énergie pour
analyser les données de consommation aﬁn d'encourager la réduction de la demande. La société a
été acquise par Oracle Corporation en 2016.
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descriptives de la consommation, les ménages qui consomment moins que la moyenne
ont tendance à augmenter leur consommation. Schultz et al. (2007) suggèrent que
l'utilisation d'une norme sociale descriptive fournit un niveau auquel il n'est pas
souhaitable de s'écarter. Ce niveau devient le niveau normal de comportement et
donc, être au-dessus ou en-dessous n'est pas désiré. Ceci conduit à une convergence
vers la moyenne que Schultz et al. appellent un eﬀet boomerang. Un tel com-
portement peut également être décrit par un eﬀet de compensation morale lorsque
l'engagement dans une bonne action, c'est-à-dire en réduisant sa consommation, per-
met à un individu de s'engager ultérieurement dans une mauvaise action, c'est-à-dire
en augmentant sa consommation (Khan and Dhar, 2006). L'inclusion de visages con-
tents est utilisée pour contrecarrer ces eﬀets en fournissant une approbation sociale
du comportement désirable : la réduction de la consommation.
Si de tels nudges relativement peu chers sont eﬃcaces pour réduire la consommation
d'énergie, ils peuvent être utilisés comme alternatif à des incitations plus coûteuses
comme la tariﬁcation dynamique. Avant de prendre une telle mesure, il convient
d'étudier l'eﬀet des nudges et de la tariﬁcation aﬁn de déterminer la valeur monétaire
d'un tel nudge (voir chapitre 3).
Plan de la thèse
Les compteurs intelligents sont introduits dans les foyers pour inciter les consom-
mateurs à jouer un rôle actif dans leur gestion de la consommation d'énergie et
donc contribuer à la réalisation des objectifs nationaux et européens en matière de
changement climatique. Actuellement, la France n'est pas en mesure d'atteindre
tous ses objectifs d'ici un an. En outre, les incitations utilisées pour encourager les
ménages à réduire leur demande en énergie présentent à la fois des avantages et des
inconvénients, comme nous l'avons souligné dans la section précédente. La question
centrale de cette thèse est donc :
Comment les consommateurs du secteur résidentiel réagissent-ils aux in-
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citations utilisées pour les encourager à réduire leur consommation ?
Cette question est abordée en quatre chapitres dont une présentation de chacun suit
ci-dessous.
Chapitre 1
Le premier chapitre de la thèse est une revue de la littérature existante sur la
façon dont les consommateurs du secteur résidentiel interagissent avec les incita-
tions décrites ci-dessus et les utilisent pour réduire leur consommation, que ce soit
la consommation en période de pointe ou globale. L'objectif du premier chapitre
est d'identiﬁer tous les problèmes qui aﬀectent le succès des diﬀérentes incitations
à encourager les ménages à réduire leur consommation. Diﬀérents obstacles à
l'acceptation et à l'adoption des compteurs intelligents, des moniteurs et des in-
citations qu'ils oﬀrent sont identiﬁés.
L'objectif du chapitre 1 est d'analyser le potentiel des compteurs intelligents pour
encourager les consommateurs résidentiels à réduire leur consommation par le biais
d'incitations ﬁnancières et non ﬁnancières.
La question de recherche de ce chapitre est : Quels sont les principaux obstacles
à l'acceptation et à l'adoption des compteurs intelligents et les incitations
qu'ils peuvent oﬀrir ?
La littérature référence deux principaux obstacles à surmonter pour pouvoir inciter
les ménages à réduire leur consommation : les obstacles à l'acceptation et ceux à
l'adoption. L'acceptation est le premier obstacle. Les ménages doivent d'abord être
prêts à accepter l'installation de compteurs intelligents dans leur maison et à recevoir
un feedback sur leur consommation, que ce soit par le biais de factures papier, de
portails en ligne ou de moniteurs. L'installation de compteurs intelligents ouvre la
voie de l'utilisation d'une tariﬁcation dynamique qui est mise en ÷uvre de manière à
 opter pour  plutôt qu'à  opter contre . Une fois que les ménages ont accepté les
compteurs intelligents et les incitations associées, le prochain obstacle à surmonter
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est l'adoption aﬁn de savoir si ces dispositifs peuvent être eﬃcaces. L'installation
d'un compteur intelligent, la présence d'un moniteur et la tariﬁcation dynamique ne
suﬃsent pas à elles seules à faire baisser la consommation des ménages. Ces derniers
doivent s'engager à utiliser ces diﬀérentes mesures incitatives.
La littérature souligne que le principal obstacle à l'acceptation des compteurs in-
telligents est que les ménages ne font pas conﬁance aux compagnies d'énergie. Ils
ne savent pas ce que sont les compteurs intelligents et comment ils peuvent être
utilisés au proﬁt des consommateurs. En ce qui concerne la tariﬁcation dynamique,
les ménages trouvent que les tarifs sont complexes et lorsqu'ils ont le choix, peu
de ménages optent pour une tariﬁcation dynamique. Ils préfèrent rester sur le tarif
standard qui est plus simple et sans risque. En ce qui concerne l'adoption par les
ménages de compteurs intelligents et de mesures incitatives, les résultats de la lit-
térature suggèrent que tout eﬀet sur la consommation est généralement de courte
durée. Les ménages ont tendance à répondre au feedback au début, mais leur intérêt
diminue après quelques semaines ou quelques mois. De plus, les ménages sont con-
traints de répondre au feedback selon leur niveau de confort personnel sur lequel ils
ne sont pas prêts à faire des compromis, et selon les rigidités de la vie quotidienne.
En outre, les économies monétaires résultant de la baisse de leur consommation sont
rarement suﬃsamment élevées pour encourager des changements de comportement
persistants.
La contribution de ce chapitre est une revue récente de la littérature expérimentale
aﬁn d'identiﬁer les obstacles à l'utilisation des compteurs intelligents et des incita-
tions associées comme moyen d'encourager les ménages à réduire leur consommation.
Chapitre 2
Il existe une richesse des expériences de terrain et des études pilotes explorant com-
ment les consommateurs réagissent aux incitations (seuls ou en combinaison, dans
de nombreux pays et les nombreux protocoles expérimentaux) et une attention crois-
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sante accordée aux incitations comportementales telles que le nudging ces dernières
années. Etant donnée le deuxième chapitre utilise une approche méta-analytique
pour analyser les résultats des études expérimentales récentes qui ont examiné l'eﬀet
des incitations sur la consommation énergétique du secteur résidentiel.
L'objectif du chapitre 2 est d'analyser quantitativement la littérature expérimentale
existante pour obtenir des estimations précises de l'eﬀet des diﬀérentes incitations
sur la consommation du secteur résidentiel.
Les questions de recherche abordées dans le deuxième chapitre sont : Quelles
mesures incitatives sont les plus eﬃcaces pour encourager les ménages
à réduire leur consommation d'énergie ? Comment la conception de
l'étude expérimentale inﬂue-t-elle sur l'eﬃcacité des diﬀérentes mesures
incitatives pour réduire la consommation d'énergie du secteur résidentiel
? La méta-analyse est une méthodologie qui consiste à combiner les résultats
de nombreuses études qui explorent un même objectif (l'eﬀet des incitations sur la
consommation d'énergie du secteur résidentiel) aﬁn d'obtenir une estimation plus
précise de l'eﬀet réel. L'idée est que la combinaison de nombreuses estimations d'un
eﬀet conduit à une meilleure estimation de l'eﬀet réel (Stanley and Doucouliagos,
2012).
Ce chapitre se concentre sur les études menées à l'époque de l' Ère des réseaux
intelligents59. La collecte des données est limitée à cette période aﬁn d'éviter de
fausser les estimations de l'ampleur de l'eﬀet en utilisant les études des décennies
précédentes, lorsque des eﬀets plus importants des incitations sur la consommation
d'énergie ont été constatés (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010). Dans le passé, on a
constaté que l'eﬀet était plus grand en raison des diﬀérents niveaux de connaissance
de la consommation d'énergie par les consommateurs et en raison de la technolo-
gie et des méthodes de feedback disponibles. Ces dernières années, de plus en plus
d'études ont expérimenté des mesures incitatives fondées sur la théorie économique
comportementale. Dans le présent chapitre, ces incitations comportementales sont
59McKerracher and Torriti (2013) propose un ère des réseaux intelligents à partir de 2005.
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séparées en deux catégories : celles qui ne fournissent qu'une norme sociale (une
comparaison descriptive), et celles qui comprennent également une norme injonc-
tive (une approbation ou désapprobation sociale). Aﬁn de déterminer s'il y a une
diﬀérence de l'impact de l'eﬀet dû à des eﬀets de boomerang ou de compensation
morale (Schultz et al., 2007). De plus, la méta-analyse vise à fournir une meilleure
estimation des eﬀets réels des diﬀérentes mesures incitatives en incluant les résul-
tats non seulement des revues à comité de lecture, mais également des rapports du
gouvernement et des services publics.
Les résultats montrent que le biais de publication peut être limité en tenant compte
de la taille de l'échantillon de l'étude originale. Ainsi, si l'on prend en compte la taille
de l'échantillon, une étude mesurant l'impact des incitations sur la consommation
énergétique du secteur résidentiel fera apparaitre en moyenne une baisse de 2% de
cette consommation. Il s'agit d'un eﬀet beaucoup plus faible que celui estimé dans
les méta-analyses précédentes. C'est le fait de fournir aux ménages un feedback sur
leur consommation d'énergie en temps réel ou en termes monétaires qui a le plus
d'impact, avec une réduction de la consommation s'élevant respectivement à 2,89%
et 2,86%. Le protocole de l'étude (par exemple, la manière dont les participants
sont recrutés) inﬂuence l'ampleur de l'impact mesuré. Les études reposant sur une
participation volontaire des sujets font apparaître une réduction plus importante
de la consommation énergétique. Ce résultat suggère que le déploiement d'une
incitation particulière à l'échelle nationale sera probablement moins eﬃcace que ce
que les expériences de terrain et les études pilotes peuvent montrer. Cela revêt une
importance particulière pour les décideurs politiques.
L'apport de ce chapitre est de proposer une analyse actualisée de l'impact des dif-
férentes mesures incitatives sur la consommation d'énergie du secteur résidentiel. En
particulier, cette méta-analyse se concentre sur des études récentes et de ce fait, elle
considère plus d'expériences utilisant des incitations comportementales. Elle lim-
ite le problème du biais de publication, souvent présent dans les méta-analyses, et
enﬁn, elle tient compte de certaines caractéristiques des protocoles expérimentaux,
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non prises en compte par les méta-analyses précédentes.
Chapitre 3
Dans les chapitres 1 et 2, on souligne l'idée que la tariﬁcation dynamique peut être
politiquement diﬃcile à mettre en ÷uvre (Alexander, 2010), et qu'elle est diﬃcile à
comprendre pour les consommateurs (Layer et al., 2017, Schlereth et al., 2018). De
plus, les nudges sous forme de comparaisons sociales, avec ou sans normes injonc-
tives, sont eﬃcaces pour réduire la consommation. Ils peuvent néanmoins engendrer
un eﬀet de compensation morale ou de boomerang, lorsque les ménages qui con-
somment moins que la moyenne de leurs voisins estiment qu'ils peuvent augmenter
leur consommation pour converger vers la consommation moyenne (Schultz et al.,
2007, Allcott, 2011b). Dans le troisième chapitre, ces incitations sont analysées dans
un environnement de laboratoire aﬁn de comparer leurs avantages et inconvénients
respectifs en conditions contrôlées.
L'objectif du chapitre 3 est de comparer les réactions des individus à une incitation
comportementale et à une incitation ﬁnancière dans un jeu stylisé de consommation
d'énergie.
Les questions de recherche posées dans ce chapitre sont les suivantes : Quelles sont
les mesures incitatives les plus susceptibles de favoriser un comportement
socialement optimal ? Quel est le  prix  du nudge ?
Le chapitre 3 décrit une expérience basée sur un jeu de ressources communes ap-
pliqué au contexte de la consommation d'énergie du secteur résidentiel. (Ostrom,
1990) décrit une ressource commune comme un système de ressources à partir duquel
un ﬂux de ressources peut être extrait. Le stock de ressources est renouvelable et
peut être maintenu tant que la quantité extraite ne dépasse pas le taux de renou-
vellement. Collectivement, il est préférable que chacun ne dépasse pas sa part de
la quantité renouvelable de la ressource. Cependant, chaque individu aimerait en
extraire davantage. Des recherches antérieures ont porté sur la façon dont ce cadre
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peut être appliqué à l'infrastructure énergétique (Bäckman, 2011, Goldthau, 2014,
Gollwitzer et al., 2018). Ce cadre est appliqué à la consommation d'énergie dans le
secteur résidentiel en période de pointe, où la capacité maximale est utilisée. Chaque
ménage aimerait consommer comme il l'entend, mais il serait bénéﬁque pour tout le
monde que tous les ménages s'eﬀorcent de réduire leur consommation aﬁn d'éviter
des chutes de tension et des pannes de courant.
Les résultats de l'expérience montrent que l'utilisation d'un nudge ou d'un prix
encouragent les individus à adopter un comportement plus optimal socialement en
réduisant leur consommation, comparé à une situation où il n'y a pas d'incitations.
A la moyenne, le nudge est compris rapidement par les individus et a un eﬀet
immédiat sur la consommation dans la deuxième période du jeu après la première
réception du feedback. Il faut plus de temps pour que le prix ait un eﬀet, et ce
n'est qu'au cours de la quatrième période de jeu que les individus intègrent le prix
dans leur prise de décision. L'hypothèse sous-tendant le nudge est que les individus
qui ne se comportent pas de manière optimale en absence d'incitation, c'est-à-dire
qui surconsomment, seront encouragés à baisser leur consommation après avoir reçu
le nudge. Cependant, les résultats montrent que les individus ne répondent pas au
nudge de cette manière et continuent à surconsommer. Cette constatation revêt
une importance particulière, car elle met en lumière un inconvénient potentiel des
nudges.
La contribution de ce chapitre est l'application de la théorie des ressources communes
au marché de l'électricité dans le cadre d'une expérience en laboratoire. La valeur
monétaire du nudge est estimé en comparant le comportement des individus face
au nudge au comportement face au prix équivalent. Le prix est ﬁxé pour que les
individus soient incités à choisir le même niveau de consommation que celui qu'ils
choisissent dans le traitement nudge.
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Chapitre 4
Le chapitre 1 montre que l'information fournie par le moniteur n'incite pas néces-
sairement les ménages à réduire leur consommation : lorsque cette information
est aﬃchée en unités énergétiques, elle est incompréhensible (Raw and Ross, 2011,
Buchanan et al., 2014) ; lorsqu'elle est en unités monétaires, les économies poten-
tielles sont trop faibles. Certains ménages estiment que l'eﬀort qu'ils font pour
réduire leur consommation d'énergie n'en vaut pas la peine car il n'a qu'un faible
eﬀet sur la consommation et entraîne peu d'économies monétaires (Hargreaves et al.,
2010, 2013, Goulden et al., 2014). Le dernier chapitre tient compte de ces obstacles
et cherche à déterminer comment des mesures incitatives pourraient être formulées
pour encourager un eﬀort plus important, lorsqu'on demande aux individus de faire
de petits eﬀorts pour de petites récompenses. Ce cas de ﬁgure s'applique en eﬀet
particulièrement aux eﬀorts visant à réduire la consommation énergétique.
L'objectif du chapitre 4 est d'explorer le cadre des mesures incitatives utilisées pour
encourager les petits eﬀorts lorsque les récompenses sont faibles.
La dernière question de recherche est la suivante : Comment l'information
(sur les moniteurs) peut-elle être formulée pour encourager la fourniture
d'eﬀorts ?
Le chapitre 4 vise donc à déterminer comment l'information peut être structurée
pour encourager les individus à faire un petit eﬀort lorsque les récompenses sont
faibles. Dans l'expérience, les individus sont incités à faire un eﬀort pour réaliser
une tâche artiﬁcielle à eﬀort réel sur un certain nombre de périodes. L'incitation
prend la forme de paiements, qui sont présentés aux individus de manière diﬀérente
(sous forme de gains ou de pertes) et dont la structure est diﬀérente (paiements
sans risque ou à risque). L'expérience s'appuie sur les conclusions de la théorie
des perspectives (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) qui suggère que les individus font
plus d'eﬀorts lorsque les paiements sont présentés comme une perte (en particulier
lorsque les pertes sont risquées), que lorsqu'ils sont présentés comme un gain.
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Dans le cas des petites récompenses pour de petits eﬀorts, la présente expérience ne
révèle aucun eﬀet signiﬁcatif de la présentation des paiements sous forme de gains
ou de pertes sur l'eﬀort. En moyenne, les individus fournissent le même niveau
d'eﬀort quelle que soit la présentation. Toutefois, les individus fournissent plus
d'eﬀorts lorsqu'ils peuvent gagner ou perdre un montant élevé plutôt que faible.
Cela suggère que lorsque les récompenses sont faibles, comme dans le cas des actions
visant à réduire la consommation d'énergie, les individus font un eﬀort équivalent
dans le cadre d'une présentation sous forme de gains ou d'une présentation sous
forme de pertes. Augmenter l'importance des récompenses associées à une action
est essentiel pour encourager les individus à faire un eﬀort.
Ce chapitre contribue à la littérature sur la présentation des paiements sous forme
de gains ou de pertes en examinant comment la théorie de la perspective s'applique
dans une situation où les individus doivent faire de petits eﬀorts pour de petites
récompenses, et en incluant un élément de risque dans la structure des paiements.
Enﬁn, la thèse se termine par une vue d'ensemble des quatre chapitres et de leurs
conclusions en relation avec la question centrale de la recherche. Les limites de la
recherche et ses implications pour les décideurs, les praticiens et les théoriciens sont
examinées. La thèse se termine par une discussion sur les pistes de recherche futures.
Conclusion
Cette thèse a exploré les diﬀérentes mesures incitatives utilisées pour encourager
les consommateurs du secteur résidentiel à réduire leur consommation d'énergie.
L'objectif était de déterminer si les ménages acceptent ces mesures incitatives et les
technologies qui y sont associées, et si ces mesures sont eﬃcaces pour réduire leur
consommation. Ce sujet revêt une importance particulière étant donné l'impact des
activités humaines sur le réchauﬀement de l'atmosphère de notre planète, qui a des
eﬀets désastreux dans le monde entier. Pour limiter l'impact futur de l'humanité, les
gouvernements du monde entier se sont ﬁxé des objectifs de réduction des émissions,
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d'augmentation de la part des énergies renouvelables dans le mix de production et
d'économies d'énergie. Les consommateurs du secteur résidentiel peuvent contribuer
à cet eﬀort en réduisant leur demande globale et, en particulier, leur demande de
pointe.
Ces dernières années, on observe un regain d'intérêt pour l'utilisation d'incitations
comportementales pour encourager les ménages à réduire leur consommation. Compte
tenu de l'application récente de ces incitations à la consommation résidentielle
d'énergie, les recherches sur ces incitations dans le contexte de la consommation
d'énergie sont moins nombreuses que celles portant sur les incitations ﬁnanciers ﬁ-
nancières traditionnelles. De plus, il y a peu d'études qui ont rassemblé les données
existantes sur les incitations comportementales. En outre, se pose la question de
l'eﬃcacité des incitations comportementales pour motiver des changements signiﬁ-
catifs et durables dans le comportement des consommateurs. La présente thèse con-
tribue à ce corpus de recherche en explorant la littérature antérieure et en évaluant
l'eﬃcacité des incitations traditionnelles et comportementales sur la consommation,
et en analysant plus ﬁnement les incitations comportementales en laboratoire.
Pour répondre à la question centrale de savoir comment les consommateurs du
secteur résidentiel réagissent aux incitations utilisées pour les encourager à réduire
leur consommation énergétique, la thèse a été divisée en quatre chapitres. Pre-
mièrement, une revue de la littérature a permis d'identiﬁer les principaux obstacles
à l'acceptation et à l'adoption des compteurs intelligents et aux incitations qu'ils
peuvent oﬀrir. Deuxièmement, une méta-analyse a permis d'actualiser les connais-
sances sur l'eﬃcacité des mesures incitatives pour encourager les ménages à réduire
leur consommation, et de prendre en compte le fait que la manière dont sont conçues
les expériences inﬂuence les résultats. Compte tenu des conclusions des deux pre-
miers chapitres, le troisième chapitre visait à analyser plus en détail les réactions
des consommateurs aux incitations ﬁnancières et comportementales dans un envi-
ronnement contrôlé en laboratoire aﬁn de déterminer si ces incitations sont capables
d'encourager un comportement socialement plus optimal et à quantiﬁer la réaction
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à une incitation comportementale. Le quatrième et dernier chapitre s'appuie sur les
résultats de recherches antérieures qui suggèrent que les individus font plus d'eﬀorts
pour éviter les pertes que pour recevoir des gains. Ce chapitre cherche à savoir si
cela est applicable à la fourniture d'eﬀorts pour économiser l'énergie, qui se carac-
térise par de petits eﬀorts pour de petites récompenses. Cette expérience a permis
d'explorer les moyens de présenter l'information aﬁn d'encourager la fourniture de
l'eﬀort.
En réponse aux questions de recherche, le chapitre 1 a permis de constater qu'il existe
de nombreuses barrières limitant les possibilités d'encourager les ménages à réduire
leur consommation au moyen de mesures incitatives associées à des compteurs in-
telligents. Ces obstacles doivent être surmontés pour que les ménages acceptent
l'installation de compteurs intelligents et de la technologie connexe à leur domicile
dans un premier temps, et dans un deuxième temps, pour qu'ils soient en mesure
de motiver eﬃcacement les consommateurs à réduire leur demande énergétique.
Si ces obstacles persistent, les ménages n'utiliseront pas de compteurs intelligents
et n'adopteront pas les mesures incitatives, et le coût d'investissement dans cette
technologie ne sera pas amorti par les économies énergétiques et monétaires qui
pourraient être réalisées.
Le chapitre 2 a examiné en détail l'eﬃcacité de diﬀérentes mesures incitatives à
l'aide d'une méta-analyse combinant les résultats d'expériences récentes sur le ter-
rain et d'études pilotes qui ont testé l'eﬀet de diverses mesures incitatives sur la
consommation énergétique résidentielle. La méta-analyse a révélé que la prise en
compte de la taille de l'échantillon dans les études initiales fournit des estimations
plus précises de l'eﬀet des incitations et qu'en moyenne, une incitation entraîn-
era une réduction de la consommation de l'ordre de 2%. Des mesures incitatives
telles que les stratégies de prix, qui visent principalement à réduire la demande de
pointe, peuvent également être eﬃcaces pour réduire la demande globale tant que
l'incitation à réduire la consommation pendant les périodes de pointe n'est pas com-
pensée par une incitation à augmenter la consommation pendant les heures creuses.
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Des réductions de la demande de pointe sont nécessaires pour éviter l'utilisation de
générateurs coûteux et polluants, mais si la demande globale augmente en raison des
stratégies de tariﬁcation, les objectifs d'économies d'énergie pourraient ne pas être
atteints. Les mesures incitatives fondées sur l'économie comportementale, telle que
la comparaison sociale, sont également eﬃcaces pour encourager une réduction de la
consommation en moyenne. De telles incitations sont eﬃcaces, qu'elles soient sim-
plement descriptives ou qu'elles fassent également appel à des normes injonctives.
Toutefois, cette dernière montre un eﬀet de réduction légèrement plus important.
L'estimation de l'eﬃcacité des mesures incitatives a été grandement inﬂuencée par
le protocole de l'étude. En particulier, l'absence d'un groupe de contrôle fournit
des estimations gonﬂées des réductions de consommation par rapport au cas où
un groupe de contrôle est présent. Les études sans groupe de contrôle comparent
la consommation d'un même groupe de ménages avant et après la mise en ÷uvre
d'une mesure incitative et n'eﬀectuent donc pas un contrôle simultané des facteurs
externes qui peuvent aﬀecter la consommation au cours d'une expérience. Les études
qui utilisent un groupe de contrôle fournissent à la fois une comparaison entre la
consommation des ménages avant et après la mise en ÷uvre d'une mesure incitative,
et une comparaison avec un groupe de ménages dont la consommation n'est pas
inﬂuencée par une mesure incitative, pendant la même période. L'utilisation d'un
groupe de contrôle fournit une estimation plus robuste de l'eﬃcacité que les mesures
incitatives auraient dans un cadre naturel et non expérimental.
De plus, il est important de noter que les résultats des expériences sur le terrain
et des études pilotes peuvent surestimer l'eﬀet que des incitations auraient dans le
cas d'un déploiement à l'échelle nationale. En particulier, lorsqu'il y a de petits
échantillons de ménages qui choisissent de participer à l'étude, ces ménages peuvent
être particulièrement disposés à faire un eﬀort pour réduire leur consommation,
que ce soit pour des raisons monétaires ou environnementales, ou même en raison
d'un intérêt pour la technologie oﬀerte dans le cadre de l'étude. Comme l'ont sug-
géré Spence et al. (2014) le type d'incitation utilisé ou le choix de l'unité utilisée
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pour la présentation de l'information sur la consommation inﬂue sur les motivations
déclarées des individus à réduire leur consommation et, comme le montre le chapitre
3, cela peut aussi inﬂuer sur leurs décisions de consommation.
Au chapitre 3, les individus ont été encouragés à réduire leur consommation par le
biais d'un nudge, ou incités à le faire par une augmentation du prix de la consom-
mation hypothétique dans le cadre d'un jeu expérimental de ressources communes.
L'incitation via le prix était la plus eﬃcace pour atteindre le niveau de consomma-
tion que chaque incitation était conçue pour encourager. Cependant, le nudge a
eu un eﬀet immédiat puisque l'information a été immédiatement comprise par les
individus. Dans le cas de l'incitation tarifaire, les individus ont mis plus de temps
à intégrer le prix dans leur prise de décision. Cela reﬂète les constatations tirées de
la littérature dont il a été question au chapitre 1, à savoir que les stratégies de prix,
telle que la tariﬁcation dynamique, sont complexes à comprendre pour les ménages
(Layer et al., 2017).
Ces deux mesures incitatives ont été plus eﬃcaces pour encourager les consom-
mateurs à réduire leur consommation que l'absence de politiques. Cependant, les
évaluations ex post des caractéristiques individuelles, y compris la sensibilité envi-
ronnementale, ont montré que les caractéristiques déclarées par les individus dif-
fèrent selon l'incitation utilisée pour les encourager à réduire leur consommation.
Les choix de consommation dans le traitement nudge diﬀèrent selon la sensibilité
environnementale individuelle ; ceux qui étaient plus sensibles aux questions envi-
ronnementales sont ceux qui ont le plus réduit leur consommation. L'utilisation
d'une incitation monétaire n'a pas eu cet eﬀet diﬀérencié en fonction des caractéris-
tiques environnementales, car les personnes plus sensibles ont choisi de consommer
la même quantité que celles qui étaient moins sensibles aux questions environnemen-
tales. Cette constatation, ainsi que les discussions des chapitres 1 et 2, mettent en
lumière l'existence d'un lien entre les incitations, et les motivations et les caractéris-
tiques individuelles. Si l'utilisation d'incitations monétaires écarte toute inﬂuence
des caractéristiques ou motivations environnementales sur la réduction de la con-
220 FRENCH SUMMARY
sommation, c'est préoccupant, car le chapitre 1 a montré que les consommateurs
sont peu motivés par les économies monétaires liées à la réduction de leur consom-
mation énergétique, celles-ci étant souvent faibles (Hargreaves et al., 2010, Murtagh
et al., 2014).
La discussion et l'analyse de la documentation aux chapitres 1 et 2 ont mis en lumière
les problèmes potentiels liés à l'utilisation d'incitations comportementales pour en-
courager la réduction de la consommation d'énergie, à savoir que lorsqu'on leur dit
qu'ils consomment moins que la consommation moyenne dans leur quartier, les mé-
nages augmentent leur consommation (Schultz et al., 2007). Cet eﬀet boomerang
a été atténué par l'inclusion d'un smiley pour rappeler aux individus que consom-
mer moins que la moyenne est socialement souhaitable (Allcott, 2011b). Le nudge
expérimenté au chapitre 3, qui est présenté diﬀéremment de ceux utilisés sur le ter-
rain, a conduit à un autre impact inquiétant. Le nudge a réussi à encourager une
réduction de la consommation moyenne, mais il a renforcé le comportement existant
des individus, de sorte que ceux qui sous-consommaient ont compensé pour ceux qui
surconsommaient. Cela est particulièrement préoccupant, car l'utilisation de tels
nudges peut diviser les consommateurs : ceux qui sont peu consommateurs font des
eﬀorts accrus pour réduire leur consommation et ceux qui sont gros consommateurs
ne le font pas.
Comme expliqué dans le chapitre 1, les économies monétaires ne sont pas nécessaire-
ment suﬃsantes pour encourager les eﬀorts d'économie d'énergie. C'est dans cette
optique que le chapitre 4 a exploré expérimentalement la façon dont la présentation
de l'information sur les gains peut encourager un plus grand eﬀort. Le chapitre a
également montré que les personnes fournissent, en moyenne, le même niveau d'eﬀort
lorsqu'elles sont incitées à faire un petit eﬀort pour une petite récompense, quelle que
soit la présentation des paiements (en gains ou en pertes). Lorsque les récompenses
possibles sont relativement plus importantes, la présentation des paiements n'aﬀecte
pas l'eﬀort fourni par les individus. Lorsque les individus ne sont pas sûrs du mon-
tant qu'ils gagneront après un eﬀort, c'est-à-dire lorsque les gains sont risqués, ils
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ont tendance à fournir un peu moins d'eﬀort dans le cas d'une présentation sous
forme de pertes. Ces résultats ont montré qu'aﬁn d'encourager les individus à faire
de petits eﬀorts pour de petites récompenses, comme c'est le cas pour les économies
d'énergie, la présentation des paiements n'est pas de la plus haute importance, il
serait plutôt plus eﬃcace de se concentrer sur le montant qui peut être économisé.
Aﬁn d'encourager les ménages à faire un eﬀort pour réduire leur consommation, il
convient de mettre l'accent sur le fait que plusieurs eﬀorts combinés conduisent à des
économies plus importantes, car les individus fournissent plus d'eﬀorts lorsque les
récompenses potentielles sont relativement plus élevées. En outre, il conviendrait de
minimiser le risque sur les paiements aﬁn que les ménages soient assurés du montant
qu'ils gagneront en réalisant une certaine action.
Les résultats de la présente recherche ont permis de répondre à la question cen-
trale de la recherche : comment les consommateurs résidentiels réagissent-ils aux
incitations utilisées pour les encourager à réduire leur consommation énergétique ?
Malgré les obstacles au déploiement des compteurs intelligents et des mesures incita-
tives qui y sont associées, les consommateurs résidentiels réagissent aux incitations
et ces dernières sont eﬃcaces pour encourager une réduction de la consommation.
Les diﬀérentes incitations sont plus ou moins eﬃcaces selon l'objectif de réduction.
Les incitations monétaires, à savoir les stratégies de prix, sont plus appropriées
pour réduire la demande de pointe que la demande globale. Pour qu'ils soient vrai-
ment eﬃcaces, il faut mieux expliquer les tarifs aﬁn que la complexité perçue ne
freine pas leur adoption, ni la réactivité des consommateurs. Les incitations com-
portementales sont une autre incitation eﬃcace, en particulier lorsque des normes
injonctives sont utilisées parallèlement aux normes sociales. Ces incitations ont
l'avantage, par rapport aux stratégies de prix, d'être comprises rapidement, mais il
peut y avoir des conséquences non désirées. Lorsque les individus se rendent compte
qu'ils sont poussés vers un comportement socialement optimal, ils peuvent réagir
en adoptant exactement le comportement qui n'est pas souhaitable. L'information
sur les économies d'énergie et les économies monétaires est également eﬃcace, du
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moins au début. Cependant, il y a des limites à la motivation monétaire. Les eﬀorts
d'économie d'énergie se traduisent par de petites récompenses monétaires qui ne
sont pas nécessairement suﬃsantes pour être motivantes. Les diﬀérentes méthodes
de présentation des petites récompenses pour de petits eﬀorts n'augmentent pas la
fourniture d'eﬀort.
Limites
Au cours de cette recherche, certaines limites ont été rencontrées. La méthodologie
de la méta-analyse utilisée dans le chapitre 2 consiste à inclure de façon exhaustive
toutes les études sur le sujet, mais elle est limitée par la disponibilité des études.
Or, il est possible que les études disponibles ne soient que celles qui ont des eﬀets
signiﬁcatifs. Si les études qui ne montrent pas d'eﬀets signiﬁcatifs ne sont pas
incluses dans la méta-analyse, alors les résultats de l'analyse sont biaisés. Cette
limite a été contournée en analysant les problèmes liés au biais de publication, et
en utilisant des méthodes pour le corriger. La méthode consistant à donner plus de
poids aux études portant sur des échantillons plus importants a permis d'atténuer
de façon signiﬁcative le biais de publication.
Le chapitre 3 portait sur les choix de consommation d'énergie dans un jeu de
ressources communes contextualisé. Les sujets prenaient leurs décisions dans un
laboratoire informatique et, même si leurs décisions avaient des conséquences moné-
taires conçues pour reﬂéter l'utilité et la désutilité des choix de consommation, leurs
décisions n'avaient aucune incidence sur la consommation réelle. D'autre part, au
chapitre 4, un jeu entièrement décontextualisé imitant de manière stylisée certaines
caractéristiques de la consommation et des économies d'énergie a été conduit. Les
expériences de laboratoire bénéﬁcient d'une validité interne élevée - les individus
prennent des décisions dans un environnement hautement contrôlé, mais elles peu-
vent manquer de validité externe.
Les résultats des expériences de laboratoire présentées dans cette thèse ont permis
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de mieux comprendre les comportements en réponse aux nudges et aux prix, et en
réponse à la présentation des paiements. Ils ne se substituent pas aux expériences
de terrain et aux études pilotes analysées au chapitre 2, mais constituent plutôt
une approche complémentaire pour mieux comprendre le comportement individuel.
L'expérience du chapitre 3 a mis en évidence une conséquence inattendue d'un nudge
donné à diﬀérents groupes sur les individus, et a montré comment les réponses aux
incitations et les caractéristiques individuelles sont liées. L'expérience du chapitre
4 a étudié la possibilité de fournir des eﬀorts pour de petites récompenses dans
un environnement moins complexe que dans la vie réelle, où les eﬀorts d'économie
d'énergie ont des impacts plus larges, notamment sur le confort et sur les autres
individus. L'absence d'eﬀets de la façon de présenter les paiements (sous formes de
gains ou de pertes) en laboratoire soulève la question de savoir si de tels eﬀets se
manifesteront lorsque l'eﬀort à fournir est plus complexe. Toutefois, les sujets de
l'expérience n'avaient qu'à se concentrer sur une tâche qui consistait à compter le
nombre de  1  dans une série de tableaux, et n'étaient donc peut-être pas sensibles
à la présentation des paiements, car ils n'étaient concentrés que sur la tâche en cours.
Une exigence importante pour vériﬁer la robustesse des résultats d'expériences en
laboratoire est la réplication. Bien que l'expérience du chapitre 4 ait repris certains
aspects des expériences précédentes et ait tiré des conclusions similaires, à savoir
que les eﬀets de présentation des paiements (sous forme de gains ou de pertes) ne se
manifestent pas toujours lorsque les gains sont faibles, les résultats de l'expérience
du chapitre 3 devraient faire l'objet de recherches plus poussées. En particulier sur
l'eﬀet du nudge consistant à renforcer le comportement existant.
Conséquences
Les implications de la présente recherche sont de trois ordres. Premièrement, les dif-
férentes incitations sont eﬃcaces pour encourager les ménages à réduire leur consom-
mation à des degrés divers. Lorsque les décideurs décident des mesures d'incitation
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à mettre en ÷uvre, ils doivent d'abord tenir compte de l'objectif : réduction glob-
ale de la demande ou réduction de la demande de pointe. Les incitations devraient
ensuite être adaptées à cet objectif en gardant à l'esprit que les stratégies de tariﬁca-
tion sont les plus eﬃcaces pour réduire la demande de pointe et que des incitations
supplémentaires devraient être utilisées pour contrer les augmentations de la de-
mande pendant les périodes creuses. En outre, les décideurs devraient tenir compte
du fait que l'information sur la consommation sous forme de nudges est rapidement
comprise par les consommateurs et peut donc avoir un eﬀet immédiat sur la con-
sommation, alors que les prix prennent un peu plus de temps à être intégrés dans le
processus décisionnel des individus. Cela présente un intérêt pour les décideurs, car
l'augmentation des prix peut aggraver la situation des individus pendant un certain
temps s'ils ne sont pas en mesure de réduire immédiatement leur consommation en
réaction à la hausse des prix. Les consommateurs peuvent subir une diminution de
leur bien-être avant d'être pleinement en mesure d'ajuster leur consommation en
réponse à l'augmentation des prix.
Deuxièmement, les décideurs politiques devraient être conscients des obstacles à la
mise en ÷uvre des diﬀérentes incitations et de leurs potentielles conséquences indésir-
ables. En particulier, ils devraient prendre en compte l'eﬀet individuel des nudges
habituellement utilisés. Comme le montre la revue de littérature, les comparaisons
descriptives peuvent inciter les ménages consommant peu à augmenter leur consom-
mation jusqu'au niveau moyen ou, comme vu dans la présente étude, l'inclusion de
normes injonctives peut renforcer les comportements existants, de sorte que les mé-
nages peu consommateurs réduisent leur consommation, compensant l'impact des
ménages très consommateurs qui continuent à accroître leur consommation.
Enﬁn, la présente recherche a également des implications pour la conception de
dispositifs qui aﬃchent des informations sur la consommation aux ménages : la
présentation des paiements en termes de gains ou de pertes n'a pas d'eﬀet sur l'eﬀort
fourni. C'est le montant des paiements potentiels et la réduction du risque sur les
paiements qui est importante. Cette absence d'eﬀet de présentation pour les petites
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récompenses a également des implications théoriques, car il semblerait que l'aversion
aux pertes n'incite pas les individus à fournir plus d'eﬀorts lorsque les paiements
sont présentés sous forme de pertes (par rapport à une présentation sous forme de
gains) dans le cas des petites récompenses. Le montant que la personne peut gagner
est tout simplement trop petit pour que la présentation ait un eﬀet.
Recherches futures
Le premier chapitre de cette thèse identiﬁe les obstacles à l'utilisation d'incitations
pour encourager la réduction de la demande énergétique, dont certains sont ensuite
analysés plus en détail dans les chapitres suivants. Plusieurs obstacles ayant été
identiﬁés, les possibilités de recherche sur le sujet de cette thèse sont vastes.
Les ménages ignorent généralement leur consommation ou ne connaissent pas le tarif
de l'électricité qu'ils paient. Cela inﬂue sur leur décision d'opter pour des contrats à
tariﬁcation dynamique. En eﬀet, les ménages préfèrent avoir un contrat simple car ils
ne savent pas si un tarif dynamique serait avantageux dans leur cas, ni comment ils
peuvent modiﬁer leur comportement pour proﬁter des tarifs moins élevés en période
creuse. Une piste de recherche future pourrait être d'étudier la manière dont les
choix tarifaires des individus évoluent lorsqu'ils bénéﬁcient d'informations sur leur
propre consommation et sur l'utilisation qu'ils peuvent faire des diﬀérents niveaux
de prix, en s'appuyant sur les recherches des autres.
La motivation monétaire ne s'est pas avérée être un facteur clé du changement
des comportements de consommation, car les économies monétaires sont générale-
ment faibles. De plus, la manière dont est présentée l'information peut être mise
en regard des diﬀérentes motivations pour économiser de l'énergie. Une autre
piste de recherche pourrait être de proposer aux individus diﬀérents aﬃchages de
l'information sur leur consommation d'énergie (économies monétaires, économies
d'énergie, économies environnementales, ...) puis, à travers une expérience de choix,
de mesurer leurs préférences pour ces diﬀérents aﬃchages. Cela pourrait ensuite faire
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l'objet de recherches plus approfondies sur le terrain en comparant les réponses aux
incitations à la réduction de la consommation basées sur des calculs non monétaires
de l'impact des économies d'énergie : sur l'environnement, la santé, ou autre.
Outre les obstacles identiﬁés au chapitre 1, les expériences menées dans le cadre de
cette thèse ont également ouvert la voie à de nouvelles recherches. Au chapitre 3,
le nudge a eu pour eﬀet involontaire de renforcer le comportement existant. Une
explication possible a été trouvée dans la théorie de la réactance : les individus
estiment que leur liberté de faire ce qu'ils veulent est menacée et ils adoptent donc un
comportement qui n'est pas encouragé. Pourtant, cet eﬀet n'a pas été observé dans
les expériences de terrain analysées aux chapitres 1 et 2. Il y a une diﬀérence entre
la création du nudge utilisé sur le terrain et celui utilisé dans la présente expérience.
Sur le terrain, le comportement est comparé au niveau de consommation moyen
des ménages similaires (niveau endogène), alors qu'en laboratoire, le comportement
est comparé à un niveau optimal de consommation déﬁni de façon exogène, calculé
par l'expérimentateur. Les réponses individuelles aux nudges endogènes et exogènes
méritent des recherches plus approfondies.
Cette thèse avait pour but d'étudier la manière dont les consommateurs du secteur
résidentiel réagissent aux incitations utilisées pour les encourager à réduire leur
consommation énergétique. Les consommateurs résidentiels réagissent positivement
aux diverses mesures incitatives utilisées : les incitations entrainent une réduction
moyenne de la consommation de pointe ou globale. La recherche a mis en évidence
que diverses mesures incitatives peuvent avoir des conséquences indésirables sur
la consommation au niveau individuel et que les mesures incitatives déclenchent
diﬀérentes caractéristiques qui peuvent inﬂuer sur la façon dont les consommateurs
réagissent à ces mesures.
Abstract
This thesis examines how consumers respond to incentives used to encourage a reduction in their energy con-
sumption. This necessary reduction stems from the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, increase energy
production from renewable energy sources and achieve energy savings. These objectives require that residential
demand be more ﬂexible in response to changes in supply and that energy savings be achieved by households.
The ﬁrst chapter explores the barriers to consumer acceptance and adoption of smart meters and the incentives
that they provide. Signiﬁcant barriers exist and consumption reductions are far from being achieved. Limited
motivation, lack of understanding of information on consumption and the rigidity of daily life are the main
barriers preventing households from acting upon the incentives delivered via smart meters. The second chapter
analyses the results of ﬁeld experiments and pilot studies on the impacts of diﬀerent incentives on residential
consumption. The results show that there are large variations and that, on average, an incentive will result
in a 2% reduction in energy consumption. Real-time feedback and monetary information have the greatest
eﬀect. Finally, more robust studies report lower reduction eﬀects. In the third chapter, a common pool resource
game is used to explore individual responses to price and nudge-based incentives. Individuals are encouraged to
reduce their consumption either by price increases or by smilies that reﬂect their overconsumption. The price
is most eﬀective at encouraging the target level of consumption but takes longer to have an eﬀect. The nudge is
quickly understood but tends to reinforce overconsumption behaviours. The fourth chapter examines the eﬀect
of framing on eﬀort provision. Individuals are asked to complete a simple and repetitive task for which they
receive a piece-rate payoﬀ in the form of a gain or loss. Framing in the form of gains and losses is combined
with three diﬀerent payment structures: ﬁxed gain, low gain or high gain with an equal probability revealed
before or after the eﬀort is made. The results show that framing has no eﬀect on eﬀort provision, except for a
high gain context announced before making the eﬀort.
Keywords: Common pool resources, demand response, framing, residential energy consumption, incentives,
smart meters.
Résumé
Cette thèse examine comment répondent des consommateurs aux mécanismes visant à réduire leur consomma-
tion d'énergie. Ce besoin de réduction découle de la nécessité d'atteindre les objectifs de réduction d'émissions
de gaz à eﬀet de serre, d'augmenter la production d'énergie à partir d'énergie renouvelables et de réaliser des
économies d'énergie. Ces objectifs exigent que la demande résidentielle soit plus ﬂexible face à l'évolution
de l'oﬀre et que des économies d'énergie soient réalisées par les ménages. Le premier chapitre explore les
barrières à l'acceptation et à l'adoption des compteurs intelligents et des incitations qu'ils peuvent fournir.
D'importantes barrières existent et les réductions de consommation sont loin d'être réalisées. Le manque de
motivation, l'incompréhension de l'information sur la consommation et la rigidité de la vie quotidienne sont les
principales barrières qui limitent la réponse des ménages aux incitations fournies par les compteurs intelligents.
Le deuxième chapitre analyse les résultats d'expériences de terrain et d'études pilotes portant sur les impacts
des diﬀérentes incitations sur la consommation résidentielle. Les résultats montrent qu'il existe de grandes
variations et qu'en moyenne, une incitation entraînera une réduction de 2% de la consommation d'énergie. Les
incitations de feedback en temps réel ainsi que l'information monétaire ont le plus grand eﬀet. Enﬁn, les études
plus robustes font état d'eﬀets de réduction plus faibles. Dans le troisième chapitre, un jeu expérimental de
ressources communes est utilisé pour explorer les réponses individuelles aux incitations basées sur le prix et les
nudges. Les individus sont encouragés à réduire leur consommation, soit par une augmentation de prix, soit
par des smiley évoquant leur surconsommation. Le prix est le plus eﬃcace pour encourager le niveau cible de
consommation, mais il faut plus de temps pour qu'il fasse eﬀet. Le nudge est compris rapidement mais tend
à renforcer les comportements de surconsommation. Le quatrième chapitre examine l'eﬀet du framing sur la
disposition à l'eﬀort. Les individus doivent accomplir une tâche simple et répétitive pour laquelle ils reçoivent
un paiement à la pièce sous forme d'un gain ou d'une perte. Le framing sous forme de gains et de pertes est
combiné à trois structures de paiement diﬀérentes : gain ﬁxe, gain faible ou élevé avec une probabilité égale
révélée avant ou après la réalisation de l'eﬀort. Les résultats montrent que le framing n'a aucun eﬀet sur la
réalisation de l'eﬀort, excepté pour un contexte de gain élevé annoncé avant de fournir l'eﬀort.
Mots clés : Compteurs intelligents, consommation résidentielle d'énergie, framing, incitations, réponse à la
demande, ressources communes.
